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Abstract 
As one of the most well-known figures of the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill was 
depicted extensively in journalism, pictures, life-writing and fiction. This thesis draws 
on a selection from these diverse and underexplored sources to offer a new perspective 
on Mill’s presence in Victorian cultural and emotional life. It shows how Mill figured in 
fierce debates about science and culture in the mid- to late-nineteenth century, and how 
ideas of Mill’s ‘femininity’ were used to both attack and commend him philosophically, 
politically and personally. Mill’s ‘Saint of Rationalism’ label continues to belie the extent 
to which he was associated with ideas of passion, sensitivity, tenderness, feeling, and 
emotion in the nineteenth century. This project explores how such terms were invoked 
in relation to Mill as a philosopher and politician, but also how they related to readers’ 
encounters with his works. More than any previous study, this thesis pays close 
attention to the interaction between verbal and visual depictions, and considers official 
images and caricatures of Mill alongside written accounts.  
Though much scholarship emphasises that Mill’s reputation went into decline 
after his death in 1873 (to be recovered in the late twentieth century), this thesis 
demonstrates the vitality and diversity of literary engagements with Mill in the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. It offers case studies of three authors – 
Thomas Hardy, Mona Caird and Olive Schreiner – and reads both the form and content 
of their fiction as involved in recognisably Millian experiments in living. Exploring the 
Millian concepts that figure in novels by Hardy, Caird and Schreiner not only expands 
the sense of the philosophical context to their writings, but underscores the continued 
relevance of Mill to discussions of self-development and education, free discussion and 
intellectual independence. Finally, this thesis suggests ways in which work on 
representations of Mill could be developed to gain further insight into the cultural 
history of the philosopher, into interactions between philosophy and literature, and into 
the nineteenth-century definitions of liberal culture that inform twenty-first century 
debates. 
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Preface 
In April 1863, the Reader: A Review of Literature, Science and Art published an 
article on ‘Mr John Stuart Mill and his Influence’. The editor of the journal at the time – 
and possible author of this unsigned piece – was David Masson, a friend and protégé of 
Mill’s.1 The article is ostensibly a review of Mill’s Utilitarianism and Herbert Spencer’s 
First Principles, but Spencer is only given a cursory mention in the last few lines, and 
two columns are devoted to reflecting on Mill’s eminence before a discussion of 
Utilitarianism begins. One of the concerns of the article is how to quantify the value of 
philosophic endeavour. The writer offers a literary analogy, comparing ‘the Poet’ with 
‘the Philosopher’ and suggesting that Mill is the national philosopher, akin to, or even 
more important than, the national poet Shakespeare (376, emphasis in original). 
Readers were likely to be receptive to such a laudatory assessment of Mill: the intended 
audience of the recently-launched journal was men who were highly educated, 
politically liberal and philosophically inclined.2 Indeed, the writer makes such readers 
integral to the assessment of Mill’s current presence in British life, claiming that: 
‘Wherever one goes among our thoughtful younger men in England – say, our men 
under forty – it is Mill’s name, Mill’s authority, Mill’s ideas, that one now hears quoted’ 
(376) and ‘It is the spirit of Mill, the philosophy of Mill ... that is in the ascendant among 
those minds ... that are now leading the instruction of the public in most of our fresher 
literature of criticism and speculation, and discussing as brisker and younger men 
discuss, our public questions’ (376). Four years after the publication of Charles Darwin’s 
Origin of Species it was still possible for Mill to be regarded as the era-defining influence. 
Underscoring the pervasiveness of Millian thought, and associating this with youth, 
innovation, leadership and public education, the writer notes that it is somewhat 
irreverent to say, as others do, that ‘the age we are now living in may be called the John-
Millennium’ (376).  
The writer offers the phrase half-approvingly, half-disapprovingly, because while 
it proclaims Mill’s eminent status, its punning playfulness also hints at the opposite 
                                                 
1 Masson describes his friendship with Mill in Memories of London in the ’Forties (1908), 33, 98–107. Full 
bibliographic details for all works referred to in footnotes are given in the Works Cited and Consulted at 
the end of the thesis. 
2 The Reader’s audience, and all aspects of its publication history are discussed in an unpublished doctoral 
dissertation by John Francis Byrne, ‘The Reader: A Review of Literature, Science and the Arts, 1863–1867’, 
(1968). Byrne explains that in 1864, Mill became one of the journal’s proprietor-contributors; others 
included Charles Darwin, Thomas Hughes, T.H. Huxley and Herbert Spencer (19, 21). 
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tendency to mock or condemn. ‘The John-Millennium’ announces both the endurance 
and transience of Mill’s influence: Mill was in the ascendant at that moment, he was ‘the 
English philosopher of the present’, but he had displaced other influences to arrive at 
this prominence, thus the moment when he would be superseded is prefigured (376). 
The moment of renown that the Reader describes came after Mill had published most of 
his major works – System of Logic in 1843, Principles of Political Economy in 1848, On 
Liberty in 1859, and Utilitarianism in 1861. At this point, the Logic and Political Economy 
were textbooks at the universities; digested versions of the Logic were even written for 
‘poor lads who are to be examined’ (‘Our Library Table’ 233).  
The Reader article appeared a couple of years before Mill was proposed as a 
Liberal candidate for Westminster in 1865, when the attention he received as a 
distinguished author was set to intensify.3 ‘Mill’s immense reputation and his previous 
seclusion made his parliamentary performance the object of very general curiosity’, 
Leslie Stephen later coolly observed in the Dictionary of National Biography (396). 
Alexander Bain said that when his candidature was proposed ‘his name blazed out into 
a sudden notoriety’ and book sales went up – ‘the cheap volumes went off like wildfire, 
while there was an increased demand for the Logic’ (John Stuart Mill 124). Bain’s 
comments reflect more accurately the mixture of veneration and condemnation which 
Mill’s foray into Parliament occasioned; for, if it was during the 1860s that Mill became 
an ‘iconic liberal figure’ (Varouxakis and Kelly 7), it was also during this time that his 
cultural function as a touchstone for all kinds of prejudice was confirmed. ‘The John-
Millennium’ is such an evocative phrase because it draws attention to this movement 
between reverence and irreverence (during the 1860s, but also before and after), and 
thus to many of the contrasts and tensions which this project seeks to explore. 
Importantly, ‘The John-Millennium’ pun also invites questions, which underpin this 
thesis, about nineteenth-century readers and interpreters of Mill: questions about who 
was reading him, where in the world they were located, what parts of his oeuvre they 
were engaging with, and how they were responding to what they read.  
                                                 
3 For a summary of the different phases of Mill’s career, see Stefan Collini, Public Moralists (1991), 123. 
For recent biographical accounts see Nicholas Capaldi’s John Stuart Mill: A Biography (2004), Bruce L. 
Kinzer’s J.S. Mill Revisited: Biographical and Political Explorations (2007) and Richard Reeves’s John Stuart 
Mill: Victorian Firebrand (2007). For ease of reference, a brief chronology of key events, publications and 
memorials is given in an appendix to this thesis. 
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1. Introduction 
After reading John Stuart Mill’s The Subjection of Women in 1869 Frances Power 
Cobbe thought: ‘How he will be abused for this! What an avalanche of sarcasms and 
rebukes and jokes will be flung at him ...’ (56). When his Autobiography was published 
posthumously in 1873, a reviewer in the Athenaeum expressed relief at the chance to 
read Mill’s own story. ‘To see the sweet nature of the man coming out from under the 
overlaying mass of other men’s opinions’, noted the reviewer, ‘gives the reader, who has 
any sympathy with the character of Mill, a sense of deep and lasting pleasure’ 
(‘Autobiography: By John Stuart Mill’ 521). The publication of Three Essays on Religion in 
1874 provoked a more frustrated response from a commentator in the British Quarterly 
Review: 
The essays have received from so many hands exposition and criticism, 
that the former seems now almost unnecessary, while the latter has 
already become a very complicated task. The comments by distinguished 
admirers or honourable opponents of Mill’s philosophical career already 
form a body of disquisition far exceeding in bulk the original essays. 
(Review of Three Essays on Religion 60) 
These three reviewers convey a sense of the proliferation of commentary on Mill during 
his lifetime (1806–73) and in the decades of the nineteenth century which followed. 
This thesis takes as its subject a selection from these jostling accounts of Mill’s life and 
work. This is a history of ideas about Mill with a large component of literary analysis, 
seeking to understand the issues at stake in representations of the most famous liberal 
of the period and the reception of his moral philosophy. 
My project gives an account of Mill’s presence in Victorian cultural life by 
analysing portrayals in the periodical press, newspapers, memoirs, biographies, diaries, 
letters and novels. It considers how he was depicted visually, in photographs, portraits 
and caricatures. It asks how ideas about the man and his works were articulated in 
public and personal accounts of meeting Mill or reading his work. Unlike the Athenaeum 
reviewer, or the most recent biographer of Mill, Richard Reeves, I am not concerned 
with establishing Mill’s ‘true character’ or a definitive narrative of his life (John Stuart 
Mill: Victorian Firebrand 2). In chapters two and three, my focus is on the often 
contradictory stories and themes which make up the avalanche of sarcasms, rebukes 
and jokes, the overlaying mass of opinion, and the body of disquisition on his 
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philosophical career. These chapters are organised thematically, exploring how Mill’s 
philosophy, politics, personality, and physicality, instigated and perpetuated debates 
about science, culture and gender. Chapters four, five and six are case studies of how 
three authors – Thomas Hardy, Mona Caird and Olive Schreiner – engaged with some of 
Mill’s ideas in their fiction and other writings. The author-centred chapters also pursue 
specific themes: Hardy’s concern with intellectual independence and connected 
thinking, Caird’s treatment of free discussion, and Schreiner’s spiritual experience of 
reading Mill.  
Of course, the plurality of opinion on Mill did not end in the nineteenth century. 
The rich variety of Mill’s thought has provoked an equally rich secondary literature in 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The University of Toronto’s edition of the 
Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, begun in 1965 and finished in 1991, has made Mill’s 
oeuvre available in thirty-three volumes. Mill’s reputation and relevance have been 
appraised and reappraised from a variety of disciplinary perspectives spanning 
philosophy, history, economics, politics, and literary criticism. In their introduction to 
John Stuart Mill – Thought and Influence: The Saint of Rationalism (2010), a collection of 
essays which originated as lectures at a bicentennial conference held in 2006, Georgios 
Varouxakis and Paul Kelly chart the decline of Mill’s social and political philosophy after 
his death in 1873, through to its recovery in the late twentieth century (2–3). 
Varouxakis and Kelly affirm the relevance of Mill’s philosophy to twenty-first century 
discussions of liberty, individuality, diversity, gender equality, freedom of thought and 
speech, forms of democracy, and political representation (1).  
Mill’s life and works form part of cross-disciplinary monographs dealing with 
diverse aspects of Victorian social and political life, particularly those grappling with 
contesting historical and contemporary definitions of liberalism. Mill, as David Wayne 
Thomas observed in Cultivating Victorians: Liberal Culture and the Aesthetic (2004), is 
‘the preferred Victorian liberal spokesman’ (29). For Thomas, Mill is a problematic 
spokesperson for ideas of cultivation and self-development because his ‘thinking enacts 
an incessant oscillation between two antithetical values: on the one hand, a vision of 
genius, understood as a heroics of individuality; and on the other hand, a practice of 
liberal many-sidedness ...’ (33). Thomas’s position on the irreconcilability of elements of 
Mill’s thought resumes a strand of Victorian thinking discussed in chapter two of this 
thesis. For Elaine Hadley irreconcilability is also an issue, as she contends that Mill’s 
Autobiography provides ample evidence of the disconnections between liberal ideals 
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and lived realities. Hadley argues, in Living Liberalism: Practical Citizenship in Mid-
Victorian Britain (2010), that though Mill was ‘deeply invested in the romance of liberal 
individualism’, his Autobiography reveals ‘the difficulties of living liberalism, of 
simultaneously being interested and disinterested, of being a body and an abstraction’ 
(103). In chapter three of this thesis, I consider how nineteenth-century commentators 
debated Mill’s embodiment of his liberal principles, and how his ‘femininity’ was 
invoked both by those who thought he did this successfully, and those who thought he 
failed miserably. The theory–practice debate is also important to Thomas Hardy’s 
engagement with Millian philosophy and in chapter four I consider how Hardy’s fiction 
is ever alert to the difficulties of living liberalism, particularly in relation to forming 
independent opinions and adhering to them consistently, but how it nevertheless 
champions an ideal of intellectual independence and connected thought, and makes 
space for moments when this is successfully achieved. 
While Thomas and Hadley emphasise antitheses, others – in accordance with 
another strand of Victorian thought – see Mill’s synthesis of ideas, and intellectual 
practices, as the most significant aspect of his philosophical legacy. For Lauren Goodlad, 
Mill is an important figure in the history of liberal thought because he is ‘a hybrid 
thinker who blended Enlightenment ideas with civic republicanism and a Romantic 
stress on history and diversity’ (‘“Character Worth Speaking Of”’ 9). In Victorian 
Literature and the Victorian State: Character and Governance in a Liberal Society (2003), 
Goodlad’s account of the contest between idealist and materialist worldviews, Mill is 
‘the arch-exponent of a principled liberal middle ground’ (27–8), urging ‘a liberal 
balance between civil and state authority and between local and centralized 
government’ (28). In chapters two and three of this thesis I examine the views of 
Victorians who commended Mill’s ability to bring together disparate concepts and to 
apply his synthesised thinking to the practical problems of the state. 
In Amanda Anderson’s The Powers of Distance: Cosmopolitanism and the 
Cultivation of Detachment (2001), Mill is the spokesperson for an ‘ideal of impartiality ... 
tinged with sympathy’ (16). Anderson argues that Mill ‘privileges the capacity to 
achieve distance from one’s own perspective and interests’ but that his approach to 
intellectual impartiality involves ‘a complex dialectic of detachment and engagement’ 
which also accords value to sympathetic understanding of opposing viewpoints (17). 
Anderson identifies ‘the opposition between desirable and undesirable forms of 
detachment’ as a ‘general tendency within Victorian cultural debate’ (4) and in the 
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viewpoints I consider in chapters two and three this opposition is clearly at work in 
depictions of Mill. Those who sought to undermine Mill’s authority often represented 
him as isolated and out of touch, but equally, many detractors insisted that Mill was too 
impassioned. Supporters were more likely to take the line that Anderson does, by 
suggesting that Mill was able to combine detached analysis with sympathetic 
understanding. As I argue in chapter five, this characterisation of Mill’s abilities was 
particularly important for Mona Caird, as she drew on Millian philosophy to support her 
contributions to the fin-de-siècle New Woman debates. 
The relationship of Mill’s thought to literature has been of perennial interest. In 
the 1950s, M.H. Abrams, F.R. Leavis and Raymond Williams considered Mill’s own 
literary criticism, ‘What is Poetry?’ (1833), and his essays on Bentham (1838) and 
Coleridge (1840). Isobel Armstrong’s Victorian Poetry (1993) took the concept of ‘two 
systems of concentric circles’ (from Mill’s essay on Bentham) as the starting point for an 
account of two traditions of poetry that developed in the Victorian period, one 
democratic and radical, the other conservative (ix). In his 1971 introduction to Mill’s 
Autobiography, Jack Stillinger drew parallels with Wordsworth’s The Prelude (1850), in 
terms of each text’s treatment of early education, crisis and recovery. Janice Carlisle’s 
John Stuart Mill and the Writing of Character (1991) argued that Mill’s notion of 
character (as articulated throughout his works rather than in one particular 
publication), which made the process of writing central to the formation of 
individuality, is particularly worthy of study by literary and cultural critics. John Plotz’s 
‘Mediated Involvement: John Stuart Mill’s Antisocial Sociability’ (2010) shifted this 
focus slightly, arguing that ‘Mill’s liberalism is in fact profoundly indebted to his 
theorizing about the role that reading can – and should – play in crafting character’ (70).  
In J.S. Mill (1974), political scholar Alan Ryan noted that Mill’s own literary 
interests were ‘more sociological and psychological than textual’ and it was this 
approach that had appealed to Leavis and Williams (50). Critics contemporary to Mill 
shared the view that Mill’s literary interests were not primarily textual. The literary 
scholar William Minto wrote in a memorial essay that ‘Mr Mill was not a cultivator of art 
for art's sake. ... He read poetry for the most part with earnest, critical eye, striving to 
account for it, to connect it with the tendencies of the age, or he read to find sympathy 
with his own aspirations after heroic energy’ (50–1). Outside of his literary criticism, 
however, Mill did pay close attention to matters of language. In the Logic and then in On 
Liberty, he developed a theory of the difference between living language and beliefs, and 
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dead ones, and the need for frequent discussion of familiar ideas to keep them alive. 
These concepts were very important in the fiction of Hardy, Caird and Schreiner, as I 
discuss in detail in chapters four, five and six. 
Within the voluminous criticism, the key influences on this project have been 
Stefan Collini’s Public Moralists (1991) and Goodlad’s ‘“Character worth Speaking Of”’: 
Individuality, John Stuart Mill, and the Critique of Liberalism’ (2008). Public Moralists 
places Mill in British intellectual history, focusing on his ‘inescapable presence’ in 
political debate during the last fifteen years of his life, and his posthumous canonisation 
as a political thinker (121, 314). Collini’s attention to the ‘cultural needs’ Mill was 
recruited to serve in England from 1873 until 1933, has particularly informed the 
approach I have taken (314). However, as I outline in the section on Victorian readers 
below, I take a quite different view from Collini on the possible effects of reading Mill. 
Goodlad identifies Mill as ‘the most important nineteenth-century liberal’ for those 
‘interested in the ongoing legacy of Victorian ideas’ (9). This, Goodlad concludes, is 
because ‘Mill’s complex writings on liberty and individuality, despite their manifest 
flaws, challenge us to experiments in living’ (30). Sharing Goodlad’s viewpoint about the 
enduring value of Mill’s writing, I pay close attention to three novelists, who, I think, 
were particularly alert to the complexities of Millian liberty and individuality. I read 
both the form and content of their fiction as involved with the recognisably Millian 
project of experiments in living. 
This thesis argues that despite the accumulation of research, there is more to be 
said about how Millian debates and commentary took shape in nineteenth-century 
journalism, pictures, life-writing and fiction. Mill is a familiar figure in academic 
criticism, but the diversity of Victorian interpretations provides a rich and previously 
underexplored resource for those interested in the cultural history of the philosopher, 
in interactions between philosophy and literature, and in liberal culture. Most studies 
take Mill’s own works as their starting point, whereas the primary focus in this project 
is on Mill as refracted through the lenses of others’ readings. This is not to say, of course, 
that Mill’s own works do not figure among my sources: there has been a symbiotic 
relationship between my readings of Mill and my understandings of the debates and 
creative responses which his written output provoked. I draw directly from Mill’s works 
most often in the author-centred chapters, as I consider the Millian themes, images and 
rhetorical strategies which it is possible to trace in the letters and fiction of Hardy, Caird 
and Schreiner.  
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Even before the completion of the Collected Works, the trend in Millian 
scholarship was towards holistic readings, with some arguing that the parts of Mill’s 
corpus can only be fully understood in the context of the whole.4 Though, in what 
follows, I have cause to refer to most of Mill’s major works, from System of Logic in 1843 
through to Three Essays on Religion in 1874, I do so in varying detail, and I have not 
attempted to cover the whole of Mill’s oeuvre – which includes multiple volumes of 
letters, newspaper writings, debating and parliamentary speeches, and correspondence 
produced in his day job for the East India company – anymore than I have tried to give 
an exhaustive account of all the Victorian references to Mill. Instead my aim is to deepen 
the understanding of Mill’s place in Victorian cultural and emotional life by examining a 
selection of sources which illuminate the complex interplay of ideas in circulation about 
Mill’s writings, Mill as an individual, and Mill as a representative figure (of philosophy, 
liberalism or feminism, for example).5 Many of the sources I use throughout this 
introduction and the following chapters are drawn from the 1860s, when Mill’s 
transition from philosopher to politician generated so much interest, but others are 
ranged on either side of this decade – going as far back as Thomas Carlyle’s letters of the 
1830s, and as far forward as Mona Caird’s last novel, published in 1931.6 
It is important to note that the commentators I draw on in chapters two and 
three are chiefly concerned with Mill’s philosophical and political roles, rather than his 
thirty-five year career (from 1823–58) as an imperial administrator for the East India 
Company. Likewise, Hardy’s, Caird’s and Schreiner’s engagements with Mill’s moral 
philosophy are not directly concerned with his thoughts on Britain’s imperial encounter 
with India. Historian Trevor Lloyd offers a possible explanation as to why these aspects 
of Mill’s life and work were peripheral or invisible to many: ‘there was no doubt in the 
mind of Mill or of his admirers that the main importance of his job was that it enabled 
him to do things that had nothing to do with his job’ (74). Evidence that Mill’s 
contemporaries subscribed to this view is found, for example, in narratives by 
Alexander Bain and Barclay Fox. They depicted India House as a backdrop for sociable 
                                                 
4 On the importance of reading Mill’s works in their entirety in order to understand the coherence and 
evolution of his thought see Ryan, J.S. Mill; William Stafford, John Stuart Mill (1998); Nicholas Capaldi, John 
Stuart Mill (2004); and Carlisle’s John Stuart Mill and the Writing of Character. 
5 I rely on the context of each use of ‘Mill’ or ‘Millian’ to indicate whether the reference is to the person, 
his writings, or this complex interplay of ideas. 
6 The majority of Mona Caird’s journalism and fiction was published in the late-nineteenth century, but I 
include her twentieth-century novels to show the development of her treatment of Millian free discussion. 
Likewise, with Olive Schreiner and Thomas Hardy, I include works from the early twentieth century 
which demonstrate the continuation of their engagement with him. 
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intellectual encounters with Mill.7 ‘His Career at the India House’ was one of the 
memorial essays which made up John Stuart Mill: His Life and Works, Twelve Sketches by 
Herbert Spencer, Henry Fawcett, Frederic Harrison and Other Distinguished Authors in 
1873.8 Mill’s colleague, W.T. Thornton, began unassumingly by stating that on the 
subject of Mill’s official career, he had ‘scarcely any thing to add to the few particulars 
on the subject which have already found their way into print’ (30). A brief summary of 
Mill’s work on Indian despatches is given, but much of the sketch is devoted to personal 
reminiscences about generous support for Thornton’s career, and Mill’s unfavourable 
reaction to the gift of a silver inkstand upon his retirement – ‘He hated all such 
demonstrations’ remembered Thornton (36). Though Thornton conveys a sense of 
pleasure in relating these anecdotes, he also worries that they are an inappropriately 
trivial way to pay tribute to a figure such as Mill. In an obituary, the Saturday Review 
highlighted the way Mill’s job had benefitted his other work: ‘It is probable that his 
employment in the India Office saved him from being a bookworm, and checked his 
propensity to become an impracticable dreamer’ (‘Mr Mill’ 638). 
Recent re-evaluations have challenged the idea that Mill’s work for the East India 
Company should be underplayed or seen as separate to his philosophical and political 
roles. In particular, Lynn Zastoupil’s John Stuart Mill and India (1994) has foregrounded 
the connections between Mill’s administrative responsibilities and his intellectual 
development, arguing that ‘What needs to be done is to investigate the subtle or 
submerged influence of India House ideas in the published works of Mill’, and aiming to 
demonstrate how ‘the Imperial experience in India left its mark on Mill and, through 
him, on Victorian Liberalism’ (171). In Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-
Century British Liberal Thought (1999) Uday Singh Mehta is less interested in policy 
decisions, than in how Mill and his father had ‘conceptualized India and its past within 
the broader terms of their political thought’ (78). While Zastoupil seeks to establish that 
Mill’s intellectual encounter with India was not a purely exploitative one (175–6), Mehta 
finds that Mill’s commitments to individuality and progress failed the challenge posed 
                                                 
7 For Bain’s account of meeting Mill at India House, with a lengthy footnote describing the building, see 
John Stuart Mill: A Criticism with Personal Recollections (1882), 64–5; Barclay Fox’s Journal 1832–1854 
(2008), edited by R.L. Brett, contains several references to meeting Mill at India House: see 184, 192, 196, 
341.  
8 In an introduction to Thornton’s essay in Lives of Victorian Political Figures IV: John Stuart Mill (2009), 
David Martin notes that of the commentary which appeared after Mill’s death ‘relatively little referred to 
the main source of his employment, the thirty-five years with the East India Company. This neglect was 
reinforced by Mill’s own account. In the Autobiography he confined to four or five pages a few factual 
details and general reflections on his career’ (221). 
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by the unfamiliarity of ideas about Indian life (20). Zastoupil and Mehta’s approaches 
suggest ways in which my work on depictions of Mill could be developed in future 
projects, to investigate in more depth how Victorian commentators characterised his 
imperial involvements in writing and in person. 
My approach in this thesis places more emphasis than previous studies on the 
connections between verbal and visual depictions. Mill apparently took little interest in 
the self-fashioning of his public image in photography or other portraiture and he 
remains strongly associated with the written word and abstraction. This has not made 
him an obvious subject for studies of visual culture in the way that other eminent 
Victorians, such as Queen Victoria, Alfred Lord Tennyson and Darwin, have been.9 
Works which do include images of Mill tend to let them speak for themselves, or include 
only very brief analysis of how these images might link to other issues.10 The notable 
exception to this is ‘Mill in Parliament: The View from the Comic Press’ (1990), by John 
M. Robson (who was head of the Mill Project at the University of Toronto which 
produced the Collected Works). The article contains many of the cartoons from the 
periodical press which feature Mill and considers these alongside puns and verse. 
Robson’s very specific aim was to clarify a point of political history: to establish that it 
was not Mill’s ‘“crochets” or “whims”, especially women’s suffrage and proportional 
representation, that damaged his chances for re-election in 1868, but the hardening of 
party allegiances’ (102). One of the aims of this thesis is to build on Robson’s account by 
further analysing the significance of these caricatures, and importantly, to connect them 
with other types of image, and other textual accounts of Mill’s appearance, personality 
and social role.  
The following three sections of this first chapter introduce these interconnected 
elements of my thesis. First, I explain how two tropes of Millian commentary – fire and 
ice – function as shorthand for an array of issues which I discuss in chapters two and 
                                                 
9 See John Plunkett’s Queen Victoria: First Media Monarch (2003); and Tennyson Transformed: Alfred Lord 
Tennyson and Visual Culture (2009), ed. by Jim Cheshire. Janet Browne has written several pieces on 
Darwin and visual culture: ‘I Could Have Retched All Night’: Charles Darwin and His Body’ (1998), 
‘Darwin in Caricature: A Study in the Popularisation and the Dissemination of Evolution’ (2001), and 
‘Looking at Darwin: Portraits and the Making of an Icon’ (2009). 
10 Janice Carlisle’s John Stuart Mill and the Writing of Character (1991) contains two cartoons from Judy of 
Mill dressed as a woman, but only discusses these briefly (114–17). A Moralist In and Out of Parliament: 
John Stuart Mill at Westminster, 1865–1868 (1992) by Bruce L. Kinzer, Ann P. Robson, and John M. Robson 
includes fifteen cartoons featuring Mill, but does not make any direct link between these and the 
discussion of Mill’s political career (perhaps because John Robson does this in his article on cartoons in 
the comic press, discussed above). Biographies by Michael St. John Packe, Eugene August, Nicholas 
Capaldi and Richard Reeves all contain a variety of images with brief captions. 
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three. Second, I begin to consider the range of visual representations of Mill which were 
available to the Victorians, alongside writing which emphasises Mill’s appearance, or 
comments particularly on visual portrayals. Third, I focus on the questions prompted by 
the Reader article on Mill’s influence, about nineteenth-century readers of Mill, and how 
these relate to my case studies of Hardy, Caird, and Schreiner. 
 
1.1 Fire and Ice: Two Tropes of Commentary on Mill  
Fire and ice, warmth and chilliness, are tropes which run through commentary 
on Mill, from the nineteenth century through to the present day. To give some relatively 
recent examples, in a survey of Mill’s life and reputation in John Stuart Mill (1998), 
William Stafford notes that ‘A picture has developed of a chilly, bloodless man, over-
intellectual, under-sexed, uxorious, priggish and humourless’ (23). In Rosemary 
Ashton’s 142 Strand: A Radical Address in Victorian London (2006), Mill is characterised 
as ‘the ascetic John Stuart Mill’ and ‘that cold philosopher J.S. Mill’ (40, 286). Ashton sees 
this disposition as an anomaly in the world of John Chapman and his associates, 
representing something antithetical to their warmer, creative energies. Conversely, in 
John Stuart Mill: Victorian Firebrand (2007), Richard Reeves signals his desire to reclaim 
Mill for passion and action in the biography’s subtitle; the book as a whole setting out to 
challenge the ‘received picture of Mill as a bone-dry, formal, humourless Victorian’ (3). 
The firebrand designation did not ring true for some reviewers, however. Hilary 
Spurling in the Guardian still focused on Mill’s chilliness, as described by Thomas 
Carlyle and Caroline Fox and also, according to Spurling, Thomas Hardy. Equally, Adam 
Gopnik in the New Yorker suspected a marketing ploy: ‘The book’s subtitle, meant to be 
excitingly commercial, is ill chosen; a firebrand should flame and then die out, while Mill 
burned for half a century with a steady heat so well regulated that it continues to warm 
his causes today –“Victorian Low-Simmering Hot Plate” might be closer to it’. Here and 
elsewhere in depictions of Mill, coldness is almost always regarded as a fault, 
synonymous with a range of deficiencies including lack of humour and lack of feeling. 
Warmth, however, is associated with a variety of attributes, from lamentable excess to 
commendable consistency and compassion.  
 In chapter two, ‘Man of Science or Man of Letters? Mill and the “desire of 
culture”’, I draw on books, journals, and newspapers from the 1860s and from the 
1870s and 1880s, after Mill’s Autobiography and Three Essays were posthumously 
published, to show how Mill was variously placed on a spectrum ranging from ‘hard’, 
20 
‘cold’ science at one end to ‘soft’, ‘warm’ feeling and imagination at the opposite. Mill’s 
move from philosopher to politician, his own account of his childhood, and the 
disclosure of his views on religion, all provoked extensive debate revolving around the 
questions: was he a man of science or a man of culture? Was he an incoherent mixture 
of the two or was he a perfect combination of both? Sympathisers insisted that Mill’s 
greatness was based on his ability to synthesise an appreciation of the imaginative, with 
a logical, rational approach to social problems. Detractors sought to emphasise the 
impossibility of Mill ever being a man of well-rounded culture, and therefore of 
philosophical or practical authority.  
Bound up with the questions of science and culture, and animating much of the 
Victorian conversation about Mill, was the relation of the theoretical to the practical. 
This relation was also often imagined in terms of temperature. The Saturday Review was 
not unusual in associating theorising with coldness, and action with heat. They thought 
Mill’s ‘fervour of temperament’ in relation to the Governor Eyre controversy, and 
proposals for Irish land reform, preferable to ‘cold-blooded indifference’ – before 
proceeding, in their review of Subjection, to suggest that such heated interest made Mill 
forgetful of logic (‘The Subjection of Women’ 37). In John Stuart Mill and the Writing of 
Character, Carlisle argued that Mill was the victim of a Victorian prejudice which ‘valued 
practice over theory’ (49). Despite the eminence that Mill achieved, Carlisle even 
contends that Mill’s Autobiography reveals how he shared the prejudice that saw 
theorists ‘too often dismissed as powerless and marginal figures’ (44). As chapter two 
shows, it suited many to insist that Mill’s status as a ‘cold thinker’ disqualified his 
opinions on practical topics, and some forceful anti-philosophical opinions were 
expressed about him.11 However, the chapter also demonstrates how multi-faceted the 
theory–practice debate was, particularly in the slew of articles which reflected on the 
value of having ‘literary men’ in Parliament. Some thought that Mill’s theoretical 
knowledge raised the level of debate in the House of Commons, and national life more 
generally, and that it added authority to the Liberal cause. For some, such as theatre 
critic and writer Thomas Purnell, Mill’s time as an MP damaged his philosophical 
credentials: ‘All that abstraction and disinterestedness which gave him authority has 
vanished. He is no longer umpire, but a party to the squabble’ (61). In the sources I 
examine, the interrelationship between Mill’s philosophy, his own life, and the lives of 
                                                 
11 ‘Cold thinker’ is a description from the Daily News, as reported in the Pall Mall Gazette in a round-up of 
opinions given in obituaries of Mill (‘Epitome of Opinion in the Morning Journals’ 3). 
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others is constantly interrogated, but – in line with Amanda Anderson’s theory of the 
‘powers of distance’ in Victorian culture (5) – some value his theory over his practice. 
In chapter three, ‘A Feminine Philosopher’, I explore how the evocations of 
warmth and coldness in debates about Mill’s relation to science, emotion and 
imagination were aligned to ideas about gender. Both coldness and warmth were used 
as indicators of Mill’s lack of ‘manliness’: his ‘coldness’ was associated with a lack of 
virility and his ‘warmth’ with a feminine excess of emotion. As Mill set out to challenge 
ideas about separate spheres and essential differences between the sexes, those 
committed to such views used them to question his own performance of masculinity. 
However, the shifting and conflicting nature of these portrayals allowed some to 
interpret his ‘feminine’ qualities as particular virtues, adding to rather than detracting 
from his eminence. For many, Mill’s modesty, delicacy, and nurturing skills – all 
characteristics more readily associated with Victorian constructions of femininity – 
were part of what made him so admirable. And, as with the commentators discussed in 
chapter two who believed that Mill had a unique ability to synthesise the imaginative 
and the scientific, the highest praise came from those who thought that Mill was 
successfully able to combine masculine and feminine qualities.  
In Hadley’s Living Liberalism, she considers ways in which William Gladstone 
embodied liberalism ‘in his tone, temper, and policy’, during the Midlothian election 
campaign of 1889 (293). Hadley argues that ‘the public was notably fixated on his body, 
his voice, and moreover, to what degree the body and voice signalled his political 
integrity’ (307). Though Mill’s status as a liberal icon in the 1860s did not create a 
moment of popular celebration when ‘plates, trays, mugs and other consumer goods 
sported his visage’ as it did for Gladstone towards the end of the century (Hadley 292), 
chapter three shows how, alongside Mill’s emotions, his body and voice were regularly 
anatomised. In Gladstone’s case, the strength of his body and voice were frequently 
lauded (Hadley 308). In Mill’s case, the weakness of his body and voice were often 
alluded to, but the target does not seem to have been his political integrity. My focus in 
chapter three is on how caricatures of Mill, mostly during his time as an MP, and 
commentary about Mill both in out and of Parliament, drew on long-standing and newly 
emerging stories about what type of bodies produce authoritative knowledge, as well as 
accounts of Mill’s support for women’s rights. As a result, Mill’s body was often 
construed as lacking the strength and solidity expected of a man in such a prominent 
public position. Official images of Mill and reverential tales of seeing or meeting him, 
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provided a counterpoint to the satirical drawings in the periodical press, and 
derogatory descriptions of his physicality. In the next section, I consider how these 
figured, and continue to figure, in estimates of Mill as a philosopher. 
 
1.2 A Face as well as a Name: Mill in Visual Culture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The official images of Mill – a cameo of him as a young man, studio photographs 
taken in the mid-1860s, engravings based on these photographs, a George Frederic 
Watts portrait, and a statue on the Thames Embankment by Thomas Woolner – seem so 
ordinary as to hardly be worthy of further investigation.12 They do not stray beyond any 
of the norms or conventions of photography, portrait painting, or sculpture of their 
time. Though they might not be regarded as particularly aesthetically innovative, they 
are important in that Mill’s personal appearance was always integral to the discussion 
of the value of his philosophic endeavours as I explore in detail in chapter three. 
Moreover, his appearance has continued to feature in such discussions. In Isaiah Berlin’s 
                                                 
12 By calling these ‘official images’ I mean to differentiate them from the caricatures in the periodical 
press. With the exception of the Woolner statue, they are all images which Mill sanctioned (however 
reluctantly, as discussed below). 
 
Fig. 2. Cameo of Mill, c. 1840. London 
School of Economics archive. 
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classic lecture on ‘John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life’ in 1959, Mill’s sombre 
appearance belied the liveliness of his intellectual commitments: ‘Despite the solemn 
bald head, the black clothes, the grave expression, the measured phrases, the total lack 
of humour, Mill’s life is an unceasing revolt against his father’s outlook and ideals, the 
greater for being subterranean and unacknowledged’ (227). More recently, Janice 
Carlisle complained that the contrast between Mill’s appearance and his writing had 
been elided: ‘After nearly one hundred and fifty years of commentary on his work, he 
has become too much the sad and wizened man who looks out from the late, touching 
portrait by George Frederick [sic] Watts’ (xii). Commentary on images and the contexts 
of their production also provides insight into the issues at stake in the ongoing process 
of memorialising Mill.  
The cameo in Figure 2, which depicts Mill in his thirties, is thought to have been 
based on a lost portrait, made when he visited Cornwall, and stayed with the Foxes, an 
influential Quaker family of shipping merchants and industrialists, in 1840.13 Though 
they were first published in 1882, extracts from Caroline Fox’s journals, Memories of Old 
Friends, describe the time when this image was created, shortly before the Logic 
appeared in 1843. Fox wrote about Mill’s ‘extraordinary power and genius’ in visual 
terms, evoking the links between facial appearance and character explored in the 
illustrations of the eighteenth-century Swiss physiognomist Johann Lavater (Memories 
of Old Friends I: 107). She observed that Mill ‘is a very uncommon-looking person – such 
acuteness and sensibility marked in his exquisitely chiselled countenance, more 
resembling a portrait of Lavater than any other that I remember. His voice is refinement 
itself, and his mode of expressing himself tallies with voice and countenance’ (I: 132–3). 
Evidence of Mill’s strong sense of social responsibility was also visible in ‘his careworn 
and anxious, though most beautiful and refined, countenance’, recorded Fox (I: 138). In 
Lavater’s physiognomic scheme, the belly and reproductive organs were associated 
with animal life, the breast and heart with moral life, and the head and eyes with 
intellectual life. Different regions of the face provided evidence of these characteristics: 
‘the mouth and chin related to animal life; the nose and cheeks represented moral life; 
and the forehead and eyebrows epitomised intellectual life’ (Hartley 34). Using the 
terms of physiognomy, Fox suggests a perfect harmony between Mill’s inner properties 
and outer form – a remarkable face to match his remarkable intellect. 
                                                 
13 In The Life of John Stuart Mill (1954) Michael St John Packe suggests that the lost portrait by the Cornish 
painter ‘was probably not a good one’ but that it was used as the basis for the cameo (263, note). 
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 Fox evokes not only Lavater, but the veneration of heroes in classical Greece and 
Rome. The sculptural allusions – ‘his exquisitely chiselled countenance’ and refined 
beauty – are suggestive of his rising celebrity, as if Mill’s living body already 
commemorates his achievements and fame in the form of an animated bust or statue. 
The Foxes were accustomed to hosting distinguished guests – Fox’s brother, Barclay, 
wrote in his diary about an after dinner walk with Mill and John Sterling where they 
‘divided lions’ (183). Nevertheless, Caroline’s narrative conveys a sense of the oddness 
of Mill’s presence outside of his metropolitan milieu – light-heartedly suggesting that 
lighted candles be left at Pendennis Cavern ‘as an offering to the gnomes’, ‘unhooking a 
bramble’ from her dress, concocting for her ‘an almanac of odours that scent the air’ (I: 
135, 154, 156) – and a desire to solemnise the encounter. A concern with both 
celebration of Mill’s emerging eminence, and its commemoration, is evident in Fox’s 
description of the local artist’s attempts to capture his likeness: ‘John sitting for his 
portrait; fell first into a reverie, and then into a doze; nevertheless the artist is hopeful’ 
(I: 158). A few days later, Fox reiterated her view of the harmony between Mill’s 
temperament and the outward expression of this, in her assessment of the painting: 
‘Cunningham showed us his portrait of J.S. Mill, which is very beautiful; quite an ideal 
head, so expanded with patient thought, and a face of such exquisite refinement’ (I: 
168). Sterling wrote to Mill to say: ‘... not having seen your head according to 
Cunningham of course, I can give no opinion of it. Any likeness of you would give me 
pleasure. I wish you would get Morrison to make a medallion then any of your friends 
could have copies to any extent’ (qtd. in Packe 263, note). The cameo, which accords 
with Fox’s descriptions of Mill’s refined and patient features, without evidence of the 
careworn and anxious expression, does not appear to have been copied in this way. 
Fox’s account of Mill’s reverie/doze while sitting for Cunningham suggests that Mill took 
little interest in the self-fashioning of his public image through portraiture, or even the 
reproduction of his image as a more intimate keepsake for friends and family.  
Allusions to Lavater’s scheme of classification are discernible in later accounts of 
Mill, which focus on his forehead and eyes, and which were as certain as Fox’s about the 
connection between appearance and intellect. The Danish scholar Georg Brandes 
recalled that Mill’s brow was ‘high and arched, with a strongly marked protuberance 
over the left eye; he looked as though the labor of thought might have forced its organs 
to extend in order to make more room’; when departing from Mill, Brandes ‘gazed long 
into his deep, blue eyes’ (Eminent Authors 124, 145). Reporting on the election for 
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American readers of Harper’s New Monthly Magazine in 1865, the social campaigner 
Moncure Daniel Conway was aware that his exuberant admiration for the Millian brow 
was liable to be misinterpreted as mockery:  
... speaking in all soberness, his forehead is the best I ever saw. ... Broad 
and high with an undulating surface, and a bump on one side, which 
nature would seem to have extemporized to hold a surplus of brain, the 
forehead was merged into a noble dome of a head whose fine outline was 
disclosed by the baldness. (‘The Great Westminster Canvass’ 737) 
Conway recounts with breathless excitement the effect of Mill’s presence at a public 
meeting: at first he was just ‘a delicate blue-eyed stranger’ who ‘entered the house with 
the stream of people’. When the audience realised who he was, it generated a collective 
frisson: ‘There was something in the first glance which passed between the simple, 
unworldly scholar and the English crowd which electrified them, and caused an effusion 
of genuine emotion to his face and eye’ (‘The Great Westminster Canvass’ 737). Hardy’s 
letter to the times in 1906, which I discuss in chapter four, also dwells on the shape of 
the philosopher’s head, and his effect on the crowd gathered at the hustings, but Hardy 
places more stress than Conway on Mill’s vulnerability. 
In his Reminiscences (1899), Justin McCarthy, an Irish nationalist, Liberal 
politician, historian and novelist, claimed that when Mill stood for parliament in 1865, 
‘His very appearance was unknown to the vast mass of the community; no photographs 
of him were to be seen in the shop windows’ (I: 92). McCarthy remembers that leading 
Conservatives tried to exploit the fact that his appearance was little known by 
circulating rumours that Mill did not really exist – this was done ‘half in jest and half for 
a serious electioneering purpose’ (I: 93). Even when Mill’s renown was at its greatest, 
questions of absence and obscurity arose. However, if there were few images of Mill, or 
descriptions of his appearance, in circulation prior to his election as MP, then this was 
set to change. Mill had been reluctant to have his photograph taken, but by July 1865 
had been ‘so urged to have one taken’ that he finally agreed to sit for John Watkins of 
Parliament Street.14 Mill then supplied John Plummer with two cartes de visite 
                                                 
14 Letter from Mill to John Plummer, 14 July 1865. In a letter to Edwin Chadwick dated 15 May 1865, Mill 
had written ‘As to the application you have received about having my likeness taken for publication, I 
have a real difficulty about it, owing to having refused my photograph to friends who much wished for it. 
If it should be necessary, however, there is a cameo likeness of me from which a copy could be taken’. 
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Fig. 3a. Studio photograph of Mill by John 
Watkins, 1865. 
Fig. 3b. Studio photograph of Mill by John 
Watkins, 1865. 
  
Fig. 3c. Studio photograph of Mill by John 
Watkins, 1865. 
Fig. 3d. Mill and Helen Taylor by John 
Watkins, 1865. 
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photographs which Plummer used as the basis for a pen and ink illustration in Cassell’s 
Illustrated Family Paper, accompanying an article on ‘Remarkable Men: Members of the 
New Parliament’. As well as providing the basis for numerous engravings in the 
periodical press, the photographs themselves were widely displayed in London, 
according to the doorkeeper of the House of Commons, William White: ‘Of the personal 
appearance of this extraordinary man we need say nothing, for thanks to photography, 
his thoughtful features, copied with wonderful faithfulness, look at us from hundreds of 
shop-windows’ (II: 72). Mill resisted subsequent requests from photographers, writing 
to Edward Walford, the editor of Hardwicke’s Shilling House of Commons in 1867, to 
explain that: ‘Want of time, combined with dislike for the operation, has obliged me to 
refuse all proposals from photographers to take my likeness, except in one instance, 
when I sat to Mr Watkins’.15 
The studio photographs by Watkins are shown in Figures 3a–d. In Figure 3a 
where Mill looks directly towards the camera, and in the profile view in Figure 3b, the 
physical features which attracted much comment – the bump on his forehead and his 
domed, bald head – are pronounced. The focus on these features, which referenced 
physiognomy, as well as phrenology, to account for Mill’s extraordinary intellect, also 
referenced older visual traditions of depicting philosophers. Janet Browne has shown 
how photographs of Darwin similarly emphasised his forehead and baldness, following 
conventions established in images of ancient philosophers such as Socrates. However, 
the custom of depicting philosophers with a ‘capacious forehead’ and ‘bald pate’ always 
included one other feature, which Browne attaches great significance to in images of 
Darwin: a beard (‘I Could Have Retched All Night’ 277). Darwin’s beard, Browne argues, 
was ‘a dramatically masculine beard, a very visual symbol of the real seat of Victorian 
power ...’ (275). In mid-Victorian Britain, as Christopher Oldstone-Moore explains, 
beards became increasingly popular because it was believed that they were ‘... integral 
to that elemental masculinity which still pertained in the modern age, first by 
contributing to men’s health and vitality, and second by serving as the outward mark of 
inward qualities – particularly independence, hardiness, and decisiveness – that they 
were the foundations of masculine authority’ (8). The images of Mill’s side-whiskered 
face, which presented quite a contrast to photographs of other prominent men, such as 
                                                 
15 Letter from Mill to Edward Walford, 14 February 1867. On Watkins and Walford, see notes to this letter 
by Mineka and Lindley, Collected Works rpt. in The Online Library of Liberty. 
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Darwin, Carlyle and Charles Dickens, with full beards, may well have been a factor in the 
feminisation of Mill in some of the periodical press cartoons I discuss in chapter three. 
Figure 3c shows Mill seated and reading, in front of a plain background. His long 
legs extend outside of the frame of the picture, conveying a sense of his height. 
Contrastingly, as I discuss in chapter three, caricatures by John Tenniel in Punch 
depicted Mill as of diminutive stature. In this photograph, Mill’s gaze is absorbedly and 
introspectively directed towards the book he holds, rather than towards the camera and 
the spectator. Mill’s philosophic role is signified by his book, but books were also 
commonly used in studio photographs of the time to suggest literacy.16 As such, Mill’s 
prop is rather less exotic than the microscopes, bones, globes, maps or travelling boxes 
other eminent men used to symbolise their intellectual interests.17 The lack of grandeur 
in these photographs may have reflected Mill’s lack of concern for the images of him 
which were to be circulated, or may have been carefully managed to avoid any sense of 
ostentation. Either way, they suggest Mill’s humility and provide a counter narrative to 
the focus on his extraordinary life. The book appears again to signify his philosophising 
in Figure 3d, where he poses with his step-daughter Helen Taylor. The configuration in 
this photograph, with Helen stood behind the seated Mill, her hand placed affectionately 
on his shoulder, suggests her role as intellectual and emotional support for her step-
father since the death of Harriet Taylor in 1858. But with Helen standing, dressed in 
mourning robes, Mill does not take precedence in the frame: the familial relation 
depicted also conveys something of Mill’s political commitment to equality for women.  
In 1873, Sir Charles Dilke, a Liberal politician and writer, commissioned the 
successful and popular George Frederic Watts to paint a portrait of Mill. It seems that 
Mill was as reluctant to sit for a portrait painter as he was a photographer, writing to 
Dilke: ‘I have hitherto disliked having my portrait taken, but I am unwilling to refuse the 
high compliment paid me by Mr Watts and yourself’ (qtd. in Mary S. Watts 273). The 
portrait (Figure 4) was painted shortly before Mill contracted the bacterial infection 
which was to prove fatal. After Mill died, his step-daughter Helen Taylor wrote to Lady 
Dilke asking if a copy could be made, envisaging it as a gift to the nation for all admirers 
of Mill – this copy still hangs in the National Portrait Gallery.18 At a time when  
                                                 
16 See Audrey Linkman, The Victorians: Photographic Portraits (1993), 52. 
17 See Browne, ‘I Could Have Retched All Night’, 263–9. 
18 ‘... I would give much now to have such a portrait where it could be seen by all who live and look up to 
his name and work; and when I saw you I felt that I should have liked to ask you to allow the first portrait 
to be copied for me in order that I might give it to the nation’ (20 November 1873). 
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Fig. 4. Portrait of Mill by George Frederic Watts. 1873. National Portrait Gallery.  
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photography was ‘building a new legacy of the more complex personality constructed 
from multiple perspectives taken at different points in time’, Watts was known to be a 
proponent of a different tradition which saw ‘the single iconic image as a distillation of a 
complete personality and an entire life’ (Hamilton and Hargreaves 51). In a biography of 
her husband, George Frederic Watts: The Annals of an Artist’s Life (1912), Mary S. Watts 
underscored the uniqueness and authority of his painting: 
As this is the only portrait for which Mr Mill ever sat, it may be reckoned 
amongst the most fortunate accidents of the artist’s career that he 
succeeded in painting what must be called one of his most subtle 
delineations of character. During these sittings Mr and Mrs Fawcett came 
to see the portrait, and I think then first made acquaintance with Signor 
[Watts]. Mrs Fawcett tells me Signor seized that characteristic of Mill 
which gave the impression of his great refinement and delicacy. ... [Watts] 
found his sitter surprisingly sympathetic; sensitive to all that was 
beautiful in form and poetic thought. (273–4) 
In reporting Millicent Garrett Fawcett’s response to the painting, and hinting at how 
prevailing perceptions of Mill had influenced the artist before they met, Mary S. Watts 
points to ideas which recur in discussions of Mill’s appearance and personality in 
chapter three. Refinement, delicacy and sensitivity are terms which were bound up with 
debates about his suitability for the role of philosopher and politician, and were used by 
some as praise and by others as condemnation.  
 In Watts’s portrait, Mill’s dark, downcast eyes and closed, firmly-set mouth 
bespeak contemplation and interiority. The gnarled face, surrounded by dark tones, 
looks sad and bereft, foregrounding both Mill’s sense of grief at the loss of Harriet and 
the sombre intensity and isolation of life as a philosopher. His expression seems 
humourless and closed to discussion rather than open to it. In Virginia Woolf’s 1915 
novel The Voyage Out, the portrait is a symbol of convention and a lack of aesthetic 
innovation. A copy resides in a ‘dull’ and ‘dingy’ drawing room which is ‘without definite 
character, being neither typically and openly hideous, nor strenuously artistic, nor 
really comfortable’ (199). Today, the Watts portrait is probably the most familiar 
picture of Mill, adorning the cover of many modern editions of works by and about him, 
and fulfilling the role of the single iconic image. 
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Shortly after Mill’s death in 1873, George Jacob Holyoake, a self-educated 
secularist and promoter of the co-operative movement among the working classes, 
issued a pamphlet called John Stuart Mill: As Some of the Working Classes Knew Him. In it 
he devotes considerable attention to appropriate memorials for Mill. He notes that ‘A 
statue of John Stuart Mill is to be raised’ and ‘scholarships open to both sexes are to be 
founded in his name’ (11). Holyoake thought the scholarships more fitting as tributes, 
while nevertheless desiring the statue because ‘future generations will be glad to look 
on that wise and patient face, with its lines of ever-purposing thought’ (11). While a 
likeness of Mill for posterity was desirable, the less tangible work of making education 
and free discussion more widespread, and making Mill’s ideas more accessible to 
readers of all classes was equally important. Holyoake’s way of venerating Mill was to 
insist that Mill would not have wanted veneration. ‘If he should return to earth’, 
speculated Holyoake, ‘I do not think Mr Mill would ever go to see his own statue; but if 
any one shall extend mental and sociological science he would be sure to read their 
essays’ (12). More cheap editions of his works might also be ‘one of the very few things 
which he would be likely to approve as a memorial of him’ (12). Another practical 
possibility, Holyoake reported, was ‘the erection of “Memorial Halls” in towns where his 
name is regarded, in which discussion of all important questions should be free, and 
meet, as Milton expressed it, “in fair and open” encounter’ (12). In a concluding 
suggestion, Holyoake evoked Mill’s love of walking in the countryside: 
For himself he would have been content that a few working men and 
women, whom he had inspired with self-respect and who discerned some 
path to self-help which he had pointed out, should raise a cairn to his 
memory, and carve merely his initials on the topmost stone. He would 
sleep more proudly under that than under the costliest pyramid raised by 
any who had no regard for intelligent individuality, toleration, and self-
limiting liberty in the people ... (28–9) 
Though his pamphlet strikes a hyperbolic note in its praise for Mill, Holyoake’s possible 
memorials are interesting for the way in which they suggest the need for a material 
point of reference – like a memorial hall or a cairn – which acknowledged Mill’s own 
lack of concern with the preservation of his image for posterity. 
Nevertheless, a bronze statue of Mill was created by Thomas Woolner, one of the 
original seven members of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood, in 1878 (see Figure 5). 
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Those who contributed money towards the statue included Herbert Spencer, Frederic 
Harrison, G.H. Lewes, John Tyndall and T.H. Huxley, but other prominent figures did not 
want to be part of the process of memorialising Mill. Gladstone withdrew his support 
for the monument after the controversy sparked by a hostile obituary in the Times. The 
obituary, written by barrister and essayist Abraham Hayward (though it appeared 
anonymously), included a story about Mill’s arrest when he was seventeen, for 
distributing a pamphlet about contraception.19 In her 1877 autobiography, Harriet 
Martineau publicly declared that she did not wish to be associated with the statue of 
Mill, because though she had a ‘great admiration for his intellect, and a strong regard for 
his heart, and a full belief in his innocence of intention ... he was deplorably weak in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Holyoake lists contributors in Bygones Worth Remembering, 272. An extensive discussion of the 
Hayward controversy is given in David Stack’s ‘The Death of John Stuart Mill’ (2011) – Hayward had 
apparently developed a grudge against Mill after they clashed at the London Debating Society as young 
men (Stack 171). See also Collini, Public Moralists, 312–14; Stafford, 13–14; and Reeves, 481–4.  
 
Fig. 5. Bronze statue of Mill by Thomas Woolner, raised on the 
Thames Embankment in 1878. 
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Fig. 6. Detail from ‘How to Improve London’. Punch. 
1881. 
 
Fig. 7. Millicent Garrett Fawcett and other suffragettes lay wreaths by Mill’s 
statue in 1928. 
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judgment, with the weakness, so damaging to a man, of being as impressionable as a 
woman’ (2: 505). From Holyoake’s deliberations about the best way working people 
could commemorate Mill, to Martineau’s accusation of Mill’s debilitating 
impressionability, the Woolner statue is bound up with the movement from reverence 
to irreverence evident in so much Millian commentary. 
In an article on ‘How to Improve London’ in 1881 (Figure 6), Punch made fun of 
the Woolner statue for not being sufficiently reverential of Mill, comparing it 
unfavourably to a more pleasant statue of George Peabody, the American banker and 
philanthropist, at the Royal Exchange: 
The great political economist is represented seated on an iron stool so 
constructed that the cushion placed upon it cannot be retained in its 
place. Consequently it is has slipped down, causing Mr Mill to want to get 
up. This natural desire has been restrained. The martyr is seemingly 
mesmerised. In an attitude suggestive of extreme torture he gazes at the 
time-tables of the District Railway which have been placed just far enough 
away from him to be illegible. In his hand he has seemingly a dictionary – 
the only literature the hard-hearted sculptor has given to him. His 
costume is a disgrace to his tradesmen. His coat is a shapeless garment, 
boasting only two buttons. His collar seems attached to a flannel shirt. 
And as for his boots, no words can describe their hideous make. They are 
square-toed and ‘roomy’. They suggest numberless bunions. (252) 
Punch’s irreverent take on the Woolner sculpture draws attention to just the kind of 
everyday details least associated with a permanent record for posterity: minor bodily 
discomforts caused by seating and clothing. Despite Punch’s conclusion, that Mill ‘has 
been insulted – grossly insulted’, Holyoake wrote that the statue ‘stands on the Thames 
Embankment and allures more pilgrims of thought than any other there’ (Bygones worth 
Remembering 370). The statue was to become an important point of commemoration 
for suffragettes, with Millicent Garrett Fawcett leading a delegation there in 1928 when 
all women got the vote (Figure 7). Attention to Mill’s presence in visual culture expands 
the sense of his place in the Victorian imaginary and thus the understanding of the way 
readers of Mill, whom I turn to consider in the next section, interacted with him. 
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1.3 Victorian Readers of Mill 
  The Reader article on Mill’s influence discussed in the preface was concerned 
with widespread engagement with Mill’s ideas in Britain in a ‘top-down’ way: the men 
who constituted the up-and-coming leaders of thought were immersed in all things 
Millian, and diffusing this beneficial knowledge via their speculation, criticism and 
instruction. William White also used a top-down model to account for the dissemination 
of Mill’s ideas: 
Great thinkers like Mr Mill never have a large audience. But think not, 
reader, that they do not ultimately influence the mass. The works of men 
like Mr Mill are like the watersheds of the world, high up in the mountain, 
down which the waters flow in thousands of tortuous courses till they 
reach the plain, and refresh millions who know nothing of their source. 
(31) 
White was including the majority of MPs in this mass, noting that ‘Country gentlemen 
and men of business do not as a rule study philosophy, or logic, or even political 
economy’ (30). Others also observed that many prominent public men were not 
assiduous readers of Mill. In Anthony Trollope’s He Knew He was Right (first published 
serially from 1868–9) there is an exchange which plays on the cultural and political 
currency to be gained from reading, or at least professing to read, Mill: “‘Your John S. 
Mill is a great man’, said the minister. ‘They tell me so’, said Mr Glascock. ‘I don’t read 
what he writes myself’. This acknowledgement seemed to the minister to be almost 
disgraceful, and yet he himself had never read a word of Mill’s writings”’ (521). 
Elsewhere in Trollope’s fiction it is female characters who take Mill more seriously, with 
Lady Laura Standish in Phineas Finn (first published serially from 1866–7) telling a 
friend ‘I shall knock under for Mr Mill, and go in for women’s rights’ (490). In the same 
novel, Phineas, musing on his political career, remarks to Violet Effingham ‘A man 
should try to be something’; Violet responds ‘And a woman must be content to be 
nothing, – unless Mr Mill can pull us through!’ (566).20  
  The references to Mill that Trollope included in these novels reflected his 
topicality when they were being written – it was in May 1867 that Mill proposed the 
word ‘man’ be replaced by the word ‘person’ in the clauses of the Reform Bill which 
                                                 
20 For analysis of Mill’s influence on Trollope’s views about equal rights for women, see John Sutherland’s 
introductions to the OUP edition of He Knew He Was Right (xviii) and the Penguin edition of Phineas Finn 
(23–4). 
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dealt with enfranchisement. The caricature shown in Figure 1 (see page 8), from an 
1867 issue of Fun, a periodical known as ‘the poor man’s Punch’ (Sullivan 135), satirises 
this moment and demonstrates how the millennium pun had taken on a more specific 
meaning in the periodical press with Mill’s role in Parliament.21 (I outline the wider 
issues encoded in this picture in chapter three.) Moncure Conway had also used the 
millennium pun in this new, more specific way, to denote an age of greater gender 
equality. Conway referred to the ‘large number of men of letters and science’ who 
formed part of the audience for Mill’s first public address as parliamentary candidate, 
but also acknowledged the unusually large number of women present: ‘Here, then, was 
a prefiguration of England’s Mill-ennium; a well-dressed and good-looking young 
English woman rising to speak in a public political meeting!’ (‘The Great Westminster 
Canvass’ 739, emphasis in original).  
For Conway – a fervent supporter of Mill, who had read On Liberty bound for 
Britain on the steamship City of Washington in 1863 (Autobiography I: 390) – a 
familiarity with the works of Mill and a desire to see him in person was a marker of 
cultivation. Conway thought that for British citizens of all kinds, it should be a matter of 
national pride. In ‘The Great Westminster Canvass’ Conway remarked with 
disappointment that the excitement many felt at Mill’s candidature was countered by a 
distinct lack of awareness in some parts of the electorate:  
It was shown that after all the vaunted spread of education and the labors 
of the penny press there was a vast number of well-to-do tradesmen that 
had never heard the name of England’s chief political economist. This 
ignorance was so great that the story may be regarded as true in spirit if 
not in letter that a bookseller put a card in his window announcing: 
          FOR SALE HERE. 
Mill on Political Economy. 
Ditto on the Floss. 
But this ignorance extended upward as far as it did downward. There 
were large numbers of editors and ecclesiastics, presumably belonging to 
the higher and to the educated classes, who roared out their sudden 
                                                 
21 John Robson’s 1990 article in Utilitas, ‘Mill in Parliament: The View from the Comic Press’, provides 
more instances of Mill puns in the periodical press, including windmill, watermill, powder-mill, Mill-
stones, milliner, and, from Judy, ‘The Ladies’ Favourite Scent – Mill-fleurs’ (103–5). 
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discoveries of Mr Mill’s religious heresies, with the manifest impression 
that they were entirely unknown. (736) 
Some members of the working classes were more careful readers of Mill’s works than 
wealthy tradesmen and professionals thought Conway, recounting with relish the story 
of a preacher on a street corner being told: ‘“See ’ere, pars’n, Jon-stote Mill says as how 
that ere’s oll bosh!”’ (736). Conway’s article – which offers perhaps the only instance of 
Mill’s name being rendered in colloquial language – is as rhapsodic in its praise for Mill’s 
entry onto the political scene as the Reader article was in its account of Mill’s influence. 
But Conway’s assessment of the British election for American readers makes room for a 
more diverse engagement: dissemination of ideas via the popular press, yes, but 
perhaps also women and the working classes reading and responding to Mill’s work 
directly. Bain’s comment about the popularity of the People’s Editions of Mill’s works 
supports this view, as do the words of Holyoake. In his pamphlet on John Stuart Mill: As 
Some of the Working Classes Knew Him, Holyoake paid homage to Mill’s accessibility to 
the working classes, in print and in person. On Mill’s appearance at a raucous public 
gathering to discuss co-operative working, Holyoake commented: ‘What man save he, 
eminent as a thinker, has in this generation incurred the odium, peril, and discomfort of 
attending ... a workman’s meeting such as that?’ (5–6); on the educative value of Mill’s 
writing he insisted, ‘He could be trusted, and to those we wanted to convince we could 
say – read him’ (11, emphasis in original). 
An authoritative account of the type of readers the Reader aimed at is given in 
Collini’s Public Moralists. Taking Mill as the exemplar of the public moralist, Collini 
analyses Mill’s self-representation within a group of mostly ‘well-connected, 
conventionally educated, comfortably situated, professionally successful, intellectually 
inclined men’ (3). Throughout this project, I also draw on the views of members of the 
group Public Moralists describes, which includes John Morley, Leslie and Fitzjames 
Stephen, Herbert Spencer, Charles Kingsley, Henry Fawcett and Frederic Harrison. But 
Collini’s characterisation of Millian prose left me wanting to investigate Victorian 
experiences of reading Mill further. He argues that Mill never wanted to nurture a sense 
of complicity between himself and his readers because that would have been 
antithetical to his role ‘as moral coach’, urging the nation on ‘to yet more strenuous 
efforts’ (133). As a result, Collini contends that Mill ‘never manages to create that sense 
of intimacy between reader and author, that warming feeling of sharing a sensible view 
of a mad world’ (132). In different ways, each of the authors I have chosen to read 
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closely in chapters four, five and six, as well as some of the commentators included in 
chapters two and three, challenge the idea that Mill’s writing does not engender a warm 
or intimate bond with the reader. They show that for those less comfortably situated or 
conventionally educated, intellectual engagements with Mill are connected to issues of 
creativity and emotion.  
There are certainly Victorian precedents for Collini’s view of reading Mill. 
Writing to a friend about her experience of reading On Liberty, Caroline Fox registered 
both her awe, and the kind of discomfort that Collini argues Mill was aiming at:  
I am reading that terrible book of John Mill’s on Liberty, so clear, and 
calm, and cold: he lays it on one as a tremendous duty to get oneself well 
contradicted, and admit always a devil’s advocate into the presence of 
your dearest, most sacred Truths, as they are apt to grow windy and 
worthless without such tests, if indeed they can stand the shock of 
argument at all. He looks you through like a basilisk, relentless as Fate. 
(Memories of Old Friends II: 269–70) 
Fox’s statement of the disquiet she felt at reading On Liberty, is all the more striking for 
the contrast it presents to her earlier views of Mill’s warmth and generosity in person.  
James Martineau, reviewing Dissertations and Discussions in 1859, was in some 
ways deferential about the extraordinary abilities of ‘the most elaborated mind of our 
age’ (474). But he did not enjoy reading Mill, complaining: ‘our author seems to sit 
apart, with genial pity for the multitudes below him, with disdain of whatever is around 
him’ (478). He continued: ‘No one would believe beforehand that a writer so serene and 
even, not to say cold, could affect the reader with so much sadness. You fall into it, 
without knowing whence it comes. All the lights upon his page are intellectual, breaking 
from a deep reserve of moral gloom’ (478). The nub of Martineau’s objection to Mill’s 
prose style, which he felt was most conspicuous in the essays collected in Dissertations 
and Discussions, was what he termed a ‘suppressive air’ (507). In a writer of Mill’s 
stature, such a trait had a damaging effect, claimed Martineau: 
It seems hardly becoming in an author who has attained the highest rank 
of influence in the intellectual councils of his time, to write as if there 
were something behind which, as a veracious thinker on human life and 
morals, he would like to say, but which, under the pitiable bigotry of 
society, must be reserved for an age that does not persecute its 
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benefactors. Such a demeanour appears to us the counterpart, among 
speculative men, of dogmatic self-assurance among religious professors: 
and Pharisaism hurts the humanities and the humilities as much in the 
‘Wiser than thou’, as in the ‘Holier than thou’. (508, emphasis in original) 
Martineau’s insistence that Mill alienated ‘modest’ and ‘homely’ readers (496), was a 
theme taken up in the pages of the Spectator. As I discuss in chapters two and six, the 
Spectator’s editor, R.H. Hutton, also accused Mill of ‘a want of homeliness’ (‘Mr John 
Stuart Mill’s Autobiography’ 1339), and thought he was unable to create an intimate 
bond with his readers because of the monotonous and impersonal quality of his prose. 
The most forceful challenge to this line of thought about Millian prose is provided by 
Olive Schreiner, as chapter six demonstrates. For the ‘homely’ readers in her fiction 
‘dogmatic self-assurance’ is everywhere around them – apart from in the pages of Mill. 
Schreiner’s personal accounts of reading Mill emphasise the beneficial effects they have 
on her mental wellbeing, in contrast to Martineau’s description of sadness and moral 
gloom. 
 Others among Mill’s contemporaries also provide evidence of less detached 
reading experiences. Some were less than favourable responses. For Spencer, Carlyle’s 
dramatic reaction to On Liberty was very telling: ‘One who grew blindly furious over 
John Mill’s work On Liberty ... displayed an inability to think discreditable to an ordinary 
cultivated intelligence, much more to one ranked as a thinker’ (An Autobiography I: 
380–1). However, Bain recalled that Kingsley wrote to Mill declaring that On Liberty 
‘affected me in making me a clearer-headed, braver man on the spot’ (John Stuart Mill 
112). ‘Kingsley first saw the Liberty on the table in Parker’s shop’, Bain reports. ‘He sat 
down and read it through, there and then; and made the remark before he left the shop’ 
(112). George Meredith was apparently similarly affected by Subjection. Morley 
describes the episode in his Recollections, in terms more readily associated with novel-
reading: ‘One morning in 1869 I put into his hands Mill’s new little volume, less than 
two hundred pages long, on the Subjection of Women. Meredith eagerly seized the book, 
fell to devouring it in settled silence, and could not be torn from it all day’ (47).  
George Eliot re-read Political Economy, On Liberty, and Considerations on 
Representative Government when they were issued in the cheap editions in 1865 (Haight 
196, note). Writing to a friend she observed: ‘I agree with you in your feeling about Mill. 
Some of his works have been frequently my companions of late, and I have been going 
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through many actions de grace towards him’.22 Her re-reading of Mill prompted her to 
reflect on his candidature for Parliament, and in the same letter she wrote: ‘I am not 
anxious that he should be in Parliament: thinkers can do more outside than inside the 
House. But it would have been a fine precedent, and would have made an epoch, for 
such a man to have been asked for and elected solely on the ground of his mental 
eminence. As it is, I suppose it is pretty certain that he will not be elected’ (Eliot’s 
emphasis). Eliot was, of course, wrong in her prediction that Mill would not be elected, 
but her remarks about whether his status as a thinker made him unsuitable for political 
life, and what would be the significance if he were to be elected on the basis of his 
intellectual stature, reflect the questions which were central to much of the commentary 
on Mill’s political role. 
Mill’s influence was felt emotionally as well as intellectually in the art world, too. 
In 1862, when he was seventeen years old, the up-and-coming artist Walter Crane 
accompanied ornithologist John Richard de Capel Wise on a tour through the New 
Forest. In An Artist’s Reminiscences (1907), Crane recalled that during ‘a very wet June’ 
they collaborated on The New Forest: its History and Scenery and as they worked, they 
talked about Mill (68). Wise, who later went on to contribute to the Reader, ‘belonged to 
the school of J.S. Mill in philosophical thought and politics’ and shared with Crane his 
‘free opinions’ on religion and politics – opinions which had caused him to leave Oxford 
and quarrel with his family (69). Crane, immersed in the views of John Ruskin (aged 
fifteen he was an ‘enthusiastic admirer and follower’, 57) was unsettled by Wise’s 
Millian opinions: they ‘came rather in the nature of a counterblast to those in which I 
had been brought up, and told rather against the Ruskinian point of view, which at first 
was rather a shock to me, until I was able to see things in a broader light’ (70). Crane’s 
reaction to seeing Mill in person a few years later suggests that what appealed to him 
most was the contrast to Ruskin’s paternalism presented by Mill’s libertarianism. 
By twenty-three Crane still took a keen interest in the views Wise had introduced 
him to on their New Forest tour. In 1865, Crane saw ‘the same sort of men’ being 
returned to Parliament, with ‘a few notable exceptions, such as that of John Stuart Mill’ 
(94). Caught up in the possibility of change which Mill’s political presence seemed to 
represent, Crane went to see Mill speak at St James’s Hall, and described the 
philosopher’s public appearance in affectionate terms: 
                                                 
22 Eliot to Mrs Peter Alfred Taylor, 10 July 1865. See Haight, 196. 
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Gentle-mannered, small and spare of figure, but of very marked 
intellectual aspect, and a great earnestness, he spoke in what truly might 
be described as ‘a still small voice’. Philosopher and recluse, it was 
extraordinary the enthusiasm he evoked, standing, too, as he did for all 
sorts of advanced and unpopular opinions (94).  
On another occasion he saw Henry Fawcett introduce Charles Dilke as candidate for 
Chelsea by emphasising his Millian credentials – ‘Great applause followed’ (95). This 
period of political excitement, in which a philosopher could emerge from his study, talk 
on controversial topics, and have such a positive effect on an audience, inspired Crane 
to produce a painting ‘on the theme of Freedom, in which Humanity was personified by 
a youth chained in a prison’, with ‘Freedom – a figure in floating draperies’ in the centre 
of the picture (95). Crane is remembered as the man who, along with publisher Edmund 
Evans, transformed the quality and design of children’s books and Mill was woven into 
the fabric of his aesthetic interests. 
  The authors I focus on in chapters four, five and six were more removed from 
Mill in time and space than the commentators described above. When Mill died in 1873, 
Hardy was thirty-three years old, Caird was nineteen and Schreiner was eighteen. Hardy 
was the only one of the three to see him in person. Despite the diversity of their writerly 
engagements with Mill, they have common ground in their formative encounters with 
Mill as part of a process of self-education. Hardy famously described the ‘Of 
Individuality’ section in On Liberty as one of his ‘cures for despair’ (The Life and Work of 
Thomas Hardy 59). Two of his fictional characters – Ethelberta in The Hand of Ethelberta 
(1876) and Sue Bridehead in Jude the Obscure (1895) – read Mill at times of crisis in 
their lives. Hardy’s annotated copies of On Liberty (in Dorset County Museum) and 
Utilitarianism (in the Beinecke at Yale) provide evidence of his careful attention to Mill’s 
thought. Hardy’s letter to the Times in 1906, describing the moment he saw Mill on the 
hustings, renders in beautifully compact form many of the debates about Mill’s status as 
a philosopher which I explore in chapters two and three. In addition to the direct 
references to Utilitarianism and On Liberty, Hardy’s novels engage with concepts from 
the Logic, Auguste Comte and Positivism (1865), Subjection, and Three Essays on Religion. 
Hardy’s relation to Mill was far from straightforwardly approving, and in chapter four I 
argue, that in line with his self-proclaimed suspicion of systems of philosophy, Hardy 
was concerned with critiquing Mill’s theories in his fiction. But at the same time, Hardy’s 
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fiction takes a recognisably Millian approach in the value it places on independent 
thought and individual choice.  
In an interview with the Women’s Penny Paper in 1890, the essayist and novelist 
Mona Caird said that reading John Stuart Mill had played a formative role in her 
intellectual development. She recalled that her views on gender equality were 
pronounced at an early stage of her life, but that Mill ‘“was the first to help me bring 
these thoughts and feelings into form by his writings’” (‘Interview: Mrs Mona Caird’ 
421). In chapter five, I argue that the effect of this formative educational encounter with 
Mill resonates throughout her fiction. In the seven novels she wrote, Caird engages with 
the forms of free discussion Mill argues for in On Liberty and the model of self-
developmental conversation he sets out in his Autobiography. In doing so she offers an 
ideal of creative, liberating conversation and explores many deviations from this ideal, 
including persuasion, manipulation, mockery, banality and silence. Embedded in the fin-
de-siècle New Woman debates, her nineteenth-century novels focus on private 
discussions in upper-class domestic settings, while her early twentieth-century novels 
depict political and scientific discussion groups, which are accessible to a greater 
diversity of participants, and consider directly how private conversational practices can 
translate into public discourse. 
 Like Caird, Olive Schreiner credited reading Mill with a formative role in her 
intellectual development. And like Hardy, Schreiner included characters who read Mill 
in her fiction: the eponymous heroine in Undine (published posthumously in 1929) and 
Waldo in The Story of an African Farm (1883) both read Principles of Political Economy. 
Born and raised in South Africa, Schreiner occupied a more marginal position in 
Victorian society than Hardy or Caird. In chapter six, I situate Schreiner’s 
representations of Mill within the context of her major preoccupations, including 
agnosticism, feminism, colonial society and British imperialism, at the same time as 
locating ‘Schreiner’s Mill’ within the context of other views of Mill. Her effusive praise of 
Mill’s works is far from unprecedented, but her conception of the spiritual effect of 
reading Mill provides a quite different perspective from other writers. In her letters and 
fiction, Schreiner makes a strong statement about the emotional effects of reading Mill, 
linking Millian prose to creative day-dreaming, art, beauty and romance. 
All three of the authors I look at in detail subvert gendered assumptions in their 
fiction about who was reading Mill and what parts of his oeuvre they engaged with. 
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Even Mill’s protégé John Morley – who supported Mill’s views on women’s rights23 – 
remarked on ‘the comparatively few women whose intellectual interest was strong 
enough to draw them to his books’ (‘The Death of Mr Mill’ 671). Hardy, Caird and 
Schreiner engage with Subjection to a degree which, I suggest, disproves Peter 
Nicholson’s statement, in his chapter on ‘The Reception and Early Reputation of Mill’s 
Political Thought’ in The Cambridge Companion to Mill (1998), that in the period from 
1873 to 1900, ‘There is very little to report about The Subjection of Women’ (483). But 
they also show that female readers moved beyond the ‘Bible’ of the women’s movement 
in their engagements with Mill. The Hardyean fictional readers, Ethelberta and Sue, read 
Utilitarianism and On Liberty respectively. Though Caird was immersed in the 
arguments of Subjection, her fiction demonstrates that she was equally immersed in the 
arguments of On Liberty and the Autobiography. For Schreiner, the Logic and Principles 
of Political Economy were central texts for the young and powerless of both sexes. 
When it came to expressing the form and scope of Mill’s public standing and 
influence, Victorian commentators offered a variety of images. In a digest of opinion 
after Mill’s death, the Pall Mall Gazette reported: ‘Mr Mill’s thoughts and principles had 
entered into the very life of the time. They had become part of its mental food’ (‘Epitome 
of Opinion in the Morning Journals’ 3). Others found railway analogies most apt. 
Journalist and individual rights campaigner Joseph Hiam Levy suggested that Mill was 
‘the great intellectual pointsman of our age – the man who has done more than any 
other of his generation to give direction to the thought of his contemporaries’ (‘His 
Work in Philosophy’ 55). Levy’s pointsman metaphor struck a similar note to William 
White’s watershed comparison, by suggesting that despite Mill’s fame, his influence was 
imperceptible to the majority of people. If collective knowledge was represented by ‘a 
railway train in motion’ then most people did not realise that ‘that blustering machine, 
which puffs and snorts, and drags a vast multitude in its wake, is moving along a track 
determined by a man hidden away from the public gaze’ (55). For Georg Brandes the 
railway was also evocative of Mill’s importance in various ways. Brandes made 
connections between this new technology, philosophy and national identity, as he 
recalled arriving in Britain:  
                                                 
23 In 1870, in support of women’s enfranchisement, Morley translated Condorcet’s ‘Plea for the 
Citizenship of Women’ for the Fortnightly Review. 
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From Dover, the train went at a speed of sixty miles an hour, and made 
one think him a great man who invented the locomotive, as great as 
Aristotle and Plato together. It seemed to me that John Stuart Mill was 
that kind of man. He opened, not roads, but railroads; his books were like 
iron rails, unadorned, but useful, leading to their goal. And what will there 
was in the English locomotive that drew our train, – like the driving 
instinct of England’s character! (Reminiscences 273, emphasis in original) 
In Brandes’s view of the grand narrative of English nationhood, technological 
development and historical progress, Mill had a strong, well-defined and functional role. 
However, perhaps the most democratic and appealing description of Mill’s 
impact did not have recourse to a railway metaphor. In Bain’s conclusion to John Stuart 
Mill, A Criticism: with Personal Recollections (1882) he remarked: ‘Who shall sum up 
Mill’s collective influence as instructor in Politics, Ethics, Logic, and Metaphysics? No 
calculus can integrate the innumerable little pulses of knowledge and of thought that he 
has made to vibrate in the minds of his generation’ (195). Bain’s description is more 
alert to the connection between shared knowledge and personal experience, and it 
suggests more openness, variety, and imagination in responses to Mill. In the pages that 
follow, I attempt to trace and to reconstruct just some of the ‘innumerable little pulses 
of knowledge and thought’ that vibrated in the minds of Mill’s own generation, and the 
generation that followed.  
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2. Man of Science or Man of Letters? Mill and ‘the desire of culture’ 
If a ‘culture’, as it is called, is the final end of man, meaning by that the harmonious 
development of two only of the three inalienable faculties of man, then Mr Mill was, after 
Goethe perhaps, one of the most cultured men of modern times. Differing from Goethe 
only in this, that he was a scientist first, and a man of imagination and sentiment 
afterwards, it was his life study, as it had been Goethe’s before him, to make incursions 
into other regions of thought than those in which his life studies lay. Goethe ... was a poet 
and an artist, but he felt that, to round off his intellectual life and complete his ideal of 
culture, he must also include exact science, and therefore in his old days he studied 
botany and comparative physiology... . Mill on the other hand, whose education was on a 
different plan, began as a student of exact science and branched off in his latter days into 
sentimental theories, and what were called by political economists of the old school his 
heresies, as to the rights of women, the unearned increment of land, and other such 
sentimental views of the laws of wealth. It was the desire of culture in both cases which 
drew these men off in directions the very opposite to what they had set out with – the 
poet dabbling in science and throwing out theories in optics and botany which were little 
else than poet’s dreams, the man of exact science falling into sentimentalisms quite as 
far-fetched or alien to his true genius. (108) 
Anonymous, Leisure Hour, 18751 
 
The anonymous reviewer of Three Essays on Religion (1874) in Leisure Hour, who 
wrote of Mill’s and Goethe’s opposing, but comparable ‘desire of culture’, concludes 
regretfully that for all their interest in science and poetry, their lack of religious faith 
meant that culture in the highest sense – spirituality – was unknown to them both. 
Nevertheless, the phrase ‘desire of culture’ is a useful starting point for thinking about 
mid- to late-nineteenth-century debates on Mill’s relation to science, emotion, and 
imagination. The Leisure Hour writer uses ‘desire of culture’ to denote a capacity for a 
broad and inclusive level of learning with the potential to harmonise subjects as diverse 
as poetry and physiology. On the one hand, these incursions into areas outside 
individual specialisms are not deemed very successful: Goethe’s scientific theories are 
fantasies and Mill’s unscientific views are sentimentalisms. On the other, the ‘desire of 
culture’ indicates an admirable open-mindedness which makes the writer’s 
disappointment in Goethe and Mill’s lack of religious faith – the third of the ‘inalienable 
faculties’  in the passage from the Leisure Hour – all the keener. In suggesting that Mill 
                                                 
1 Several of the responses to Three Essays which I draw on in this chapter (as indicated by cross 
references in the Works Cited and Consulted) are collected in Mill and Religion: Contemporary Responses 
to Three Essays on Religion (1997), edited by Alan P.F. Sell. Sell’s introduction contains brief biographical 
and contextual details about each of the respondents (where they have been identified; many are 
anonymous). It is part of the Thoemmes Press ‘Key Issues’ series which also includes volumes of 
contemporary responses to On Liberty and The Subjection of Women, edited by Andrew Pyle. 
Contemporary responses to Mill and a variety of his works are collected in Pickering & Chatto’s more 
recent Lives of Victorian Political Figures IV: John Stuart Mill (2009), edited by David Martin, but Mill 
scholarship would be well served by individual source books, like those in the Thoemmes series, 
collecting responses to the Autobiography, Utilitarianism, Political Economy, Representative Government 
and the Logic. 
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was able to harmonise a scientific perspective with a more imaginative one, and then 
conflating imagination with supposed sentimentalism, the Leisure Hour writer points to 
some of the recurring themes of nineteenth-century representations. The extract from 
the Leisure Hour is concerned with antitheses: Mill versus Goethe, the man of exact 
science as opposed to the poet, science in contrast to imagination (imagination in Mill’s 
case being synonymous with sentiment). At the same time it is concerned with the 
synthesis that defines a cultivated or cultured individual – the harmonious combination 
of science, imagination, sentiment and religion. This fascination with antithesis or 
synthesis animated much of the Victorian conversation about Mill. This chapter 
explores how these issues were debated in books, journals, and newspapers from the 
1860s – when Mill was elected to Parliament – and from the 1870s and 1880s – after his 
Autobiography and Three Essays were posthumously published.  
Mill’s own terms for describing the desirable balance between poetry and 
science were part of the vocabulary used to depict his personality and philosophy. In 
‘What is Poetry?’ (1833)2 Mill had stated:   
The object of poetry is confessedly to act upon the emotions; and therein 
is poetry sufficiently distinguished from what Wordsworth affirms to be 
its logical opposite, namely, not prose, but matter of fact or science. The 
one addresses itself to the belief, the other to the feelings. The one does its 
work by convincing or persuading, the other by moving. The one acts by 
presenting a proposition to the understanding, the other by offering 
interesting objects of contemplation to the sensibilities. (344) 
Later in the same essay Mill turned to the pleasing possibility that these effects could be 
combined: if ‘a poetic nature has been united with logical and scientific culture’ then a 
‘philosopher-poet’ is formed (364). As to whether a ‘philosopher-poet’ is superior to a 
poet ‘it would be absurd to doubt ... whether truth is more certainly arrived at by two 
processes, verifying and correcting each other, than by one alone’ (364). Famously, in 
his Autobiography, Mill described how Wordsworth’s poetry remedied an imbalance in 
his own life. After recovering from a ‘mental crisis’ aged twenty, he gained a new 
perspective: ‘The maintenance of a due balance among the faculties, now seemed to me 
of primary importance. The cultivation of the feelings became one of the cardinal points 
in my ethical and philosophical creed’ (118). Mill’s claims about the necessity of 
                                                 
2 Renamed ‘Thoughts on Poetry and Its Varieties’ in Dissertations and Discussions (1859). 
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balancing intellect and emotion provoked extensive debate about how successfully he 
accomplished this: was he one of the most cultured men of modern times, or was he one 
of the least cultured ever to rise to prominence? 
Those who were sympathetic to Mill looked for – and celebrated – the synthesis: 
the points in his work and the moments in his life which they believed exemplified his 
‘desire of culture’ and rare capacity to make unexpected connections which had a 
material effect on Victorian society. Conversely, his detractors mainly sought to 
emphasise the impossibility of Mill ever being a man of well-rounded culture, and 
therefore of philosophical or practical authority – or even personal likeability. They did 
this by portraying him as a man of extremes – coldly, abstractedly scientific or 
dangerously susceptible and passionate – or an incoherent mixture of both. This chapter 
considers how a variety of nineteenth-century commentators placed Mill on this 
spectrum ranging from ‘hard’, ‘cold’ science at one end, to ‘soft’, ‘warm’ feeling and 
imagination at the opposite. Some depicted Mill’s position on this spectrum as fixed, 
usually at the scientific end, while others thought that he moved from one extreme to 
the other. In the middle there was the possibility of synthesis, but there was also the 
possibility of an irreconcilable clash.  
Ideas of theory versus practice often map on to this spectrum: the ‘hard’ science 
end of the range was seen as too abstract and therefore too unrelated to worldly 
concerns; the ‘soft’ emotional or imaginative end could similarly betoken impracticality. 
The commentators who believed that Mill had achieved a synthesis were also the ones 
who thought he had a unique ability to relate theory to practice. Ideas about gender 
were also an important factor. Mill’s ‘softer’ qualities were often taken as evidence of his 
‘truly feminine sensibility’ (Harrison 502), though there was no corresponding 
alignment of his ‘harder’ qualities with manliness. In the next chapter, I discuss this bias 
towards the feminisation of Mill in greater depth. In this chapter, the discussion is 
divided into four sections: ‘Scientific sympathy’ examines the scientific end of the 
spectrum, while ‘Passionate emotionism’ explores the emotional end. ‘Duality of 
character’ considers perceptions of unresolvable clashes between elements of Mill’s 
personality and philosophy, and the final section, ‘Emotional synthesis’, deals with 
representations of integration and balance.  
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2.1 ‘Scientific sympathy’ 
The ‘hard’ science end of the spectrum was baldly expressed in an article 
celebrating ‘The Spiritualism of Tennyson’ (1882) in Light: A Journal Devoted to the 
Higher Interests of Humanity, both Here and Hereafter. The journal for spiritualists cast 
Mill in the role of man of science, to which the poet, ‘a being of intuitions’ capable of 
fusing intellect and emotions, was the necessary corrective (286). Light objected to the 
characterisation of the man of science as ‘the man of exact knowledge’ because scientific 
terms and definitions denoted a limiting narrowness and lack of emotion (287). For 
Light, Tennyson and the Brownings were the best representatives of discovery and 
progress because they could ‘... express the deeper emotions of our time. There is 
something more than Utilitarianism in our day. “In Memoriam”, and the sonnets of the 
two Brownings, are a sign that the age not only marches with the slow method of a 
scientific intellect, but soars into the Infinite with irrepressible yearnings’ (287). Belief 
in an afterlife was the crux of the matter for Light and comparing ‘two of the purest 
unbelievers’ – Mill and George Eliot – the writer asserted that Eliot had ‘a soul impaired 
in the love sentiment’ (287); but, in terms of soulfulness, ‘J.S. Mill [is] on a lower level 
certainly, far below, deep down there in Chamouni [sic], while G. Eliot is up there on the 
heights of Mont Blanc’ (287). The novelist, though irreligious, was still antithetical to 
Mill, because, while Mill’s ‘intellect was great his emotions were scarcely developed at 
all. He was a soul without balance – a man of one-sided culture ...’ (287). Despite the 
‘void’ in Eliot’s character caused by her secularism, her novels can still provoke people 
to worship and they can stimulate spiritual growth, while Mill’s writings can only act ‘as 
a kind of ballast in our reading’ (287). The reader of Eliot’s novels is elevated, the reader 
of poems by Tennyson and the Brownings can take flight; but the reader of Mill’s work 
is slowed up, weighed down, shut off from wonder and mystery by the hardness of his 
style and the heartlessness of his subject matter. From Light’s perspective, Mill had no 
desire – or capacity – to make his ‘one-sided culture’ whole. Light’s view of Mill seems 
influenced by the views of utilitarianism put forward by Thomas Carlyle, Charles 
Dickens and others earlier in the century – even though Mill had challenged these in his 
own essay Utilitarianism in 1865. Political scholar William Stafford has argued that 
despite Mill’s ‘brilliant rescue-operation’, the prevailing nineteenth-century perception 
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of the creed with which Mill was inextricably linked, was that it was ‘hard, heartless, 
mechanical, philistine, godless and base’ (13).3 
In Job’s Comforters: Scientific Sympathy (1874), Joseph Parker, a Nonconformist 
with a reputation for lively preaching (Sell xxvii), grouped Mill with T.H. Huxley and 
John Tyndall as a leader of science and one of Job’s comforters, attempting – and of 
course failing – to account for the troubles which had descended upon him. In Parker’s 
parable, Job reproaches ‘Huxley the Moleculite, Stuart the Millite, and Tyndall the 
Sadducee’ for paying too little attention to spirituality in their teachings: ‘Miserable 
comforters are ye all, though ye are the men, and wisdom will die with you! When you 
have exhausted your pretty science what have you told me that can touch the agony of 
my heart or bring back the light of my house? ... You throw hard words at me, but you 
have no balm for my healing’ (20). An introductory note to an 1876 reprint of Job’s 
Comforters, written by George Zabriskie Gray, a rector from New Jersey, explains that 
Huxley is a Moleculite because of this view that ‘All mental phenomena are to be 
accounted for by molecular motion and molecular grouping’ (7); Tyndall’s materialism 
makes him comparable to a Sadducee, a member of a politico-religious sect of the 
intertestamental period, who did not believe in the immortality of the soul (9); and Mill 
is a Millite because ‘He was a disciple of no one but his father, James Mill, and believed 
only in himself’ (8). Parker’s Mill is, however, more earnest and hopelessly misguided – 
a true believer in the false religion of science – than egotistical and narrow-minded. 
Indeed, the parable, which, without seeking to denigrate the achievements of Tyndall, 
Huxley and Mill, suggests the inadequacy of an exclusively scientific viewpoint, is 
unusual in representations of Mill for its playfully humorous tone. ‘John Stuart the 
Millite’ becomes uncharacteristically animated as he declares ‘What time I am afraid I 
flee to metaphysics, and when conscience threatens to get the upper hand of me I 
consider the functions and the logical value of the Syllogism’ (19). Mill was understood 
to be a man of science because of his work on logic, which Parker refers to here, and 
also for his work on political economy. Mill was not a practical scientist in the sense that 
                                                 
3 Indeed, this view of utilitarianism has been remarkably persistent, according to Alan Ryan, writing in 
2004: ‘Innumerable students of English Literature go through their whole lives believing that the portrait 
of Mr Gradgrind in Dickens’s Hard Times [1854] is the last word on utilitarianism and on utilitarianism’s 
impact on education, on imagination, and on individual character. But Mill’s essay make it clear that 
Dickens was attacking a straw man; utilitarianism proposed as its ideal the happiness of fully developed 
human beings, not the commercial success of the stunted creatures Mr Gradgrind set out to produce’ (8). 
Ryan’s comment is made in his introduction to the Penguin Classics edition of Utilitarianism and Other 
Essays. From a political scholar’s point of view Mill is misrepresented in English studies as well as in Hard 
Times. 
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Huxley and Tyndall were; in his Autobiography Mill regrets that as a child he only 
became familiar with experimental science by reading about it (35–6). Nevertheless, in 
Job’s Comforters, ‘John Stuart the Millite’ tells Job that:  
When my father ... melted into the infinite azure of the past, I comforted 
myself under such melting by testing Berthollet’s curious law, that two 
soluble salts mutually decompose one another whenever the new 
combinations which result produce an insoluble compound; or one less 
soluble than the two former; and the comforting effect of the experiments 
was remarkable, – so much so that in an ecstasy of scientific surprise and 
delight I almost wished that he had melted sooner, that I might have had 
longer possession of this prize. (19) 
For Parker, then, the difference between practical and abstract science matters less than 
the scientific spirit which he takes Mill to be a representative of, in just the same way as 
Huxley and Tyndall. The playful tone was designed to convey a serious message: 
scientists are detached, bewildered and ineffective in the face of fear, grief, or existential 
crises.  
Not only the content but also the form of Mill’s education was regarded as 
scientific. In Job’s Comforters it is Mill himself who carries out the experiments, but in 
other accounts, he is the one who is subject to the experiment. Abraham Hayward 
resumed the hostile tone he had adopted for Mill’s obituary in the Times, with his 
review of the Autobiography for Fraser’s Magazine. Hayward insisted that the 
Autobiography frequently recalled the scene in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818) 
when the ‘monstrous creation ... reproaches his creator with having formed him in a 
manner to unfit him for happiness or utility’ (‘John Stuart Mill’ 664). Suggesting that 
James Mill was his son’s Frankenstein evoked the novel’s concerns with the enticements 
and drawbacks of scientific work, and how scientific discourse can function to include 
some and exclude others. It also emphasised Mill’s anomalous and isolated state. A 
review of the Autobiography in the Times on 4 November 1873, which claimed that his 
life story was more engaging than any of his other works, used the image of a scientific 
experiment to describe Mill’s education:  
Could we suppose the subject of this terrible process under a glass case, 
hermetically sealed against not only all foreign and inimical, but common 
social influences, breathing an ordained atmosphere, and sustained on 
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chymically [sic] portioned food, that would only represent a fraction of 
the mental coercion he submitted to, and the moral durance he delighted 
to bear. (‘The Autobiography of John Stuart Mill’ 7) 
This description captures the combined sense of horror and fascination which many 
reactions to the Autobiography expressed. It also seems a particularly apt image of the 
scrutiny to which Mill was subject throughout the nineteenth century. The Times drew 
attention to the scientific as well as the literary value of the Autobiography: ‘fortunately 
for the progress of psychological science, we have in this Autobiography as careful and 
exact a record of the experiment as logbooks and automatic instruments could supply’ 
(7). The scientific theme was continued in order to call Mill’s practical abilities into 
question: ‘if the object be to produce intellect in its purest virgin state, without alloy of 
concrete matter, and if this be the rod of iron earth is henceforth to be ruled by, then the 
laboratory that made J.S. Mill was the right one’ (7). Foregrounding hardness, 
inflexibility and lack of feeling, the Times, like Parker, thought that Mill’s education 
made him as unfit to be a leader of thought, as it did to interact normally with others. 
Though practical science is referred to, it is done so to emphasise Mill’s lack of 
worldly knowledge. This becomes bound up with issues of nationality and what 
constitutes a ‘genuinely’ English character. In a continuation of the review on 10 
November, the writer maintains: ‘In all that he wrote or said there is little evidence that 
he knew what an ordinary Englishman, let alone an Englishwoman, is made of. His 
philosophy deals with words, images, the mere counters of a game, all stamped with J.S. 
Mill’s own image and superscription’ (6). This encapsulates many aspects of the 
unsympathetic representations of Mill’s personality and philosophy. It mocks the 
unrelenting seriousness he was commonly associated with. Herbert Cowell, a barrister 
and regular reviewer for Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, lamented the lack of 
‘childish play’ permitted to Mill in his youth (76),4 just as Anne Mozley’s review of 
Subjection for the magazine in 1869 had condemned Mill for ‘his want of playfulness in 
himself and repugnance to it in others’ (107). A writer in the Saturday Review was 
confident that ‘he never was a boy’ (‘Mr Mill’ 638). It suggests the egotism and 
narcissism which Mill is elsewhere accused of (for instance, in Gray’s comment that he 
is ‘John Stuart the Millite’ because he believes only in himself). It also expresses 
anxieties about Mill – known, not only for his anomalous, scientific education, but also 
                                                 
4 David Martin identifies Herbert Cowell as the author of ‘John Stuart Mill: An Autobiography’ in Lives of 
Victorian Political Figures IV (247–9). 
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for his Francophilia and outspoken criticism of English society – as a representative of 
Englishness at home and abroad. Under his ‘glass case’, Mill had been cut off from 
common social interactions. Living only with abstractions he had no understanding of 
the ‘ordinary’ English men and women, whose lives he presumed to philosophise about.  
The anonymous author of The Battle of Two Philosophers (1868) – a response to 
Mill’s Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy (1865) – found it threatening 
that ‘he is looked upon by foreigners as in some sort our national intellectual champion’ 
(2). But elsewhere, commentators lauded Mill’s ‘world-wide fame’: ‘He is one of the 
kings of thought, and his kingdom stretches through the civilized world’, declared 
William D. Christie in Macmillan’s Magazine (‘Mr John Stuart Mill for Westminster’ 92, 
94). When the final volume of Hippolyte Adolphe Taine’s History of English Literature, 
‘Modern Authors’, was published in 1865, Mill appeared alongside Dickens, Thackeray, 
Macaulay, Carlyle and Tennyson as a representative of English literature. The 
Westminster Review said that the essay on Mill’s doctrines was ‘the best exposition and 
fairest estimate of them which has yet been written in any language’ (‘Taine’s History of 
English Literature’ 22). While the Saturday Review found something to smile at ‘in the 
ease with which M. Taine passes from discussing Becky Sharpe to discussing Mill’s logic’ 
they also commended the French author for drawing on a variety of sources in order to 
illustrate ‘the English character’ (‘Taine’s Contemporary English Literature’ 21). In 
suitably Millian style, Taine analyses System of Logic in the form of a dialogue between 
himself and an English friend, which weighs up the strengths and weaknesses of Mill’s 
work. It includes an explanation of why Mill’s philosophy is considered to be scientific:  
What is logic? It is a science. What is its object? The sciences ... . Sciences ... 
are as real things as facts themselves, and therefore, as well as facts, 
become the subject of study. We can analyse them as we analyse facts, 
investigate their elements, composition, order, relations and object. There 
is, therefore, a science of sciences; this science is called logic, and is the 
subject of Mill’s work. (481)  
The Millian abstractions and analyses, which others criticise or mock, are taken by 
Taine to be foundational to English national character and activity. Mill’s distinguishing 
feature is that ‘He excels in giving precision to an idea, in disentangling a principle, in 
discovering it amongst a number of different facts; in refuting, distinguishing, arguing’ 
(480).  
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In his broad view of scientific processes and systems, which helps others to 
clarity, Mill’s writing is sharply distinguished from that of Dickens, whose imagination 
Taine compares to that of a monomaniac: ‘To plunge oneself into an idea, to be absorbed 
by it, to see nothing else, to repeat it under a hundred forms, to enlarge it, to carry it 
thus enlarged to the eye of the spectator, to dazzle and overwhelm him with it ... these 
are the great features of this imagination and style’ (344). Where Dickens dazzles and 
thus ‘moves his reader in the most inner depths, and becomes the master of all hearts’ 
(366), Mill instead helps his reader to a new vision of the world around him. At the end 
of the dialogue, Taine pauses to reflect but is distracted, in a seeming whimsy, by the 
‘lovely August morning’; seeing some ‘enormous trees, four centuries old’ he ‘found in 
them a new trace of that practical good sense which has effected revolutions without 
committing ravages; which, while reforming in all directions, has destroyed nothing ... 
which has lopped off the dead branches without levelling the trunk’ (517). After pages 
of dense analysis of the Logic, this ending conveys a sense of lightness – as if a burden 
has been lifted – very unlike the stance that Light would take in 1882 in describing the 
heaviness induced by reading Mill. Outward rather than inward-looking, Mill’s self-
effacing search for truth is, according to Taine, a reasonable, measured and peaceful 
way of effecting social change. In his new view of the history of social advances 
inscribed in the environment around him, Taine suggests there is a certain poetry and 
romance to Mill’s scientific approach.  
The political economist John Elliott Cairnes also saw ‘scientific’ Mill as a positive 
figure. Cairnes, a friend and disciple of Mill, thought, like John Morley, that Mill was able 
to extend his scientific approach well beyond the realms of theory, to the point where it 
could have an impact on lived experience. In ‘His work in Political Economy’ (1873) he 
argued that the originality of Mill’s contribution to ‘the science of political economy’ was 
obscured by his insistence on fitting his own views into the existing framework of 
thought (72). Unlike those who viewed Mill as hopelessly lost in irrelevant abstractions, 
Cairnes thought that Mill’s innovations to existing theories of political economy were 
nothing but enlivening. He used a suitably embodied image to convey this: ‘[David] 
Ricardo supplied the backbone of the science; but it is not less certain that the limbs, the 
joints, the muscular developments, – all that renders political economy a complete and 
organized body of knowledge, – have been the work of Mill’ (67). Rather than 
Frankenstein’s monster, Mill becomes a kind of successful Frankenstein, creating a 
functioning body out of constituent parts. In stark contrast to the many commentators 
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who portrayed Mill as completely detached from knowledge of ‘ordinary’ human bodies 
and feelings, Cairnes maintained that Mill’s explanation of production, distribution and 
exchange made tangible Ricardo’s abstractions: ‘In Mill’s exposition ... [t]he conditions 
and modes of action are exhibited by which human wants and desires – the motive 
powers of industry – come to issue in the actual phenomena of wealth, and political 
economy becomes a system of doctrines susceptible of direct application to human 
affairs’ (67). Cairnes might have argued that ‘scientific sympathy’ was not an oxymoron 
when it came to Mill’s approach. Cairnes concludes that ‘he has been enabled to divest 
of repulsiveness even the most abstract speculations, and to impart a glow of human 
interest to all that he has touched’ (73).5 This, alongside the image of Mill fleshing out 
the bare bones of political economy, evokes warmth instead of the coldness commonly 
associated with Mill as a man of science.  
 
2.2 ‘Passionate emotionism’ 
Evocations of warmth and heat are more commonly found at the other end of the 
spectrum, in representations which – at the most extreme point – depict Mill as too 
emotional, too fanciful, too susceptible to ‘softer’ influences such as poetry. In another 
anonymous review of Three Essays in 1875, this time for the Dublin Review, the writer 
notes that Mill’s ‘passionate attempts to construct some kind of religious edifice do 
more credit (if we may use the common antithesis) to his heart than to his head. Such 
attempts, we think, are due to that passionate emotionism [sic], which was so very 
prominent and so very singular a part of his character’ (82). The ‘Saint of Rationalism’ – 
in Gladstone’s famous phrase – was, surprisingly often, perceived to be ruled by his 
emotions rather than his intellect. In his Life of John Stuart Mill (1889), the philosopher 
and journalist W.L. Courtney included a letter from Gladstone which explained why Mill 
was called the Saint of Rationalism. It was apparently because Mill was unmoved – to 
the point of complete detachment – by attempts to rile him when he spoke in 
Parliament. But elsewhere, Mill’s enthusiastic praise for his wife’s intellectual abilities, 
and his support for the issues which were considered his ‘crotchets’ when he was in 
Parliament, such as women’s rights and Irish land reform, brought accusations that he 
                                                 
5 That the most abstract of speculations should be considered repulsive gives some weight to the 
argument made by Janice Carlisle in John Stuart Mill and the Writing of Character (1991) about the level of 
prejudice which existed in Victorian Society against theory as opposed to practice. Carlisle’s thesis that 
Mill shared this prejudice against writers, and that his emotional crisis should therefore be read in terms 
of a vocational crisis, is much more problematic; mainly, I believe, because of the way it is used as the key 
to interpreting all of Mill’s life and works. 
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was fanciful, overly-sentimental, even delusional.6 Abraham Hayward in Fraser’s 
Magazine noted that, soundly, Mill had introduced balance to his philosophy after his 
mental crisis, before observing: ‘Unluckily he did not maintain the due balance. He ran 
off into the opposite extreme, and suffered feeling to overcome judgement to an extent 
almost unparalleled in the history of mind; at least a mind like his’ (672). Hayward 
thought that Mill had behaved in such an unprecedentedly irrational way because of his 
feelings for Harriet Taylor, which were ‘an extravagant delusion’ (672). He implied that 
Mill had betrayed his rationalist roots, at the same time as finding that rationalism 
inadequate. In the Spectator, R.H. Hutton insisted that Mill’s view of his wife was an 
hallucination (‘Mr John Stuart Mill’s Autobiography’ 1338), as did Bain in his biography 
(171), and Goldwin Smith, writing on ‘Female Suffrage’ in Macmillan’s Magazine in 
1874. Smith, a Professor of Law at Oxford, and later the first Professor of English at 
Cornell University, felt that the Autobiography, by revealing details of Mill’s 
‘extraordinary’ education and ‘singular’ marriage, also exposed areas where his 
judgement was clouded and his authority weakened (268).7  
In 1896, Frederic Harrison, a positivist and author, who had served on the 
committee Mill headed for the prosecution of Governor Eyre, wrote a retrospective 
assessment of Mill’s influence in the Nineteenth Century and After. Harrison claimed to 
be an impartial judge of Mill because he combined ‘vehement aversion to some of Mill’s 
                                                 
6 In A Moralist In and Out of Parliament (1992), John M. Robson discusses Mill’s ‘crotchets’. At a meeting 
on 3 July 1865, during Mill’s election campaign, Mill introduced the idea of his ‘crotchets’. Without 
specifying what they were he argued that ‘the crotchet of one generation, becomes the truth of the next 
and the truism of the one after’ (qtd. in Kinzer, Robson and Robson 63). 
7 There has been an extensive scholarly debate about the significance of Mill’s praise for Harriet. Jack 
Stillinger’s dismissive comment in his 1971 introduction to the Autobiography – ‘It is unfortunate that Mill 
did not simply thank his wife for encouragement, perhaps also for transcribing a manuscript or making an 
index, and let it go at that’ (xix) – has its echoes in later scholarship. In John Stuart Mill (1998), Stafford 
remarked: ‘Serious doubts hang over what he writes about Harriet Taylor Mill. She must have been a 
remarkable woman, intelligent, committed and inspirational. But it is difficult to believe that she was as 
brilliant as Mill said’ (46). In English Pasts (1999) Collini describes Mill’s praise for Harriet in the 
Autobiography as ‘his embarrassing eulogy’ (123). Other critics have been less dismissive, and have 
sought to understand the complexities of Mill’s view of his wife. In ‘The Feminization of John Stuart Mill’, 
Susan Groag Bell argues that in his representation of Harriet, Mill drew on a Romantic model of 
extravagant praise for women, but rather than focusing on ‘beauty and rapture’, he combined this 
Romantic sensibility with his own keen sense that women’s intellectual abilities must be fully 
acknowledged (86–90). In Subjectivities: A History of Self-Representation in Britain, 1832–1920 (1991), 
Regenia Gagnier argues that ‘whatever Harriet Taylor Mill’s psychological effect upon her husband, her 
appearances in the Autobiography function rhetorically to represent the consistency of Mill’s private 
desire and political project. Opposed to stereotypes, he represented his wife as a thinker greater than the 
men of his age; opposed to the subjection of some to others, he made her his collaborator’, 256. Works by 
Jo Ellen Jacobs – The Complete Works of Harriet Taylor Mill (1998) and The Voice of Harriet Taylor Mill 
(2002) have foregrounded Harriet’s role in the collaboration. 
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cherished ideals and doctrines’ (such as criticism of Harrison’s ‘master’ Auguste Comte) 
with ‘a deep reverence for his noble qualities’ (488). Rather than achieving impartiality, 
Harrison’s estimate of Mill vacillates between criticism and praise in just the way these 
two extremes suggest. In reverential mode, Harrison asked his readers to consider 
‘what tenderness underlies the precise statements even of such pieces as the 
Autobiography, the Subjection of Women, and the Liberty: pieces which are red-hot 
within with affection, pity, and passion’ (489). As a consequence, he remembered, ‘Some 
of us were always more attracted by Mill’s character than by his intellect: we rated his 
heart above his brain: and his failures seemed to us mental, not moral perversities’ 
(489). In suggesting that Mill’s personality and compassion outshone his intellect, 
Harrison presented a much more appealing portrait than Carlyle, James Fitzjames 
Stephen and Hutton (discussed in the next chapter), who thought that Mill’s intellect 
was so dominant it rendered him disembodied, characterless and unmanly. But in the 
same move he clearly wished to indicate that Mill’s philosophical credentials were not 
as unassailable as some maintained: 
The truth is that Mill, for all his apparent proof armour of dry logic, was 
continually moved by what has been called ‘the logic of feeling’. He was 
excessively sensitive and indeed impressionable; and was often carried 
away by new ideas and intense feelings. In the course of his career he 
passed through the tremendous grinding of Bentham and James Mill’s 
cast-iron machine, and ultimately ended in social utopias and sentimental 
ideals. It was said of the great Condorcet that he was a volcano covered 
with snow. And Mill had something of that temperament – without, a 
method of severe logic, within, intense sympathy and aspirations after 
new ideals. (505)  
‘The Logic of Feeling’ was a term of Comte’s which G.H. Lewes appropriated in Problems 
of Life and Mind (1879) to designate ‘those mental processes in which the elements of 
the judgement or the determinants of the act are sensations, perceptions, images, 
appetites, instincts, or emotions’ (238). The ‘Animal Logic – the Logic of Feeling –’ said 
Lewes, ‘is never critical, always intuitive’ (228). In evoking these associations to account 
for the waning of Mill’s influence at the end of the century, Harrison denied Mill one of 
the fundamentals of Millian philosophy – agency to decide one’s own course in life. 
Harrison’s Mill is acted upon by Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, then carried away by 
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his reaction against them into the realms of idealism and impracticality. ‘A volcano 
covered with snow’ corresponds somewhat with Carlyle’s image of Mill imprisoned in 
ice and stone as a result of his upbringing, which I discuss in the next chapter. Mill’s 
iciness and stoniness were Carlyle’s preoccupations; Harrison’s volcano reference 
places much more emphasis on the blazing inferno at the core: unstable and liable to 
erupt in spectacular, devastating fashion. A theatre critic and writer, Thomas Purnell, 
thought that as a politician, Mill demonstrated just such unpredictability, giving way to 
furies and passions that undermined the authority of his writings and rendered him ‘a 
lost philosopher’ (61). Harrison concluded that Mill’s sensitivity and passion 
‘overpowered his science’, leading to unexpected inconsistencies in his philosophy 
(508). 
 At the scientific end of the spectrum Mill’s anomalous position was often 
emphasised to denote a lack of feeling and sympathy for others. But when connected to 
sensitivity and emotion, his isolation denoted naïveté. ‘Goethe and Mill: A Contrast’ 
(1874), published in the Westminster Review, stated that ‘Mill had not the splendid 
vitality of Goethe, and was thus spared many of the sensual temptations to which the 
latter too often yielded’; nevertheless, ‘of “reason divine, red-hot with passion pure” ... 
Mill was the very embodiment’ (52). The article, which stressed Goethe’s greater 
worldliness throughout, presented them as ‘essentially antagonistic natures’ because 
‘Goethe looked upon Bentham as a Radical madman and Mill was but a spiritualized 
Bentham’ (70). Nevertheless ‘Goethe and Mill’ concludes that their one, overriding point 
of union was their desire for social improvement.  
Mill’s ‘red-hot’ passion was not construed as sexual, but as religious in spirit. In a 
memorial essay called ‘His Place as a Critic’ the literary scholar William Minto 
characterised Mill’s aesthetic sense as ‘interpenetrated by a certain militant apostolic 
fervour; his love was as the love of a religious soldier for a patron saint who extends her 
aid and countenance to him in his wars’ (51). Cowell, in Blackwood’s Edinburgh 
Magazine, labelled Mill ‘incarnate analysis’, but the context of this designation was Mill’s 
relationship with Harriet Taylor: ‘Incarnate analysis was in love, and, of course, with the 
wrong woman’ (84). This, thought Cowell, was corroboration of Mill’s innate qualities, 
which had much in common with those a Romantic poet was typically assumed to 
possess: 
He had the ardent sympathies, the imaginative faculty, the love of nature, 
and the disposition to worship and revere which would have united him 
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to his kind. His father failed to crush them out, but he fixed a gulf between 
his son and the world which was never afterwards filled up. Mill went 
through life fitted to excel in the pursuit of abstract science; but 
hopelessly wrong in his estimate of men and women, and unversed in 
practical life. (80–1) 
Had Mill’s innate sympathy and imagination been developed in conjunction with his 
intellect he would have been able to connect with other people, and this would have 
made him truly great, argued Cowell. In particular, the ‘disposition to worship and 
revere’ which Mill revealed in his relationship with Harriet Taylor, should have been 
nurtured; as it was, ‘Religion was crushed out of Mr Mill from his cradle by an artificial 
process’ (90).  
Mill was not religious in any orthodox sense, as Tomahawk drew attention to in 
their cartoon ‘“Not for Jo”(hn) Stuart Mill, or A Smith for Westminster’ on 7 November 
1868 (Figure 1). In a reference to Mill’s donation to the campaign fund of the radical 
atheist Charles Bradlaugh, Tomahawk depicted ‘Mister Mill’ fishing for voters next to a 
bag of bait marked ‘Atheism’, ‘Dreams’, and ‘Claptrap’ (202). However, other 
commentators found evidence of Mill’s religious disposition in his unstinting pursuit of 
social change and his unquenchable quest for knowledge and truth. In 1868, Punch even 
gave this religious association pictorial form, by having Mill appear at the head of their 
‘Essence of Parliament’ column dressed as a priest, holding a baby in a dress marked 
political economy, standing next to an M-shaped altar (Figure 2). Punch depicted Mill 
‘christening’ a new kind of political economy for Ireland in a reference to his speech on 
‘The State of Ireland’, delivered to the House of Commons on 12 March 1868.  
In The Hopes of the Human Race, Hereafter and Here (1880), Frances Power 
Cobbe added a footnote to her criticism of Three Essays: 
Let it be understood that, in speaking of the Religious Sentiment as 
deficient in Mr Mill’s nature, I use the term expressly in the sense of that 
spiritual organ whereby man obtains direct perception of the Living God. In 
the broader meaning of the word, implying general reverence and 
tenderness towards all things noble and holy, – a sense of the mystery 
surrounding human life, and a fervent devotion to the ideal of Duty, – Mr 
Mill was assuredly an eminently religious man. (202, Cobbe’s emphasis) 
59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. ‘“Not for Jo”(hn) Stuart Mill, or A Smith for Westminster’. Tomahawk. 7 November 1868. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Illustration accompanying 
‘Essence of Parliament’. Punch.  
21 March 1868. 
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Three Essays displeased Christians and secularists in equal measure. Cobbe objected to 
the portrayal of God as ‘so feeble a Being’ (198): Mill had conceded the possibility that 
an intelligent mind had created the world, but added that if such a supernatural being 
existed, it was limited in its powers and benevolence. Like the Leisure Hour reviewer, 
she was disappointed that a man such as Mill should not have any recognisable faith. 
However, in a laudatory obituary of Mill in Harper’s New Monthly Magazine the 
American social reformer Moncure Conway thought that it mattered little if Mill’s 
religious feeling did not express itself in conventional ways when, ‘it is probable that if 
Mr Mill’s intimate friends were one and all asked to-day what they considered the 
profoundest element in their great friend’s character, each would reply: his essential 
religiousness’ (534). Conway shared Cobbe’s estimate of Mill’s magnanimity of soul, 
without a corresponding sense of regret.  
Abnormal, but also marvellous: many accounts dwelt on Mill’s anomalous and 
isolated position. The Blackwood’s reviewer, Cowell, used a geological metaphor to 
accentuate this: 
The abnormal development of intellect, joined to singular ignorance of life 
and all its incidents, rendered him a portent; but the fact that a rich vein 
of poetry, and a real tenderness of nature, lay beneath, oppressed but not 
driven out by the iron discipline he had endured, gives the real and 
enduring interest to the subsequent pages of the book. (81) 
In 1891, in Tess of the D’Urbervilles (as I discuss in chapter four), Hardy was to reverse 
this image in his description of the intractable element hidden within Angel Clare’s 
gentleness and affection: ‘a hard logical deposit, like a vein of metal in a soft loam, which 
turned the edge of everything that attempted to traverse it’ (241). For Blackwood’s, it 
was Mill’s tenderness that was buried within him: influencing everything but unlikely, 
as Harrison suggested, to ‘overpower his science’. Cowell identified the contrast 
between the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ aspects of Mill’s life story as the most compelling aspect of 
the Autobiography and many others agreed. 
 
2.3 ‘Duality of character’ 
In December 1873, local and national newspapers covered the fourth Earl of 
Carnarvon’s lecture to the Birkbeck Literary and Scientific Institution on the occasion of 
its fiftieth anniversary. Carnarvon spoke about the increasing tendency for education to 
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prioritise science and warned about the dangers of neglecting the softening and refining 
influences of literary and religious studies. The prevailing scientific bias had unwelcome 
implications for the types of leaders and policies which would be seen in the future, 
argued Carnarvon, recalling the fear expressed the previous month in the Times about 
rule by rod of iron. On 8 December the Pall Mall Gazette reported: ‘When science was 
pushed to the extreme his lordship said its professors would not be the best rulers for 
mankind, and he, for one, should regret to see the affairs of men regulated solely by such 
a standard as they should apply’ (‘Summary of this Morning’s News’ 6). On 12 December 
in a piece on ‘The Lesson’s of Mill’s Autobiography’, the Pall Mall Gazette again made 
reference to Carnarvon’s lecture: 
Speaking of a certain narrowness and want of liberality which he imputes 
as too common a result of education in abstract science, he would quote, 
he said, an illustration from ‘one of the most remarkable and touching 
books he had ever read – the autobiography of John Stuart Mill. He should 
be sorry to take Mr Mill as a representative of hard, abstract science; for 
throughout his nature there ran veins of feeling softer and more tender 
than he was willing himself to allow ... Those who had read the book 
would remember how carefully Mr Mill – partly under the influence of his 
father and partly through self-education – endeavoured not merely to 
suppress but to trample down and to crush out everything approaching to 
feeling in his nature’. (10) 
As the Pall Mall Gazette reported it, Carnarvon went one step further than Blackwood’s 
in describing the effect produced by reading the Autobiography – for him the contrast 
between the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ elements of Mill’s life were not only compelling, but 
moving. Carnarvon attributed much more agency to Mill than other commentators, who 
gave James Mill sole responsibility for crushing out, starving or cramping his son’s 
feelings. The Pall Mall Gazette disagreed with Carnarvon about the effect of Mill’s 
education. They suggested that his ‘veins of feeling’ had been strengthened by it, rather 
than repressed; his sentiment and his sympathies were prevented from becoming 
fanaticism by the strength and clarity of his intellect. Moreover, both sides of his 
personality were partly the result of nature and partly the result of nurture. He 
developed ‘an “indignation” like Swift’s, not only fierce but profound, ingrained in his 
disposition’. ‘As a political writer and thinker’, the Pall Mall Gazette averred, ‘he played 
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through great part of his life a double part, his reason moving in one direction, his heart 
in another. This duality of character comes to light in almost every memorial which he 
has left’. Though the Pall Mall Gazette initially implies a kind of balance induced by the 
presence of such duality, by invoking what the Dublin Review was to call the ‘common 
antithesis’ of head and heart, it also suggests that this was at best a precarious balance, 
involving Mill in a constant battle between different aspects of his personality.  
The Pall Mall Gazette’s report highlights another perceived clash: Mill’s personal 
lack of liberality versus his political liberalism. Noah Porter, a Professor of Moral 
Philosophy and Metaphysics at Yale College, writing in 1875 in Dickinson’s Theological 
Quarterly, thought that Mill’s ‘Nature’ essay demonstrated a particularly regrettable 
regression:  
Though written in the maturity of the powers of the author, after he had 
felt and acknowledged the liberalizing and elevating influences of both 
poetry and love, and had learned to be catholic in judging, and kindly in 
appreciating, the opinions and feelings of men from whom he differed 
very widely, this essay seems to reflect the narrowest and the most acrid 
spirit of his unripe youth ... . (67) 
Porter’s comments, read in conjunction with the Pall Mall Gazette’s, indicate the extent 
to which Mill’s literary interests were bound up with his politics; his receptivity to 
poetry was perceived by some as an integral part of his liberalism. Here, Harriet Taylor 
is portrayed as a positive influence in this respect, just as Mill himself insisted.  
Hutton, who thought Mill’s view of Harriet’s influence was embarrassingly 
inaccurate, also thought that such a mental crisis as Mill underwent was ‘never followed 
by a less radical moral change’ (‘Mr John Stuart Mill’s Autobiography’ 1339). Though 
Hutton felt that Mill’s recourse to Wordsworth and Coleridge had given him a huge 
advantage over his fellow utilitarians, he also insisted that Mill’s compassion for others 
remained too abstract throughout his life. According to Hutton, Mill had: ‘... no pleasure 
in men, no delight in actual intercourse with this strange, various, homely world of 
motley faults and virtues. ... His tastes were refined, but there was a want of homeliness 
about his hopes’ (1339). Hutton suggests that the effect of Mill’s mental crisis was to 
create the impression of a vast change or growth in his thought, which succeeded in 
widening his philosophical and political influence. However, Hutton felt that it was an 
impression of change and growth only: in actuality his philosophy and his politics 
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merely became ambiguous because of this literary influence. Likewise, Hayward 
complained that both Mill’s personality and his philosophy were inescapably 
contradictory: ‘the harder and softer elements of his character never blended; they rose 
to the surface alternately; and hence much of the subsequent incoherence of his 
opinions and his life’ (‘John Stuart Mill’ 673).  
A Baptist minister from New York, Cephas Bennett Crane, invoked opposite ends 
of the spectrum simultaneously in order to portray Mill as completely incoherent. In 
rhetorical mode – ‘John Stuart Mill and Christianity’ was given as an address to the 
Rochester Theological Seminary before it was published in Baptist Quarterly in 1874 
(Sell 8) – Crane declared that Mill was: 
A product of culture, rather than of nature; incisive, rather than 
comprehensive; cold, yet capable of torrid heats; a vassal to persons, yet a 
despiser of the public; a discoverer, but not an inventor; analytic, but not 
synthetic; a slave to prejudice, yet inquisitive and innovating; refined, yet 
often coarse; self-controlled, yet erratic; challenging admiration, yet 
disappointing admiration; kindling enthusiasm, yet quenching 
enthusiasm; scientific, yet unscientific; a builder, yet not a founder; a 
Uhlan [a soldier], but not a general; a gatherer of material, but not an 
organizer of material; it is easy to over-estimate him, equally easy to 
under-estimate him. (11) 
Crane’s Mill was composed of a breathtaking series of contradictions. What Mill denies 
in his Autobiography – that he was a ‘mere parroter’ of his father’s opinions (45) – Crane 
asserts emphatically in order to undermine what he felt to be Mill’s insufficiently 
reverential account of Christianity: ‘James Mill is the explanation of John Stuart Mill’ 
(10). In Crane’s view, culture is that which is opposed to the natural – and therefore the 
divine – so Mill could be eminently ‘cultured’ and still lack the requisites of a 
philosopher. The force of Crane’s hostility against Mill is evident in the way he attempts 
to deny, not only Mill’s intellectual status, but also his status as an autonomous 
individual, capable of ordinary human interactions. Rather than duality, Crane creates 
the impression of nonentity. Crane’s warning that it is as easy to underestimate Mill as it 
is to overestimate him, is telling. This warning resonates with many of the reactions to 
Three Essays and other negative criticism of Mill. Mill’s wide influence, throughout his 
lifetime, had to be tackled by those wishing to challenge his ideas. One way to do this 
64 
was to dwell on or exaggerate the perceived inconsistencies in his personality and 
philosophy – Crane’s list is an extreme example of this approach. 
A more generous view of Mill’s perceived inconsistencies was taken by James 
Baldwin Brown, a Congregationalist preacher, who was known for his support of 
working-class causes and Dissenters (Sell xxx). Writing on ‘Mr John Stuart Mill’s 
Legacies’ (1874) in the Evangelical Magazine and Missionary Chronicle, he thought that 
after reading Three Essays ‘Multitudes who have thought of him as a cold, hard, 
incarnate thinking-machine will be profoundly thankful to find that he shared that 
aspiration for a wider and nobler field of thought and activity than this life can furnish’ 
(39). Moreover, he ‘was always breaking out of the bounds of his dark sad philosophy, 
and flashing out sentiments, resolutions, aspirations and hopes, which had their origin 
and justification in a quite higher sphere’ (40). Though Baldwin Brown evidently 
discerned two sides to Mill, his language suggests there was an appealing sparkiness 
and irrepressibility to Mill’s oscillations. Baldwin Brown’s ‘breaking out’ reads much 
more positively than the Times’s use of a similar phrase in their review of the 
Autobiography: ‘It was only when nature did at last break through the biggest and 
tightest swaddling clothes ever strapped round human soul that Mr Mill was discovered 
to be a lovable and interesting person’ (7). For Baldwin Brown, Mill’s philosophical 
inconsistencies and contradictions did much to humanise him in the eyes of others, 
making it easier for them to identify with him, and it was this that underpinned his wide 
influence.  
 
2.4 ‘Emotional synthesis’ 
Between the representations of imbalance were those that maintained that Mill’s 
greatness was based on his ability to synthesise his ‘passionate emotionism’, and an 
appreciation of the imaginative, with a scientific approach. When, on 10 May 1873, the 
Spectator reported Mill’s death, it commented that ‘He had his father’s abilities softened 
by a touch of poetry and a capacity for wide sympathy which raised talent into genius’ 
(‘News of the Week’ 589). This view accords with the Leisure Hour’s, that Mill was a 
scientist first, and a man of imagination and sentiment second. But while, for the Leisure 
Hour, Mill’s sentimentalisms were ‘alien’ to his ‘true genius’, in the Spectator’s news 
item, his appreciation of poetry and his sympathy were the qualities which transformed 
his other abilities into genius. W.L. Courtney said that ‘He had been declared to be Adam 
Smith and Petrarch rolled into one; and if he thus combined sentimentalism with the 
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doctrines of political economy, he equally exhibited the cold clearness of the Rationalist 
thinker, tempered by the emotional warmth of high moral ideas’ (Life of John Stuart Mill 
143). For Courtney, this balance of qualities demonstrated Mill’s practical abilities. 
Henry Fawcett, in ‘His influence at the Universities’, thought that Mill’s appreciation of 
subjects other than his specialism – such as poetry – was the defining feature of his 
liberalism: ‘avowing himself a liberal, he never forgot that it is the essence of true 
liberalism to be tolerant of opinions from which one differs, and to appreciate the 
advantages of branches of learning to which one has not devoted special attention’ (79). 
Contrastingly, argued Fawcett, those who are too caught up in a specialist subject, and 
have no desire to supplement their knowledge with a broader view, are frequently 
sneering and illiberal (79).  
The Reader article on ‘John Stuart Mill and His Influence’, discussed in the 
Preface, argued that though the philosopher is distinct from the poet, there is 
nonetheless something poetic in the philosopher’s abilities: ‘... the poetic mode or cast of 
genius is distinguishable from that which is more expressly, exclusively, perseveringly, 
and systematically poetic. This latter cast of mind – the genius of the philosopher or 
pure reasoner – is, in its higher degrees, quite as rare as the higher degrees of the poetic 
intellect’ (376, emphasis in original). Other commentators compared Mill to great poets, 
dramatists, and novelists in his grasp of the human condition. Georg Brandes, the 
influential critic who wrote the first Danish translation of Subjection, commenting on 
Mill’s description of Harriet, preferred to attribute his praise to poetry rather than 
hallucination: ‘I do not know that any poet has ever given truer or more passionate 
expression to loving reverence of a woman’s nature than he has in the passage which 
conveys his esteem of her worth and lasting influence’ (Eminent Authors 126). When 
Mill died, Kate Amberley’s sister wrote: ‘One feels in reading about him, what a tender 
poet he was besides being a stern philosopher – What an education of the mind & soul 
you have had all these years thro yr [sic] intercourse with him’ (qtd. in Russell 2: 541).  
For Mill’s disciple, John Morley, if On Liberty’s style did not match the literary 
grandeur of Milton’s Areopagitica (1644), ‘the idealism of it, the enthusiasm sustained 
as it was for page after page, very nearly approached the electrifying region of the 
poetic, in the eyes of ardent men and women in our age’ (Recollections I: 62–3).When it 
came to Victor Hugo, Morley thought Mill failed to grasp that  
... by bringing all the strength of his imagination and all the majestic 
fullness of his sympathy to bear on the social horrors and injustices which 
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still lie so thick about us, he kindled an inextinguishable fire in the hearts 
of men of weaker initiative and less imperial gifts alike of imagination and 
sympathy, and so prepared the forces out of which practical proposals 
and specific improvements may be expected to issue. (‘Mr Mill’s 
Autobiography’ 149–50) 
In the end, though, Morley thought that Mill’s view of Hugo reflected ‘how afraid he 
always was of everything that seemed to dissociate emotion from rationally directed 
effort’ (150), thus demonstrating that Mill’s sense of pity and injustice was as acute as 
Hugo’s own. In his review of On Liberty for Fraser’s Magazine, the historian Henry 
Buckle suggested that Mill had the same ability as Shakespeare to touch the surface and 
penetrate the centre of human problems (26). Of Shakespeare he said ‘No other mind 
has thoroughly interwoven the remote with the proximate, the general with the special, 
the abstract with the concrete. No other mind has so completely incorporated the 
speculations of the highest philosophy with the meanest details of the lowest life’ (28) – 
except, suggested Buckle, for Mill.  
In the coverage of Mill’s parliamentary career, Mill’s aptitude for interweaving in 
this way was the subject of intense scrutiny. He became interchangeably a literary 
figure or a man of science because literature and science were perceived as theoretical, 
and therefore opposed to the practical business of Parliament. In April 1865, the Reader 
ran an article on ‘Literature and Statesmanship’ which began: 
The requisition to John Stuart Mill to allow himself to be nominated as a 
candidate for the representation of Westminster raises questions which 
are of special importance to those who have at heart the best interests of 
literature. How far is a great writer qualified for the duties of a 
statesman? Is a man whose distinguishing characteristic is the possession 
of an acute and powerful intellect worthy of a seat in the House of 
Commons? Ought literature and science to be specially represented in 
Parliament, and have a voice in the affairs of the nation? (389) 
The article was a response to a piece in the Morning Advertiser – ‘the organ of the 
Licensed Victuallers’ Association’ (Brake and  Demoor 258) – which had suggested that 
Dickens or Tennyson would be a more suitable candidate for parliament than Mill, on 
the grounds of their popular appeal. The Morning Advertiser had insisted that Mill ‘has 
no deep sympathies with the people. He belongs to the cold, dry, cheerless, dictionary 
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school of politicians’ (qtd. in ‘Literature and Statesmanship’ 389). Further, it maintained 
that ‘Mr Mill is little known out of certain scientific circles. His great book on logic has 
been before the public some twenty years, and has not been sold to the extent of 5,000 
copies; while of the chief works of Dickens the sale has reached 150,000. The multitude 
would be moved at the names of Dickens or Tennyson, but of Mill they know little or 
nothing’ (qtd. in ‘Literature and Statesmanship’ 389). The unsigned article in the Reader 
pointed out that if sales alone were to be the criterion then the novelists who 
contributed to the London Journal, a best-selling penny weekly, would be the ‘fittest 
literary candidate[s]’ (389). The writer of the Reader article, resolutely supportive of 
Mill, declared that ‘... the writers least qualified for seats in Parliament are novelists. 
They have no leisure for studying the complicated problems of government. Their 
minds are turned towards depicting the various grades and phases of society. They aim 
at telling attractive stories rather than solving social problems’ (389). The Reader did 
not deny the importance of Dickens’s role as a social commentator: ‘So long as he writes 
novels containing eulogies on the poor and the oppressed, sparkling with sarcasm 
against the rich and the foolish, overflowing with attacks upon the administration of our 
Courts of Law and the management of our Government offices, he will fulfil the end for 
which he was obviously created’ (389). But Mill’s philosophy had demonstrated his 
potential to step out of ‘the solitude of his closet’ and become a statesman and a 
legislator (389). Moreover, the conditions which he imposed on his nomination – 
particularly his stipulation that he would not contribute to his election expenses – 
proved him to be a model for any future ‘literary candidate[s]’ (389). For the Morning 
Advertiser Mill was part of ‘scientific circles’ and as such, distinct from novelists and 
poets. For the Reader, Mill was a ‘literary candidate’, though nevertheless to be 
distinguished from Dickens and Tennyson. 
 In ‘Literary Candidates’ on 1 April 1865, the Saturday Review mocked the 
Morning Advertiser for suggesting that Tennyson and Dickens would make more 
effective Members of Parliament than Mill, on the grounds of their popularity, without 
wholly supporting Mill’s candidacy either. ‘Literary Candidates’ was ambivalent about 
the connection between ‘literary success and political capacity’ (371), worrying that if 
more authors were in Parliament ‘the material interests of the nation might suffer from 
the excessively spiritual characteristics of its rulers’ (370). The article acknowledged 
the literary successes of Benjamin Disraeli and Edward Bulwer Lytton, but saw this as 
incidental to their political lives. Nonetheless, in the same issue of the Saturday Review 
68 
‘Westminster Candidates’ offered more support for Mill. Though Mill’s doctrines were 
known to verge on ‘extreme Liberalism’, he would still add ‘authority to Liberal 
theories’ (359). ‘Westminster Candidates’ put forward the view that Mill would be an 
MP who taught, rather than learnt, which would be a welcome novelty: Mill would bring 
diversity to Parliament, and a philosopher in the House of Commons was therefore an 
experiment that should be tried. On 13 May, in ‘The Westminster Election’, the Saturday 
Review continued to call for Mill’s election on the grounds of the greater variety he 
would introduce to Parliament as a theorist. His presence would go some way towards 
redressing the bias towards representatives of the ‘prosaic side’ of English life (558). 
Those who thought that Mill’s arguments would in all cases be ‘unpractical or crotchety’ 
were borrowing terms of contempt ‘from the arsenal of complacent dullness’ (558). 
Very unusually, in this context, the familiar image of Mill as a thinking machine is given 
positive connotations: ‘it is evident that cases in which Mr Mill’s advice would be 
extremely valuable would be constantly occurring; he would be a kind of animated 
calculating machine, capable of being turned on at any political or economical problem’ 
(559). 
 In May 1865, William D. Christie, a diplomat who knew Mill personally, wrote ‘Mr 
John Stuart Mill for Westminster’ for Macmillan’s Magazine. He looked back to Mill’s 
articles published in the Westminster Review between 1835 and 1840 to provide 
evidence of Mill’s practical political engagement. In those articles, Christie said, ‘Mr Mill 
appears constantly as the anxious observer, the counsellor, the critic, the animator and 
inspirer of a party of parliamentary Liberals, not inconsiderable in number and very 
distinguished in talents and character’ (94). What provided evidence of Mill’s suitability 
for a parliamentary career was that ‘those numerous articles are mingled with many 
others on subjects of poetry and general philosophy’ (96). He continued: 
The time is past of vulgar abuse of philosophic politicians and political 
economists; but, if any vestige of old prejudices remain, it is well that the 
electors of Westminster have undertaken the task of carrying to the 
House of Commons one whose eminent philosophy embraces all letters, 
art, and imagination, combines the ancient and the new, reform and 
tradition, the principle of permanence and the principle of progression, 
the practical spirit of Bentham and the reverent ideal politics of Coleridge 
– is catholic, practical, genial, sympathetic ... . (96) 
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Again, Mill’s receptivity to literature and the arts, and his ability to relate them to other 
areas of knowledge, becomes a defining feature of his liberalism. Christie states more 
wholeheartedly the views expressed in the Saturday Review, that Mill’s range of 
integrated and practically applicable knowledge would do much to shake up, not just 
the views of his fellow Liberals, but the complacency and dullness of the entire House of 
Commons.  
The strongest denial that Mill was a man of extremes and inconsistencies was 
given by Morley, in his review of the Autobiography for the Fortnightly Review in 1874. 
For Morley, Mill’s intelligence was all about stability, organic structure and order. Mill’s 
opinions did not vacillate, shift or flit about; they were adaptable and pliable in a way 
that distinguished him positively from his father: they were – in a phrase which 
anticipates the Leisure Hour’s phrase ‘desire of culture’ – a ‘feeling outwards’ (141). 
Mill’s ‘intellectual impressionableness on the most important subjects of human thought 
was so cultivated as almost to acquire the strength and quick responsiveness of 
emotional sensibility’ (140), said Morley, perhaps responding to Hutton when he 
insisted that this finely-calibrated sensibility denoted strength rather than the 
weakness of over-refinement. If the Autobiography did not take the reader up to 
‘enkindled summits’, then neither did it take the reader down into abysses (142). It was 
quiet, practical and self-effacing – just like its author. Though Morley said that the 
Autobiography was not a work of imagination or art, he was far from denying Mill any 
creativity. Morley said that Mill’s self-consciously persistent attention to difficult 
subjects was common to ‘every truly scientific thinker’, but that what distinguished Mill 
from others was the systematic way he expanded this, bringing it to bear on moral and 
social issues (143). It was always this mixture of skills and perspectives that 
differentiated Mill’s works as far as Morley was concerned; Subjection was notable for 
‘the combined rationality and beauty of its aspirations’ (153) and over all, his originality 
was based on the way he acquired ‘plenary possession of truths’ before transfusing them 
‘with sympathetic and contagious enthusiasm’ (154, Morley’s emphasis). Morley 
describes how Mill introduced balance into his life as a result of his mental crisis: 
[His] dejection was dispelled mainly by the influence of Wordsworth – a 
poet austere yet gracious, energetic yet sober, penetrated with feeling for 
nature yet penetrated with feeling for the homely lot of man. Here was the 
emotional synthesis, binding together the energies of the speculative and 
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active mind by sympathetic interest in the common feelings and common 
destiny of human beings’ (155). 
If Wordsworth balanced austerity with grace, and energy with sobriety, then so, after 
reading him, did Mill. Morley though that Mill’s appreciation of this emotional synthesis 
became the keynote of his life and work, challenging Hutton’s claim that Mill’s hopes 
lacked ‘homeliness’. Mill’s was ‘a perfect rationality’ because intellect was allied to 
emotion, and the abstract to the everyday (140). 
 When Mill’s Three Essays were published, Morley objected strongly to the 
concessions he felt ‘the rationalist master’ had made to supernaturalism (Recollections 
106). These were: the possibility that the universe was created by an ‘Intelligent Mind’, 
albeit one whose powers, and benevolence, were limited; the possibility that Christ, 
therefore, had a God-given role; the possibility, however slight, that there was an after-
life and the validity of holding such a hope where it gave comfort (Mr Mill’s Three Essays 
166–8). Morley deeply regretted that Mill had not made known his thoughts on 
evolutionary theory and its moral and social applications (184), and he was not alone in 
expressing this opinion. The anonymous reviewer in British Quarterly Review, who 
noted that Three Essays showed no evidence of the spiritual progress he made by 
reading poetry, also found that Mill strangely ignored ‘modern science’ (63). The 
secularist George William Foote, complained in 1887 that ‘Mill neither understood nor 
felt the force of Darwinism’ (222). By the time that Morley came to write his 
‘Valedictory’ piece for the Fortnightly Review in 1882, he indirectly acknowledged the 
negative impact of Three Essays but returned to the sense of balance he had previously 
attributed to Mill: ‘Time has done something to impair the philosophical reputation and 
political celebrity of J.S. Mill; but it cannot alter the affectionate memory in which some 
of us must always hold his wisdom and goodness, his rare union of moral ardour with a 
calm and settled mind’ (283). Then, in a piece on ‘The Life of George Eliot’ (1885), 
Morley described Eliot’s ability to systematise the ideas of different thinkers. Morley 
quoted passages from Wordsworth’s The Prelude (1850), which Eliot had used as 
epigraphs in Daniel Deronda (1876) to illustrate her ‘growth and diversity of opinion’ 
(312). Underneath this growth and diversity of opinion, Morley said, ‘we see George 
Eliot’s oneness of character, just, for that matter, as we see it in Mill’s long and grave 
march from the uncompromising denials instilled into him by his father, then through 
Wordsworthian mysticism and Coleridgean conservatism, down to the pale belief and 
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dim starlight faith of his posthumous volume’ (312). Thus Morley’s view of the parity 
between Eliot and Mill strikes a very different note to the Light article in 1882.  
 I conclude this chapter with a piece from the Spectator which is particularly 
interesting for the way it strikes a different note to many representations of Mill’s talent 
for synthesis. ‘Mr John Stuart Mill as a Politician’ (1865) suggested that Mill’s presence 
in Parliament would produce the same effect as his books did: it would be both edifying 
and energising.  
He is a thinker, but a thinker whose thoughts visibly multiply and increase 
in vigour where he approaches the surface of actual life. He has always 
had a delicate appreciation for poetry. The ‘wonder and bloom of the 
world’ had ever a melancholy fascination for him, though he was 
compelled by his classifying and generalizing powers to apply himself 
chiefly to the analysis of the paler realm of underlying ideas. There is a 
sensitive fibre about all his writings which gives them a sensibly 
increased power and animation when he feels that they are touching the 
point where they may influence the thoughts and actions of living men. 
(325) 
Clearly not written by the Spectator’s editor, Hutton, the article turns Mill’s ‘delicate 
appreciation for poetry’ and the ‘sensitive fibre’ of his writings into strengths, rather 
than presenting them as evidence of over-refinement or naïveté. The article does not 
categorise Mill as either a man of science or a man of letters, but depicts him working at 
the interface of theory and practice in a dynamic, effervescent way, using his ‘desire of 
culture’ to enliven his own work and the lives of others. As the range of sources 
discussed in this chapter demonstrates, Mill’s ‘desire of culture’, or lack thereof, was a 
highly contentious issue in the mid- to late-nineteenth century. In newspapers, 
pamphlets, periodicals and books, depictions of antithesis and synthesis were used to 
attack or defend Mill personally, philosophically and politically. Millian representations 
were also the site of wider debates which contested the connections and disjunctions 
between science, emotion and imagination – and the best way of exploiting these to 
bring about social improvements. 
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Fig. 1. ‘A Feminine Philosopher’. Caricature in Vanity Fair by Sir Leslie Ward. 
29 March 1873. 
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3. A Feminine Philosopher 
The vibrant chrome lithograph of Mill shown in Figure 1 appeared in Vanity 
Fair’s popular and well-established ‘Men of the Day’ series on 29 March 1873, shortly 
before Mill’s death in May of that year. The image by Sir Leslie Ward (who signed his 
pictures ‘Spy’), was called ‘A Feminine Philosopher’. This moniker was explained in 
some accompanying text by Jehu Junior (the pen name of Thomas Gibson Bowles, 
founder of Vanity Fair), which offered a short account of Mill’s life and achievements. 
Jehu Junior described Mill as revolutionary because of his audacious criticism of society: 
Like all [modern] thinkers he is a thorough heretic in all his beliefs – 
social, moral, and religious. He represents the very extreme outposts to 
which the most adventurous of modern thinkers have pushed, and has 
often found himself out of the reach of the support even of the boldest 
forces of Democracy. For he is a feminine philosopher, a man of vast 
intellect and tender feelings. (n. pag.) 
The feminine philosopher designation here seems ambivalent: if Mill’s tender feelings 
were indicative of idealism and impracticality, which in turn could lead to isolation and 
unpopularity, they were also part of what enabled the adventurous thought and non-
conformism which made him an important thinker. The preface to the fifth volume of 
The Vanity Fair Album in which the caricature of Mill appeared alongside other 
‘Sovereigns, Statesmen, Judges, and Men of the Day’ from 1873, claimed that the Vanity 
Fair portraits aimed at honesty, rather than controversy – in Jehu Junior’s words they 
were concerned with ‘the unheroic representation of heroes’ (n. pag.). Identifying Mill 
as ‘The Feminine Philosopher’ was not intended to be particularly contentious, 
indicating the extent to which Mill had become associated with ideas of femininity.  
 This chapter explores the feminisation of Mill. I take a different view from Susan 
Groag Bell in her chapter on ‘The Feminization of John Stuart Mill’ in Revealing Lives: 
Autobiography, Biography, and Gender (1990). Bell argues here that Mill went through a 
process of ‘self-feminization’ whereby he made a conscious attempt to develop ‘qualities 
which he believed to be feminine – sensitivity and emotional warmth’ (91). I aim to 
show how others’ portrayals of Mill drew on his own views about gender equality, as 
well as long-standing and newly emerging stories about what types of bodies produce, 
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develop and disseminate authoritative knowledge. I argue that a number of the debates 
around Mill converge in gendered representations of him. These debates, which are 
explored in Science Incarnate: Historical Embodiments of Natural Knowledge (1998), are: 
the long tradition of stories in Western cultures which link philosophers with ideas of 
asceticism, abstinence, abstraction and disembodiment (Shapin 21–50); ideas about 
maintaining a balance between the intellect and the moral feelings and affections (a 
subject Alison Winter explains in relation to the nineteenth-century mathematician Ada 
Lovelace, 202–36); and the version of manliness cultivated at Cambridge University 
from the 1840s onwards, which saw high intellectual achievement in mathematics allied 
to athletic excellence (Warwick 288–326).  
 In the five sections that follow I begin by considering the Vanity Fair caricature 
alongside Ward’s account of creating it, and show how Ward’s view intersects with 
other accounts which scrutinised Mill’s voice, head, and frame, reading them as 
indicators of his aptitude for his philosophical and political roles. In the second section, 
‘Miss Mill Joins the Ladies’, I explore how Mill was portrayed in other caricatures, 
mostly from the politically liberal Punch, and its conservative rival Judy in the 1860s. I 
show how Punch’s caricatures played on the two senses of Mill’s stature: his physical 
height and the status he had gained by his achievements, while Judy’s cartoons 
constantly sought to undermine Mill’s standing by depicting him dressed in women’s 
clothing. The third section, ‘Cold as ice’, returns to written accounts and considers the 
views taken by Thomas Carlyle, Leslie and James Fitzjames Stephen, Alexander Bain, 
and others, about what was lacking in Mill’s manliness. Section four, ‘A heart of truly 
feminine sensibility’ continues to address the issue of imbalance, by examining the 
perspectives of those who insisted that Mill suffered from an excess of ‘feminine’ 
emotion, as well as more sympathetic views which stressed that Mill’s great strength 
was his balance of ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ characteristics. Finally, in ‘A Goddess 
called “The Passion of Reason”’ I turn to a depiction by Florence Nightingale, which, in 
its attempt to account for Mill’s uniqueness, combines elements of many of the ideas 
discussed in the chapter, in an unusual and compelling way. 
 3.1 The Vanity Fair Caricature 
Though Ward’s caricature was created several years after Mill’s time as an MP 
(1865–8), it engaged with the debate about Mill’s masculinity brought to the fore by his 
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political career. In Forty Years of ‘Spy’ (1915), Ward described making the study for the 
Vanity Fair caricature (Figure 2) as he listened to Mill give a lecture on women’s rights 
at Exeter Hall. He remembers that as Mill ‘recited passages from his notes in a weak 
voice, it was made extremely clear that his pen was mightier than his personal 
magnetism upon a platform’ (104). The perception that when Mill stood for Parliament 
he was moving from the study to the platform, from writing to speaking, and from 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Sir Leslie Ward’s study for the Vanity Fair caricature. 
National Portrait Gallery.  
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theory to practice, had generated much speculation – in the same vein as Ward’s – about 
how effectively he would be able to conduct himself in a public arena. That Parliament 
was regarded as a combative environment is evident from a line in a Saturday Review 
piece on ‘Philosophers and Politicians’ in 1865. ‘The prime characteristic of the 
Englishman’, stated the Saturday Review, ‘is activity and energy, and the conflicts of the 
political arena gratify a national instinct’ (253). According to the Saturday Review’s 
definition, a man who did not thrive in such an environment would be anomalous in 
terms of his Englishness and his masculinity. Doubts that Mill possessed the intrinsic 
qualities demanded for political success were expressed from the outset of his 
candidature. Reporting on the campaign process the month afterwards, the Saturday 
Review implied that Mill was too delicate to endure a boisterous crowd and too refined 
to come face-to-face with working men, when it remarked: ‘No one could have thought 
without a shudder of Mr Mill making an appearance in a public hall to be cross-
examined by a costermonger’ (‘The Westminster Election’ 558).  
Many years later John Morley recorded the female stereotypes which were used 
to disparage Mill’s parliamentary appearances: 
Meredith, who did not know Mill in person, once spoke to me of him with 
the confident intuition proper to imaginative genius, as partaking of the 
Spinster. Disraeli, when Mill made an early speech in Parliament, raised 
his eyeglass, and murmured to a neighbour on the bench, ‘Ah, the 
Finishing Governess’. We can guess what they meant. Mill certainly had 
not Bacon’s massive cogency, nor the concentrated force of Hobbes, nor 
the diversified amplitude of Adam Smith. (Recollections I: 54–5) 
Though Morley was perhaps Mill’s most fervent supporter, here he gave credence to 
those who found something suspect in Mill’s manliness; the knowing phrase, ‘We can 
guess what they meant’, signalling Morley’s own membership of a more assuredly 
masculine group. Morley goes on to partially rebut the spinster charge (Mill ‘knew how 
to run an adversary clean through with a sword that was no spinster’s arm’, I: 55), but 
the sense of Mill’s uncertain place in a genealogy of public men remains. Morley’s terms 
for the desirable attributes of authoritative male speakers – massiveness, force and 
amplitude – suggest robust vocal and physical strength, and Mill apparently lacked 
these qualities.  
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Many commentators reflected on the weakness of Mill’s voice and frame, as well 
as on the peculiarities of his head and face. As I noted in the introduction, the obsession 
with Mill’s body and voice could be compared to the fixation on Gladstone’s body and 
voice during his 1889 Midlothian campaign, as described by Hadley in Living Liberalism. 
With Gladstone, Hadley argues, this fixation related to the electorate’s desire to 
ascertain his political sincerity. Hadley stresses that political sincerity in the late 
nineteenth century was understood ‘to be a coherence of body, voice, opinion, and thus, 
mind ...’ (308). When it came to Mill in the 1860s and early 1870s, there was often 
perceived to be a lack of coherence between his body/voice and his opinion/mind. 
However, the target does not seem to have been his political integrity, for even after he 
failed to get re-elected in 1868, he was often represented as exemplifying, originating or 
defining liberal principles. When Mill’s candidature for Parliament was first mooted, the 
Saturday Review was broadly welcoming on the grounds that Mill would be someone 
who ‘added authority to Liberal theories, instead of merely hanging on to the doctrines 
which happen to be locally dominant’ (‘Westminster Candidates’ 359). Further, they 
observed that ‘As long as the eminent candidate was, on the whole, regarded as a 
genuine Liberal, individual eccentricities of thought would be readily pardoned’ 
(‘Westminster Candidates’ 359). For the Spectator, Mill was ‘A thorough Liberal, – in 
social philosophy a very advanced Liberal (for he maintains the right of women to be 
admitted to the same careers as men ...)’ whose opinions even if controversial or 
erroneous would ‘clear the intellectual atmosphere’, ‘define better the fundamental 
principles at issue before the country’ and ‘raise the whole tone of Parliamentary 
debate’ (‘Mr Mill as a Politician’ 325). Furthermore, the Spectator saw value in ‘a man 
who can obtain a hearing for ultra-Liberal ideas from ultra-Tory landowners’ (‘Mr Mill 
and the Ten-Pounders’ 742). 
By the time Mill sought re-election in 1868, the Saturday Review was far less 
well-disposed towards him, invoking On Liberty’s contention that ‘All silencing of 
discussion is an assumption of infallibility’ (22), and the Papal history of Mill’s 
retirement residence in Avignon, to mock his ‘Pope-like’ relations to the Liberal cause. 
They claimed that he was ‘according to his own estimate, the Vicegerent and sole centre 
of authority from which all Liberals derive their jurisdiction, and even their Liberal 
being’ (‘Mr Mill and the Infallible’ 584) – but even this mockery had the effect of re-
iterating his importance to the Liberal cause. On his death, the Spectator noted ‘the 
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extent and length of his services to the Liberal cause, which he has defended for thirty 
years, and frequently in an apparently hopeless minority’ (‘News of the Week’ 740). The 
Pall Mall Gazette repeated a resounding endorsement of his sincerity given in the 
Standard: ‘Mr Mill was the Gamaliel at whose feet were reared the modern school of 
Liberals. Of his honesty there can be no more doubt than of his perfect fearlessness’ 
(‘Epitome of Opinion in the Morning Journals’ 3). In his Life of John Stuart Mill (1889), 
W.L. Courtney suggested that many people took the view that Mill ‘was the natural 
leader of Liberal thought; not in the House, but out of it’ (142).  
Instead of Mill’s Liberal credentials, the perceived gap between his undeniable 
intellectual pedigree, and his public embodiment of this, was the difficulty with which 
many grappled. Supporters worried about how successfully he would be able to convey 
his theoretical knowledge in person, while detractors claimed that he was doomed to 
fail in any attempt to do so. Justin McCarthy, for instance, agreed with Ward that Mill’s 
voice was weak and that this made him seem inherently unsuited to public speaking. To 
accentuate the incongruousness of Mill appearing in public, McCarthy labelled him ‘a 
silent, shy, shrinking man, of feeble frame and lonely ways’ (Modern Leaders 112). In the 
metaphorical sense, McCarthy thought that Mill’s voice was strong – ‘Mr Mill was to his 
countrymen but as an oracle – as a voice – almost as a myth’ – but this popular sense of 
a disembodied voice only served to heighten the sense of its weakness in the physical 
sense (Modern Leaders 112). Like Ward, McCarthy thought that Mill’s weak voice was 
compounded by inadequate oratorical skills, and suggested that his parliamentary 
speeches were ‘only spoken essays. They differ in no wise from the speaker’s writings’ 
(Modern Leaders 113). Though an avid supporter of Mill, McCarthy’s terms here come 
very close to those of detractors such as Carlyle and James Fitzjames Stephen who 
conflated Mill’s body with the books he wrote, or those who dismissed Mill as incarnate 
analysis, an incarnate thinking machine, a reasoning machine, a reading machine and so 
on. Carlyle’s view of Mill as an abstraction, discussed below, shows that though such 
ideas are frequently found in commentary on Mill’s political career, they were in 
circulation some time before the 1860s. 
Others who admired Mill also had reservations about his voice, and their 
references to its pitch and strength all suggest that Mill was being judged against an 
ideal of manly sonorousness. Mill’s ‘thin voice approaching to sharpness, but with 
nothing shrill or painful about it’ was part of Alexander Bain’s recollection of their first 
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meeting (64). In an extremely detailed analysis of Mill’s ‘Arts of Persuasion’, Bain 
heaped praise on Mill’s powers of speech in public and private, but reiterated the lack of 
strength in his voice: it was ‘agreeable, although not specially melodious; it was thin and 
weak’ (John Stuart Mill 188). Walter Crane respectfully described it as ‘a still small 
voice’, but this contrasted with his impression of John Bright, who had ‘a fine resonant 
rich voice, and all the hidden art of a practised and eloquent speaker’ (95). On first 
meeting Mill, Kate Amberley interpreted the quietness of his voice as evidence of his 
humility and likeability, recording in her journal, ‘He speaks in a very gentle voice, and 
is not in appearance like a great man’ (qtd. in Russell 1: 297). Transposed to the House 
of Commons, however, the quietness took on a new, more disappointing aspect: ‘Mill’s 
speaking seems to bore the house, they say he has spoken too often – much, and cannot 
be heard’ (qtd. in Russell 1: 470). The doorkeeper of the House of Commons William 
White thought that Mill ‘has not a powerful voice, but then it is highly pitched and very 
clear; and this class of voice goes much further than one of lower tone – as the ear-
piercing fife is heard at a greater distance than the blatant trombone’ (II: 33). White’s 
contrast between the higher pitch of Mill’s voice and the lower tones of other MPs 
seems the most obviously gendered, yet in this case it becomes a virtue rather than a 
cause for regret: a symbol of the different quality Mill introduced to parliamentary 
debate, and his far-reaching influence. 
For Ward – like Conway, Brandes, Hardy, and others – the shape of Mill’s head 
and forehead were especially fascinating. Recalling the difficulties of observing Mill 
from a distance Ward remarked, ‘A strange protuberance upon his forehead attracted 
me; and, the oddly-shaped skull dipping slightly in the middle, “the feminine 
philosopher” just escaped being bereft not only of his hair when I saw him, but of that 
highly important organ – the bump of reverence’ (104).1 According to phrenology 
manuals such as How to Read Character: Hand-book of Physiology, Phrenology and 
Physiognomy, Illustrated with a Descriptive Chart (1869), the area associated with 
‘Reverence for sacred things – devotion – respect’ was located on the top of the head 
and called the organ of ‘Veneration’ (35).2 Ward’s phrenological reference could refer to 
                                                        
1 This term was also associated with Darwin: in his Autobiography Darwin had reported that a meeting of 
the German Psychological Society had reviewed his photograph and declared that ‘I had the bump of 
reverence developed enough for ten priests’ (45).  
2 In manuals such as How to Read Character and Heads and Faces: How to Study Them (1896) by H.S. 
Drayton and Nelson Sizer, Mill was not associated with the ‘bump of reverence’ but was deemed to have a 
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ideas about Mill’s religious disposition (as discussed in chapter two), but it is also 
suggestive of the way in which his domed head and bumpy forehead were interpreted 
as bodily manifestations of his vast intellect, and as such referred to more reverentially 
than other aspects of his physicality. Elsewhere in Ward’s memoirs, the bump on Mill’s 
forehead became the definitive feature of his appearance: discussing the art of the 
caricaturist, and the decision about which ‘defects’ to exaggerate, Ward insisted: ‘I could 
not have left out the cyst upon the forehead of John Stuart Mill’ (111). 
Conversely, Mill’s facial tics were often seen as worrying indicators of instability 
for a man of such eminence. Leslie Stephen remembered that ‘His figure was spare and 
light, his voice weak; a constant twitching of the eyebrow betrayed his nervous 
irritability’ (The English Utilitarians III: 64). In his inimitable style, Carlyle wrote that: 
‘His eyes go twinkling and jerking with wild lights and twitches’ – for Carlyle this was 
one point in a whole list of defects which indicated an impoverished and unmanly 
body.3 Bain, too, commented on ‘the twitching of his eyebrow as he spoke’ (64) and 
McCarthy on ‘a nervous, incessant twitching of the lips and eyes’ (Modern Leaders 113). 
When Conway, the foremost admirer of the Millian brow, spent time with Mill and Helen 
Taylor, he observed a contrast between different parts of Mill’s face: ‘His delicate mouth, 
almost feminine, – which twitched nervously at times, – and the small chin, were in 
contrast with the breadth and height of his brow’ (Autobiography II: 16). 
Notwithstanding the positive effect which Conway thought Mill had on a crowd, he also 
had ‘a nervous way of shutting and opening his eyes as if to clear his mental vision’ 
(‘The Great Westminster Canvass’ 737). Brandes, however, saw more of a favourable 
connection between these involuntary facial tremors and Mill’s intellect, recalling that 
Mill’s face was ‘continually distorted by a nervous twitching, which seemed to betray 
the restless, tremulous life of the soul’ (Eminent Authors 124). 
                                                                                                                                                                            
particularly pronounced ‘organ of Individuality’ located ‘immediately above the top of the nose’ (95). 
These manuals reproduced engravings of the profile photograph of Mill shown in chapter one, Figure 3b 
to illustrate this. Though it can hardly have been a coincidence that the man dubbed ‘the apostle of 
individuality’ was thought to exemplify this characteristic, the organ of individuality seems to have had 
little to do with the model of individual choice set out in On Liberty. Rather, it had to do with superior 
powers of observation: ‘Those in whom it is large are eager to see all that may be seen and nothing 
escapes their attention. It opens the door for the action of all the other perceptive organs’ (Heads and 
Faces 98). For Mill’s own views on the pseudo-science of phrenology see Rick Rylance, Victorian 
Psychology and British Culture 1850–1880 (2000), 99–100. 
3 Letter from TC to his wife, Jane Welsh Carlyle, 24 July 1836. All quotations from Carlyle’s letters in this 
chapter are from The Carlyle Letters Online (CLO). 
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Mill’s frame was also thought to be indicative of inner qualities. Ward saw a 
connection between his thinness and his philosophising ways: ‘His nose resembled a 
parrot's, and his frame was spare. In fact, he was ascetic and thin-looking generally; but 
his manner and personality breathed charm and intellect’ (104–5). In their history of 
Vanity Fair, Roy T. Matthews and Peter Mellini suggest that Ward’s focus on the 
slightness of Mill’s frame had the effect of aging him. They argue that in the final 
caricature, Ward ‘made Mill look older by thinning out his body and bending it forward, 
and by sloping the shoulders and placing Mill’s hands behind his back’ (93). Matthews 
and Mellini’s reading of the Vanity Fair caricature raises the question of the extent to 
which Mill’s age was a decisive factor in the depiction of his physical frailties more 
generally – to what extent his body was being compared to that of a more vigorous 
younger man, rather than that of a woman.  
Generally, Mill’s physical shortcomings – his weak voice, twitching eye or 
delicate frame – were not depicted as owing to an age-related debilitation, but as 
present from young adulthood. One account which did refer to his age dwelt on his 
deceptively youthful appearance. In Eminent Authors (1886) Brandes described meeting 
Mill for the first time in 1870. He recalled that: ‘Although sixty-four years of age, his 
complexion was as pure and fresh as that of a child. He had the smooth, childlike skin 
and the rosy cheeks that are scarcely ever seen in elderly men of the continent ...’ (124). 
In Brandes’s idealised recollections of his intellectual hero, the curious focus on his rosy, 
pure, childlike skin was surely a reference to the absence of that Victorian symbol of 
masculinity, a full beard. Consequently, Brandes’s reminiscences reinforce ideas of Mill’s 
femininity. A possible explanation for the lack of attention to Mill’s age (as well as 
Brandes’s emphasis on his youthful appearance) is offered in David Stack’s ‘The Death 
of John Stuart Mill’. Stack argues that owing to his late entry into Parliament, ‘The cliché 
of the young radical buck tamed in middle age into an avuncular reformer and safely 
neutered by the time of his death was not apropos to Mill’ (169).4 While it is true that 
this conventional trajectory of a male public figure was not applicable, I would argue 
that it is for different reasons from the one Stack suggests. Mill was never seen in the 
                                                        
4 In the Spectator, Mill’s nomination to Parliament was associated with youthful innovation, as it was in 
the Reader article discussed in the preface. In a piece entitled ‘Young England in the Next Parliament’, the 
Spectator maintained that his candidature ‘shows how thoroughly the younger generation is weary of the 
old formulas, and how anxious it is for some more intelligible principles’ (604). 
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kind of testosterone-fuelled terms implied by a buck in need of neutering. As I discussed 
in the previous chapter, and as I discuss below, Mill’s political passion, as well as his 
feelings for Harriet, were construed in terms of a religious disposition, or an excess of 
‘feminine’ emotion.  
For all the ways in which Ward’s visual and verbal representations engaged with 
the debates about Mill’s lack of manly robustness, his final verdict on Mill’s ‘personal 
magnetism’ was not entirely damning: if he ‘breathed charm and intellect’ then he had 
at least enough charisma to appeal in some ways to his audience. The softer lines and 
warmer tones of the study for the caricature capture the more attractive side to Mill 
that Ward perceived. Indeed, although Ward thought that Mill was more suited to the 
study than the lecture hall, choosing to exaggerate his physical frailty in the image 
which represented ‘The Feminine Philosopher’ among ‘Men of the Day’, by depicting 
Mill standing, in public, mid-speech, he nevertheless provided a counterpoint to the 
sense of philosophic interiority conveyed by the focus on Mill’s face in Watts’s portrait, 
which appeared the same year. Mill’s stance in the Vanity Fair image also contrasts with 
some of the more belittling and emasculating caricatures from Punch and Judy in the 
1860s. 
 
3.2 ‘Miss Mill Joins the Ladies’ 
In 1904, the caricaturist Harry Furniss claimed that cartoons from the 1860s had 
left more of an impression on the popular imagination than any other aspect of Mill’s 
life and work – aside from the noteworthy detail of his support for women’s rights. 
Furniss recalled that Mill ‘was a remarkably able man, treated with reverence and 
respect by all who admired philosophical thought and true greatness of mind – until he 
touched politics. Then he was laughed at’ (29). Furniss went on to observe that Mill’s 
support for female suffrage ‘was the turning-point of his sublime literary reputation 
into a ridiculous parliamentary one. Being small of stature and severe of countenance, 
he was an easy prey for the pen and pencil’ (29). Furniss comments particularly on two 
full page cartoons by John Tenniel in Punch, ‘Mill’s Logic; or, Franchise for Females’ and 
‘The Ladies’ Advocate’. On the impact of such representations of Mill Furniss concluded: 
‘He did a great work and left a name England might well honour; but ninety-nine out of 
every hundred “persons” merely recall a very little, thin man, with a severe mouth, 
bushy hair and side whiskers, the advocate of women’s rights – and they laugh!’ (30). 
83 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alongside this description, Furniss included his own caricature sporting all of these 
features (Figure 3), which he is unlikely to have drawn after direct observation of Mill.5 
Furniss’s written description seems to be as much caricature as his drawing, but the 
issues he chose to exaggerate all had their basis in debates of the 1860s. As I discussed 
in chapter two, many articles in newspapers and periodicals debated the issue of 
literary men in Parliament, and Mill was often the focus of such debate. Some argued 
that his reputation did indeed move from the sublime to the ridiculous. Furniss’s 
representation of Mill as ‘easy prey’ for visual satire emphasised his vulnerability. 
                                                        
5 See David Martin’s introduction to Lives of Victorian Political Figures IV: John Stuart Mill, xlii. 
 Fig. 3. Caricature of Mill from Harry 
Furniss at Home, Written and 
Illustrated by Himself. 1904. 
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 Where Ward’s caricature drew attention to Mill’s height, Furniss insisted that Mill 
was ‘small of stature’ and ‘very little’. If Furniss was basing this view of Mill on 
caricatures from Punch then it is easy to see why. Just as Mill’s small voice was 
compared to John Bright’s rich and resonant one, the two men’s physicalities were 
regularly contrasted in Punch’s satirical depictions of political life. ‘Punch’s Essence of 
Parliament’ on 10 February 1866 was a garland featuring all the newly elected MPs. 
Positioned prominently in the illustration, at the top and in the centre, is an emaciated 
Mill, clutching a copy of On Liberty, but shackled to a stout, bear-like Bright (Figure 4 
shows a detail from the garland). While some of the other figures are also depicted with 
large heads on small bodies, Mill’s diminutive size and strength is accentuated by being 
positioned in proximity to Bright, as well as other figures wielding signifiers of male 
authority and aggression. The Lord Chancellor, Lord Cranworth, appears to Mill’s left 
‘with his awful mace’ and ‘fiery Roebuck’ wields ‘his ready lance’ below Bright, to the 
right-hand side (53). Roebuck’s friendship with Mill had ended after a youthful debate 
about poetry in which different models of masculinity were implicitly at stake – 
Roebuck had championed Byron, whose poetry he thought epitomised ‘action and 
struggle’, while Mill had made the case for the more ‘quiet and contemplative’ verses of 
Wordsworth. Roebuck dismissed Wordsworth’s poems as having to do with ‘flowers 
 
Fig. 4. Detail from ‘Punch’s Essence of Parliament’. 10 February 1866. 
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and butterflies’ (Mill, Autobiography 122). The rhyme accompanying Punch’s garland 
included the lines:  
   Then see a splendid ring, its centre BRIGHT,  
   Grimly preparing for Reform to fight,  
   ’Twere a good omen should his stubborn will  
   Yield to the chain of intellectual MILL. (53) 
As these lines indicate, Punch was broadly sympathetic to Mill, welcoming the softening 
influence he might have on Bright’s supposed intransigence.6  
 Nevertheless, Punch consistently portrayed Mill as lacking the same robustly male 
physique as the central figures in the ‘battlefield’ of public life. In 1867, the journal ran a 
John Tenniel cartoon (Figure 5) in which a diminutive Mill was again positioned close to 
a bulky Bright. This time the physical contrast was further underscored by Bright 
squaring up to a punch bag marked ‘Aristocracy’. A feeble-looking Mill with downcast 
eyes lurks behind him clutching a cup marked ‘Logic’, the most insubstantial of the 
‘Gladiators Preparing for the Arena’. The theme of physical combat was extended 
beyond the parliamentary context when, the month afterwards, Punch featured Mill’s 
inaugural lecture as rector of St Andrews University. They noted that ‘Mill had fought a 
good fight about education’ (102), and depicted him as a tiny figure, in the guise of a 
naughty school boy, squaring up to a giant, rotund, cane-wielding don (Figure 6). In the 
run up to the 1868 election, Punch continued to portray Parliament as a battleground. In 
‘Before the Tournament’ (Figure 7), also by Tenniel, Mill appeared as a small figure to 
the left of the cartoon, which is dominated by an armoured, lance-wielding Gladstone, 
preparing to face Disraeli in a joust. Mill’s small size and sidelined position in this 
cartoon might be accounted for by his relative political importance, next to the party 
leaders Gladstone and Disraeli – except that, Robson has observed how, due to his extra-
parliamentary renown, Mill was generally given unusual precedence in such groupings, 
‘closely – indeed sometimes intimately – clustered with the party leaders (‘Mill in 
Parliament’ 116). 
                                                        
6 See Robson’s ‘Mill in Parliament: The View from the Comic Papers’, 105–11, on Punch’s support for Mill. 
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Fig. 5. Detail from ‘Gladiators Preparing for the 
Arena’. Punch. 2 February 1867. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Detail from ‘February’. Punch.  
9 March 1867. 
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 Moreover, in the Punch cartoons where the focus was particularly on Mill, rather 
than on an ensemble of politicians, he was also depicted as a small figure. In 1867, 
Punch ran two Tenniel caricatures to comment on Mill’s proposal that the word ‘man’ be 
replaced by the word ‘person’ in the clauses of the Reform Bill which dealt with 
enfranchisement. These were ‘Mill’s Logic; or, Franchise for Females’ (Figure 8) and 
‘The Ladies’ Advocate’ (Figure 9). In Tenniel’s female suffrage cartoons, Mill is 
particularly contrasted to personifications of England, in the form of John Bull in ‘Mill’s 
Logic’ and Mrs Bull in ‘The Ladies’ Advocate’. Dressed in his trademark philosopher’s 
frock coat in ‘Mill’s Logic’, and in a barrister’s wig and gown in ‘The Ladies’ Advocate’, 
Mill is a dapper figure. John Bull and Mrs Bull, in contrast, are large and rotund. In ‘Mill’s 
Logic’ John Bull looks at Mill with hostility as he clears the way for female voters. In ‘The 
Ladies’ Advocate’ Mrs Bull’s maternal solicitude is combined with condescension  
towards Mill’s misguided attempts to represent women’s views. Her cheerful 
obliviousness is contrasted with Mill’s humble, downcast stance. Thus Tenniel’s 
drawings for Punch, though they may have mocked the seriousness and earnestness 
with which Mill was so commonly associated, were not wholly belittling. They also 
played on the idea of Mill’s refinement and sensitivity in comparison to the supposed 
coarseness and vulgarity of the general national view. 
 It was in Judy, a conservative journal set up to rival Punch that Mill’s feminisation 
was the most blatant: in their cartoons, he frequently appeared dressed as a woman.7 
The striking illustration accompanying an 1867 piece called ‘Parliamentary’ shows Mill 
wearing a bonnet, holding a parasol, and daintily lifting his skirts out of the mud (Figure 
10). Here, the focus was on Mill’s support for women’s suffrage. The article concentrates 
on the way ‘the LADY’S MILL’ had disappointed women, by failing to secure them the vote 
(156). Judy revels in the way ‘both his theory and his advocacy have proved a signal 
failure’, before moving on to recount the journal’s supposed correspondence from 
disappointed women: 
                                                        
7 Robson has observed that ‘In several of the major political cartoons, no matter what the actual issue 
involved, Mill appears as a woman’ (‘Mill in Parliament’ 116). See also Carlisle, 114–17.  
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Fig. 7. ‘Before the Tournament’. Punch. 21 November 1868. 
 
Fig. 8. ‘Mill’s Logic; or, Franchise for Females’. Punch. 30 March 1867. 
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Fig. 9. ‘The Ladies’ Advocate’. Punch. 1 June 1867. 
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Many of these lady correspondents have waxed exceeding bitter, not to 
say savage, on the matter; they have in some cases even had recourse to 
satire, and by no means weakly satire either, suggesting that he belongs 
really to them as a ‘muff’; advising him to assume the non-virile garments 
of his and their proper sex, and many other similar unamiable 
propositions. (156, emphasis in original) 
In Judy’s view, there could be no more appropriate humiliation for a man who had 
proved his ‘womanly’ weakness, than to be dressed in women’s clothes, and their 
cartoon brought this vividly to life. The article affects indignation at the supposed 
outcry against Mill, in order to underscore the idea that he had handled the situation 
stupidly. Professing to defend Mill against the complaints, Judy made the familiar point 
Fig. 10. Cartoon accompanying 
‘Parliamentary’. Judy. 24 July 1867. 
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about his impractical and isolated theoretical viewpoint – ‘It is not his fault, poor man, if 
the nation does not see with the spectacles of his philosophy’ (156). The image of 
‘philosophical spectacles’ was a popular one when attacking Mill’s position on sexual 
equality – Margaret Oliphant was to use it in a similar fashion in a hostile review of 
Subjection where she constantly invoked the contrast between ‘the philosopher’s study’ 
and the world of ‘common experience’ (114).8 
 Judy added to the charge of philosophical isolation by suggesting that Mill had 
been sullied by his involvement with this cause, joking: ‘VENUS forbid that he should 
descend to posterity with a draggled reputation’ (156). This play on ideas of Mill’s 
sexual innocence would be reprised in the poem and cartoon ‘Miss Mill Joins the Ladies’ 
discussed below. Judy’s aim was clearly to suggest political naïveté, but the faux concern 
with his ‘draggled reputation’ anticipated the prominence which would be given to this 
very issue after Abraham Hayward’s hostile obituary of Mill in the Times. In Hayward’s 
obituary, as David Stack has shown, ‘A double-headed allegation of adultery and 
promoting birth control placed a question mark against Mill’s character’ (170). Such 
allegations prompted Mill’s supporter, William D. Christie, to defend Mill’s purity in 
feminised terms: ‘The young boy-philosopher, all mind, of delicate frame and features, 
even feminine in manners and appearance, moved among his companions, an 
intellectual wonder, and was like Milton, who was called the lady of his college’ (John 
Stuart Mill and Mr Abraham Hayward, Q.C. 10). Stack offers an in-depth analysis of the 
Hayward controversy in ‘The Death of John Stuart Mill’ and argues that ‘Christie did Mill 
a grave disservice’ in making sexual morality central to the defence of his character, by 
shifting the focus away from his intellectual legacy (175). Even if Christie’s strategy was 
as damaging as Stack contends, it is interesting to note how similar ideas to those that 
Judy used to mock Mill – ‘feminine in manners and appearance’, ‘called the lady of his 
college’ – and the same physical and mental attributes that some identified as evidence 
of weakness – ‘all mind, of delicate frame and features’ – could also be used in an 
attempt to honour him. 
                                                        
8 In spite of Oliphant’s hostile response to Subjection, Elise Michie argues, in The Vulgar Question of Money: 
Heiresses, Materialism, and the Novel of Manners from Jane Austen to Henry James (2011), that in her 
domestic novels Miss Marjoribanks (1866) and Phoebe Junior (1876), Oliphant engages with ideas from On 
Liberty and Dissertations and Discussions. Michie characterises these novels as taking ‘a more playfully 
satiric attitude’ towards Millian arguments, gently mocking them at the same time as seriously 
considering their implications ‘for both society and the form of the novel’ (144). 
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Fig. 11. Detail from ‘Going to the Country’. Judy.  
29 July 1868. 
 
Fig. 12. Cartoon accompanying ‘All About Everything’. 
Judy. 25 November 1868. 
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Fig. 13. ‘Miss Mill Joins the Ladies’. Judy. 25 November 1868. 
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 In 1868, when Mill sought re-election, Judy continued to feminise Mill as a means 
of undermining his political credibility. Thus, in ‘Going to the Country’ (Figure 11), on 
29 July 1868, a cartoon depicting the issues at stake in the election, Mill appeared in a 
dress embroidered with the words ‘Woman Suffrage’ and reaching for a baby in a gown 
marked ‘Suspensory Bill’. When Mill failed to retain his seat in Parliament, Judy made 
enthusiastic use of their established mode of representing him. On 25 November 1868, 
‘All About Everything’ celebrated the fact that Westminster had not re-elected ‘the 
greatest thinker of the age’, or as Judy irreverently abbreviated it, the ‘G. T. O. T. A.’ (43). 
In the accompanying picture Mill was both feminised and infantilised, depicted sitting 
on the floor wearing a bonnet and dress (Figure 12). On the same page, a poem called 
‘Miss Mill Joins the Ladies’ also delighted in Mill’s defeat, satirising him as ‘Miss Mill, 
enchantress chaste’, with a ‘coy, reluctant glance’ and ‘bewitching ankles’ (43). In an 
accompanying full page cartoon of the same name (Figure 13), Mill, bedecked with hair 
ornaments, holding a fan, and dressed in an ostentatious and revealing off-the-shoulder 
gown, is pictured delivering his ‘coy, reluctant glance’ as he leaves the room. Robson 
explains the political context of this caricature: ‘Mill is shown out by [W.H.] Smith, while 
[Robert Wellesley] Grosvenor averts his eyes to study his wine, Eyre looks on from the 
wall, and Judy waits quizzically on the stairs’ (138). ‘Philosophy’ is written on the 
lampshade in the hallway and is clearly aligned with Mill’s retreat into the private 
sphere.  
 Perhaps the most significant point about this cartoon is the link between Mill’s 
feminisation and his involvement in the campaign to prosecute Governor Eyre. Judy was 
not the only publication to make such links. The following month in the Saturday 
Review, the Governor Eyre affair was seen as chief among the aspects of Mill’s political 
life ‘which have most completely alienated him from not only the confidence of the 
Westminster electors, but the masculine mind generally’ (‘Mr Mill and Mrs M‘Laren’ 
815). In White, Male and Middle Class (1992), Catherine Hall has written about how, 
ranged on different sides of the mid-1860s debate about the violent suppression of 
unrest in Jamaica, ‘different notions of what constituted a proper English manhood’ was 
one of the issues at stake between Carlyle and Mill (277). Mill, who headed the Jamaica 
Committee formed to campaign for the prosecution of Eyre, was in favour of equality 
and independence. Carlyle, head of the Eyre Defence League, favoured a model of 
manhood based on hierarchy, passionate action and physical strength, a model 
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‘underpinned by an insistence on the essential difference between the sexes’ (266).  
 Hall concludes her reading of the differences between the Carlylean and Millian 
models of manliness by invoking a connection between the inner and outer properties 
of the two men: ‘Carlyle, then, was the man of passion, Mill the man of reason, a 
difference which can be traced in their very physiques; the one craggy and rugged, the 
other with the aquiline features of the classical’ (288). Though the clashing views of 
masculinity that Hall identifies clearly played a central role in this debate, Mill’s position 
as ‘the man of reason’ was complicated by the frequent allusions to his passion and his 
emotions. In the next two sections, I turn to consider written accounts from the 1830s 
through to the early twentieth century, whose depictions of Mill’s gender identity 
intersect with the caricatures from the 1860s, beginning with how Carlyle applied his 
model of ‘proper English manhood’ to Mill himself. 
3.3 ‘Cold as ice’: Mill’s Lack of Manliness 
Reminiscing for the purposes of Moncure Conway’s obituary of Mill in Harper’s 
New Monthly Magazine, Thomas Carlyle recalled that James Mill was ‘a man of 
somewhat stouter make and more vigorous look than his son’ and that ‘The younger 
Mill was a thin, delicate, handsome youth’ (529). As Conway reported it, this was a 
seemingly innocuous recollection about the contrasting physicalities of father and son, 
but it belied a history of Carlylean comment, which placed great importance on his 
perception that the younger Mill’s physical presence was less commandingly masculine 
than his father’s. In letters to his brother, his wife and John Sterling in the 1830s, Carlyle 
disparagingly conflated Mill’s body with the books he wrote, complaining: ‘I find him 
really assiduously serviceable: but he is so theoretic a man, and like a printed Book, I 
never open myself to him ...’.9 Mill, Carlyle insisted, was at once emotionally inaccessible 
and lacking a suitably robust physical presence: ‘I love very truly the Abstract-idea of 
him: but the Abstract-idea of him is all you can get; were the man himself never so near 
you, he remains unattainable’.10 For Carlyle, Mill’s intellectualising obscured his 
personality and this excluded him from the benefits of male friendship. 
Carlyle persistently depicted Mill as someone who, at his core, was pure, clear-
minded, creative and emotional, but who was prevented by some kind of barrier from 
                                                        
9 TC to his brother, John A. Carlyle, 12 January 1835, Carlyle’s emphasis, CLO. 
10 TC to John A. Carlyle, 25 June 1836, Carlyle’s emphasis, CLO. 
96 
expressing this authentic, inner self. He was ‘a man cased up (against his own will) in 
the miserablest impenetrable coating of stone and ice’.11 By suggesting that Mill was 
thus constituted against his own will, Carlyle was blaming James Mill and Jeremy 
Bentham for these infirmities. Carlyle’s view of Mill was bound up with his intense 
dislike for the utilitarianism with which the elder Mill and Bentham were synonymous. 
Many years later, Herbert Spencer would recall how, in addition to his ‘blindly furious’ 
reaction to On Liberty, Carlyle ‘scornfully called utilitarianism “pig-philosophy”, and 
thereby identified the pursuit of utility with the egoistic pursuit of material 
gratifications, spite of the proofs before him that it comprehends the pursuit of others’ 
welfare and the exercise of the highest sentiments’ (An Autobiography I: 381). Mill’s 
inextricable associations with a philosophy that Carlyle characterised in this way were 
part of the bar to his true character. Carlyle expressed this in another image which 
stressed Mill’s lack of agency, and his faulty skills of perception: ‘Mill ‘is a pure-minded 
clear man [in] every way; but with the strangest, unluckiest Utilitarian husk round him, 
which he will never cast off: it strikes me very much how all these people look forever at 
some theory of a thing, never any thing’.12 According to Carlyle, Mill was both a uniquely 
odd individual and linked irrevocably to utilitarians and philosophical radicals. In the 
same letter, he remarked that the radicals particularly valued an article by Mill because 
of its ‘precision, closeness, coldness, – barrenness’, thus extending his sense of Mill’s 
personal deficiencies to the work he produced.  
In other letters, the references to Mill being imprisoned or frozen within ice were 
repeated again and again, especially in relation to Mill’s relationship with Harriet 
Taylor. Writing of the gossip provoked by Mill’s relationship with Harriet he described 
the scandal as ‘this very item that he does not speak, that he never could speak, but was 
to sit imprisoned in as in thick ribbed ice, voiceless, uncommunicating’.13 Again, a few 
months later, Carlyle insisted: ‘I love him much; as a friend frozen within ice for me!’.14 
Most strikingly, when Carlyle wrote to Jane Welsh Carlyle to report on his stay with 
Mill’s family in the wake of James Mill’s death, he claimed that Mill was emotionally, 
physically and intellectually impoverished. He observed that Mill ‘talked much and not 
stupidly, far from that, but without emotion of any discernible kind; he seemed to me 
                                                        
11 TC to John A. Carlyle, 30 April 1835, CLO. 
12 TC to John A. Carlyle, 30 April 1835, Carlyle’s emphasis, CLO.  
13 TC to John Sterling, 3 October 1836, CLO. 
14 TC to John Sterling, 7 January 1837, Carlyle’s emphasis, CLO. 
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withering or withered into the miserablest metaphysical scrae [thin, shrivelled 
creature], body and mind, that I had almost ever met with in the world.15 Later in the 
century Carlyle expressed the same sentiments more publicly. In his Reminiscences 
(1881) he dismissed Mill’s editorship of the Westminster Review as ‘sawdust to the 
masthead, and a croakery of crawling things, instead of a speaking of men’ (I: 417). He 
also disparaged the personal conversations he had with Mill: ‘Dialogues fallen all dim, 
except they were never in the least genial to me, and that I took them as one would wine 
where no nectar is to be had, or even thin ale where there is no wine’ (I: 410). The 
catalogue of epithets that Carlyle used, privately and publicly, to characterise Mill and 
his work, were concerned with undermining Mill’s status as an independent man, and 
thus with negating the power of a voice which pronounced so many contrary 
sentiments to Carlyle’s own. 
Towards the end of the century, an account of Mill appeared which seemed to 
owe much in tone and theme to Carlyle’s views. In The Life of Sir James Fitzjames 
Stephen (1895), Leslie Stephen reported that his brother had pronounced Mill to be 
‘“cold as ice”, a mere “walking book”’ (316). James Fitzjames Stephen’s intellectual 
engagement with Mill was deep: having taken several of Mill’s books with him in a 
travelling library on a voyage to India, he published Liberty, Fraternity, Equality – a 
book-length attack on On Liberty – in 1873. However, the issues he had with Mill were at 
least as much to do with his temperament and physicality as with his philosophy. 
According to Leslie Stephen: 
He seemed to Fitzjames at least to dwell in a region where the great 
passions and forces which really stir mankind are neglected or treated as 
mere accidental disturbances of the right theory. Mill seemed to him not 
so much cold-blooded as bloodless, wanting in the fire and force of the full 
grown male animal, and comparable to a superlatively crammed senior 
wrangler, whose body had been stunted by his brains. Fitzjames could 
only make a real friend of a man in whom he could recognise the capacity 
for masculine emotions as well as logical acuteness ... (231) 
                                                        
15 TC to Jane Welsh Carlyle, 24 July 1836, Carlyle’s emphasis, gloss in square brackets given by CLO. 
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Though Leslie Stephen is mediating his brother’s views, his own interest in the link 
between physical and intellectual prowess is evident. During his time at Cambridge 
Leslie Stephen had embraced wrangler culture and become one its biggest proponents. 
Mill was an example of someone who has failed to achieve the demanding balance 
required. Though wrangler culture was associated with sexual abstinence,16 it is 
strongly implied here that Mill’s lack was also a sexual one. The Stephens gave a 
different take on Mill’s unworldliness, with the emphasis on his failure to mature 
sexually and to display an acceptable level of heterosexual desire. The concept of 
‘masculine emotions’ seems particularly connected to the Carlylean model of 
masculinity – for Fitzjames Stephen, like Carlyle, Mill’s perceived inadequacy in this 
respect prevented him from partaking of the benefits of homosocial relationships. 
As Leslie Stephen developed his account of his brother’s characteristics and 
values, Mill continued to be a useful point of contrast. Thus he speculated further on the 
reasons for the discord between Fitzjames and Mill: 
The two men could never come into cordial relations, and the ultimate 
reason, I think, was what I should call Mill’s want of virility. He might be 
called ‘cold’, not as wanting in tenderness or enthusiasm, but as 
representing a kind of philosophical asceticism. Whether from his early 
education, his recluse life, or his innate temperament, half the feelings 
which moved mankind seemed to him simply coarse and brutal. They 
were altogether detestable – not the perversions which, after all, might 
show a masculine and powerful nature. Mill’s view, for example, seemed 
to be that all the differences between the sexes were accidental, and that 
women could be turned into men by trifling changes in the law. To a man 
of ordinary flesh and blood, who had actually grounded his opinions, not 
upon books, but upon actual experience of life, such doctrines appear to 
be not only erroneous, but indicative of a hopeless thinness of character. 
And, so, again, Fitzjames absolutely refused to test the value of the great 
patriotic passions which are the mainsprings of history by the mere 
calculus of abstract concepts which satisfied Mill. Fitzjames, like Henry 
                                                        
16 See Warwick, ‘Exercising the Student Body: Mathematics and Athleticism in Victorian Cambridge’, on 
wrangler life and sexual abstinence (312) and Leslie Stephen’s involvement with wrangler culture (313). 
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VIII, ‘loved a man’, and the man of Mill’s speculations seemed to be a 
colourless, flaccid creature, who required, before all things, to have some 
red blood infused into his veins. (316–17) 
Some familiar charges against Mill are here given vehement expression. Theory is 
opposed to experience; abstraction is opposed to flesh and blood. Mill’s non-essentialist 
view of gender is seen as abnormal and impractical. This appeal to common sense and 
experience was not unlike the position taken by Oliphant, and also by Anne Mozley, in 
their unfavourable reviews of Subjection in 1869. Both Oliphant and Mozley, like 
Fitzjames Stephen, accused Mill of a scanty knowledge of real, unphilosophical bodies, 
driven by or responding to biological impulses. Fitzjames Stephen, according to his 
brother Leslie, took this line of attack even further by framing Mill’s perceived personal 
deficiencies in terms of nationhood, history, royalty and procreation. His fitness to form 
part of a powerful homosocial group in the present, and take his place in a genealogy of 
powerful men, was called into question in strikingly sexualised terms: Mill was effete 
and impotent. He was refined to the point of irrelevance. The objection was not just to 
Mill’s personal behaviour, but to how he conceived of masculinity in general. 
 Leslie Stephen’s own views on Mill – expressed in volume three of The English 
Utilitarians (1900) – are more measured. Indeed, in 1906 Mill’s disciple, Morley, was 
effusive in his praise for Stephen’s assessment, asserting that: ‘So far, the most elaborate 
exposition, criticism, and amplification of Mill’s work and thought has come from the 
brave and true-hearted Leslie Stephen, in one of his three volumes on the Utilitarians’ 
(‘John Stuart Mill’ 174). Unlike his brother Fitzjames, Leslie Stephen thought that Mill 
was an ‘unsurpassable ... interpreter between the abstract philosopher and the man of 
common sense’ (17). Stephen’s retrospective view states in bald terms the hostility felt 
towards the utilitarians and philosophical radicals: ‘Philosophical in English is 
synonymous with visionary, unpractical, or perhaps, simply foolish. The philosophers 
seemed to be men of crotchets, fitter for the study than the platform’ (31). Mill, he 
acknowledged, ‘softened’, ‘qualified’ and popularised the views which the utilitarians 
propounded, even if his links with this group still made him, for a time, ‘something of an 
alien’ (13). And there was one major difference between James Mill and his son that 
compounded Mill’s difficulties: ‘James Mill, whatever his faults, was a man, and born to 
be a leader of men. He was rigid, imperative, and capable of controlling and dominating. 
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John Stuart Mill was far weaker in that sense, and weaker because he had less virility’ 
(71). In Stephen’s view, Mill’s ‘unusual tenderness’ indicated womanliness:  
His feelings ... were ... as tender as a woman’s. They were wanting, not in 
keenness, but in the massiveness which implies more masculine fibre. 
And this, indeed, is what seems to indicate the truth. Mill could never 
admit any fundamental difference between the sexes. That is, I believe, a 
great but a natural misconception for one who was in character as much 
feminine as masculine. (72–3) 
So for Leslie Stephen, Mill’s intellectual and political achievements were still marred by 
his refusal to take an essentialist view of differences between men and women. 
Moreover, his receptivity rendered him too open and credulous, ‘like a woman’ (73). 
However, like Jehu Junior, Stephen was willing to concede that this was not wholly 
disadvantageous: if Mill’s sensitivity and shortage of masculine vigour made him unable 
to originate new ideas, it did at least enable him ‘to develop and widen the philosophy in 
which he was immersed’ (73). This image of widening, growth, and development, 
features in other depictions of Mill’s relation to his utilitarian roots. Even R.H. Hutton, 
who criticised Mill’s ‘radical deficiencies as a philosopher’ acknowledged ‘his genius for 
... giving breadth and elasticity to an apparently inelastic and rigid set of notions’ (‘Mr 
John Stuart Mill, 205, 206). 
 Mill’s friend, Alexander Bain, also offered a more measured view than Carlyle or 
Fitzjames Stephen, but like Leslie Stephen, he still found aspects of Mill’s masculinity 
questionable, in ways that impacted on his philosophical role. In the final chapter of 
Bain’s 1882 biography of Mill, ‘Character and Influence’, Bain claims not to offer any 
new perspective on Mill, but only to consolidate information already in the public 
domain. Throughout, Bain stresses Mill’s refinement: though he had ‘very large 
emotional susceptibilities’ he never became angry or enraged (149, 151). In Bain’s more 
sympathetic account, tenderness was evidence of kindness rather than womanly 
weakness: Mill’s capacious tenderness meant that ‘kindness to animals was a 
characteristic form’ for him (150). This, combined with his interest in botany, meant 
that he did not partake of traditionally masculine sports: 
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Plant-hunting was to him what sports are to other persons. I doubt 
whether, under any circumstances, he could have brought himself to be a 
sportsman. Hunting and shooting would, I am pretty certain, have been 
abhorrent to him; and, while his excursions often brought him into 
opportunities for fishing, he never availed himself of these. The chase for 
plants was all that he desired. (152) 
Not for Mill the type of recreations indulged in by the male characters in the first novel 
by Charles Kingsley, where the chase of live creatures gave ‘hunting and fishing their 
unutterable and almost spiritual charm’ (Yeast: A Problem 14). Kingsley’s portrayal of 
‘the chase’ in such mystical terms indicates the potential for a plant-hunting preference 
to be interpreted as a reflection on Mill’s masculinity. 
If, at the same time as commending Mill’s aversion to blood sports, Bain implied 
that there were drawbacks to such a shortage of aggression, then he was not alone. In 
his Autobiography Herbert Spencer maintained that Mill misunderstood the motivations 
for participating in fishing. After Spencer had invited Mill salmon fishing, Mill 
responded, ‘My murderous propensities are confined to the vegetable world. I take as 
great a delight in the pursuit of plants as you do in the pursuit of salmon ...’ (2: 213). 
Spencer defended his own love of fishing by insisting that: ‘Having in boyhood had no 
experience of the ordinary boyish sports, Mill had a somewhat erroneous conception of 
them. Hence the inappropriate use of the word “murderous”; as though the gratification 
was exclusively in killing’ (2: 213). In a memorial essay, the botanist Henry Trimen had 
similarly drawn attention to the solitary and peaceful nature of Mill’s recreational 
interest. He painted a leisurely picture of Mill pottering around ‘with his trousers turned 
up out of the mud ... in the search after a marsh-loving rarity’ (47). Mill’s botanising, 
Trimen noted, was strictly a hobby and he never ‘entered into the battle-field where the 
great biological questions of the day are being fought’ (47). There is a hint of regret in 
Trimen’s observation that Mill took a relaxed attitude to biology, rather than the more 
confrontational – and manly – approach apparently required to engage with topical 
issues (just as, in response to Three Essays on Religion, Morley was to express his 
disappointment that Mill had not made his views on evolutionary theory known). 
Biological debate, like parliamentary debate, was considered one of the ‘battlegrounds’ 
of public life in which Mill occupied a dubious position. 
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 Bain not only drew attention to Mill’s distaste for manly sports, but also his low 
appetites for sex and food: 
I am not singular in the opinion that in the so-called sensual feelings, he 
was below average; that in fact, he was not a good representative of 
humanity in respect of these; and scarcely did justice to them in his 
theories. He was not an ascetic in any sense; he desired that every 
genuine susceptibility to pleasure should be turned to account, so far as it 
did not interfere with better pleasures; but he made light of the difficulty 
of controlling the sexual appetite. He was exceedingly temperate as 
regarded the table; there was nothing of the gourmand superadded to his 
healthy appetite. (149) 
In ‘The Philosopher and the Chicken: On the Dietetics of Disembodied Knowledge’, 
Steven Shapin considers the ascetic ideal in representations of the philosopher, and 
how, historically, dietary and sexual abstemiousness were associated with intellectual 
life (24–37). He notes such ideas shift in the late nineteenth- and twentieth-century to a 
rejection of the ‘idea of disembodiment as the condition for making and recognizing 
truth’ (43). Bain refuted the charge of asceticism which others, such as Ward and Leslie 
Stephen, were to make so freely against Mill. Nevertheless he highlighted the way that 
Mill’s life corresponded to the hierarchy of pleasures outlined in Utilitarianism, where 
intellectual gratifications were privileged over bodily ones. From Carlyle’s letters of the 
1830s (so earlier in date than the trend Shapin observes), through to the later 
nineteenth-century accounts from Bain and the Stephens, abstinence and 
disembodiment were rejected as acceptable conditions for Mill’s philosophising, and 
they were done so in gendered terms. As with Mill’s parliamentary performances, 
embodied ideals of masculine authority, foregrounding virility and physical prowess 
were held up by way of contrast. However, the accounts of Mill’s unacceptably 
disembodied state are complicated – as the next section explains – by competing 
interpretations which emphasised not lack, but excess. 
3.4 ‘A heart of truly feminine sensibility’ 
Though Bain depicted Mill’s life as conspicuously restrained in its theoretical 
consideration and practical pursuit of bodily pleasures, he took an opposite view of his 
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‘emotional susceptibilities’. Like many commentators then and since, Bain did not 
conceal his disdain for Mill’s publicly-expressed devotion to Harriet Taylor.17 This Bain 
put down to ‘excessive emotion’ and ‘overweening passion’ (169, 171). As I argued in 
chapter two, Mill’s ‘Saint of Rationalism’ label belies the extent to which he was 
associated with emotion, passion and sensitivity. The accusations of imbalance, and 
dangerous heat, which I highlighted in the ‘Passionate emotionism’ section of chapter 
two, were frequently aligned with a feminine disposition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Such ideas are subtly encoded in the cartoon from Fun shown in chapter one, 
Figure 1 (page 8). The cartoon depicts the moment when Mill proposed the amendment 
to the wording of the Reform Bill, which if passed, would have allowed women to vote. 
Though it referenced a very specific moment in British politics, the cartoon also engaged 
with the broader debate about the suitability of a philosopher taking on a political role, 
and the widespread claim that, because he envisioned an age of greater gender equality, 
Mill was not sufficiently in touch with practical realities. The pose of Bright, in the 
foreground of the picture, indicates his ambivalence concerning the amendment (he 
voted in favour of it, though this was at odds with the objections to female suffrage he 
expressed beforehand and afterwards18); it also suggests doubt about Mill’s status 
within this group of politicians. The heart-shaped pocket watch suspended from Mill’s 
waistcoat (Figure 14) is a small but telling detail, symbolising the extended discussion 
about Mill’s tendency to be ruled by his heart, rather than his head.  
                                                        
17 See note 6 to chapter 2 (page 55). 
18 According to extracts from Bright’s diaries on the Rochdale Boroughwide Cultural Trust website. 
 
Fig. 14. Heart-shaped pocket watch detail 
from ‘The “Mill”-ennium’. Fun. 4 May 1867. 
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More blatantly, in their obituary of Mill, the Saturday Review linked Mill’s 
commitment to gender equality to a mental imbalance. They asserted that: ‘Mr Mill’s 
profound belief in the intellectual and political equality of the sexes was a delusion 
which would alone have diminished the confidence which might have been reposed in 
his authority. There was in truth something feminine in his own mental constitution 
which disturbed the calm balance of his judgment’ (‘Mr Mill’ 639). While the Saturday 
Review made the predictable connection between Mill’s commitment to gender equality 
and his own purportedly feminine constitution, it was not just his support for women’s 
suffrage that prompted such comments. The accusation of feminine imbalance was used 
to attack various tenets of Mill’s theories and his philosophical practices.  
In 1871, a professor of political economy at Oxford, Bonamy Price, included the 
following assessment of Mill’s mental powers in a critique of land reform proposals:  
The disturbing forces in Mr Mill’s mind which pervert the faculty of 
judgment are many, and their action is incessant. He is destitute of true 
fairness; he seldom does justice to the position of his opponent. He 
constantly neglects to notice his reasoning ... . The reason of this singular 
weakness in a writer endowed with so much mental power, is the 
feminine passionateness of his nature, the quickness with which his 
feelings are excited, even on the most abstract subject, and the 
consequent eagerness to establish his own side, and his dislike of giving 
due weight to the side of his adversary. (203) 
Price created an image of Mill completely opposed to that of the ‘Saint of Rationalism’ – 
easily riled, unfair, and egotistical. He picked on an issue central to Mill’s account of 
successful intellectual endeavour: cognisance of opponents’ arguments. In On Liberty 
Mill had argued that ‘He who knows only his side of the case, knows little of that’ (42), 
and in his Autobiography he was to assess his one great intellectual strength as his 
‘readiness and eagerness to learn from everybody, and to make room in my opinions for 
every new acquisition by adjusting the old and the new to one another’ (189). So the 
‘feminine passionateness’ charge was used to discredit Mill’s philosophical modus 
operandi as much as his specific views on land reform. 
In Frederic Harrison’s critique of 1896, Mill’s ‘feminine’ qualities were initially 
depicted as both strength and weakness. Harrison praised the direct connection 
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between Mill’s compassion and his intellect, asserting: ‘Mill himself was a man with a 
heart of truly feminine sensibility. His heart was even richer than his brain. Under the 
stimulus of indignation for the outrages and obstacles of which he saw women to be 
frequent victims, his acute reasoning powers caught fire’ (502). However, like many, 
Harrison felt that ultimately this led to an unforgiveable imbalance – an imbalance 
which was palpable in the pages of Subjection. Harrison maintained that ‘there are 
purple patches in the book where we seem to hear that spiteful wrongheadedness of 
some woman who has grown old in nursing her wrongs, out of touch with actual life and 
with her own sex’ (502). Complex layers of prejudice are made visible here, as Mill is 
supposed to have uncritically given voice to a woefully mistaken female viewpoint. 
Harrison further contended that Mill describing British women’s position under 
nineteenth-century marriage laws and customs as equivalent to, or worse than, that of 
slaves, was an instance of his ‘feminine want of balance, of knowledge, and of 
impartiality’ (502–3). In making this argument, Harrison was completely out of step 
with New Women writers of the 1890s, such as Mona Caird, who found Mill’s rhetorical 
stance on women and slavery deeply resonant and praised his rationality on the subject. 
However, when the focus was on qualities such as sensitivity, delicacy, modesty 
and refinement, rather than unruly emotions and passions, Mill’s ‘truly feminine 
sensibility’ also accommodated more sympathetic ideas. John Morley’s account of 
Anthony Trollope’s life for Macmillan’s Magazine in 1883 included a description of 
Trollope’s only meeting with Mill. It made much of the clash between the two men’s 
characters: ‘The contrast was too violent between the modesty and courtesy of the host 
and the blustering fashions of Trollope. These came out the worse when they figured in 
the same room with the gentle precision of Mill ... . It was a relief to get the bull safely 
away from the china-shop’ (‘Anthony Trollope’ 55–6). If there is some sense here that 
Trollope’s ‘sterling manliness’ (55) is bolstered by way of contrast with Mill’s more 
placid demeanour (anticipating Morley’s comparison of Mill to more manly speakers in 
his Recollections), others cited his modesty and gentleness in a whole-heartedly 
approbative way. After talking with Mill in 1840, Barclay Fox recorded in his diary that 
he was ‘most cordial affectionate & in short J. Millish’ (192); a few days later after 
dinner and conversation, he noted ‘such a combination of giant intellect with feminine 
modesty, is rare indeed’ (194). For Fox, Mill’s ‘feminine modesty’ denoted a refreshing 
absence of egotism, just as it did for Conway, who observed in his Autobiography that 
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Mill ‘was a man of delicate sentiment, elegant manners, and affectionate nature. By the 
personal care he had given to his stepdaughter, a care maternal as well as paternal, she 
was able to appreciate his philosophy, learning, and his unique personality’ (II: 16–17). 
In Conway’s portrait, Mill’s step-parenting skills and his support for Helen Taylor’s 
intellectual development were appealingly androgynous. 
An 1875 article on ‘Genius and Sensitiveness’ in Bow Bells, a family magazine of 
literature and art, declared that: ‘With men of genius, sensitiveness is a perfect disease; 
indeed, it is this very quality which enables them to feel and to express those emotions 
which escape other men’ (223). For such extraordinary individuals, sensitiveness 
caused loneliness, and a sense of idealism doomed to generate disappointment, but it 
was also the characteristic which enabled an unusually strong sympathy with others. 
Mill featured in the roll call of eminent men, which also included Byron and Dickens, 
who were perceived to have been both afflicted and invigorated in this way. Though the 
most obvious reason for Mill’s inclusion here was the relatively recent publication of his 
Autobiography, such a view of the connection between genius and sensitivity might well 
have been drawn from the pages of Subjection, in which Mill had equated nervous 
temperaments in both men and women with latent ability to bring about societal 
change. Sensitivity, delicacy, modesty and refinement were all qualities more commonly 
associated with ideals of Victorian femininity, and as such, capable of being used 
disparagingly to provide evidence of Mill’s weakness as an eminent public man. 
However, they were also the qualities which were frequently interpreted as signs of 
Mill’s unique strength and appeal as a philosopher, and as a human being. 
3.5 ‘A Goddess Called “The Passion of Reason”’ 
After Mill’s death in 1873 Florence Nightingale wrote to the social reformer 
Edwin Chadwick, who had introduced her to Mill, and said: 
The loss we have in John Stuart Mill is irreparable – I think there must 
have been a Goddess called “The Passion of Reason” in olden times: & he 
was that Goddess returned in the flesh to life. And he would not at all have 
considered the gender humiliating. For he was like neither man nor 
woman – but he was Wisdom ‘thrilling’ with emotion to his figures ‘ends’ 
(which last was truly said of him) – impassioned Reason – or reasonable 
Passion – in the sense which one supposes the Greeks had in their mind 
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when they made Wisdom a Woman. Or shall we call him Sancta Sophia? 
(qtd. in Vicinus 343, Nightingale’s emphasis) 
In ‘A Sub-“Note of Interrogation”: I – What Will be Our Religion in 1999?’ in July of 1873, 
Nightingale included a version of her note to Chadwick. In the article for Fraser’s 
Magazine she argued that people needed to develop powers of discrimination which are 
neither ‘Universal toleration’ nor ‘Universal criticism’, and used the example of 
misrepresentations of Mill’s position to illustrate her point: 
There are some who see no difference between the mutual flattery of 
clever men of a college or members of family; and the real, honest 
sympathy and co-operation in the real honest search after truth. There 
are some who see no difference between a Positivist and a John Stuart 
Mill – oh! too soon taken from us – ‘he should have died hereafter’, – when 
shall we see again that true ‘liberality’, which would wish to be defeated in 
the cause of truth? – when shall we see again that Passion of Reason or 
Reason of Passion – impassioned Reason and reasonable Passion – wise, 
but ‘thrilling with emotion to his fingers’ ends’ – passionate in the cause of 
Truth alone, Sancta Sophia? – Had there been a goddess called the 
‘Passion of Reason’, he would not have considered the gender humiliating, 
but have asked: Why did the Greeks make Wisdom a woman? There are 
none like him – none to come after him. (34–5, Nightingale’s emphasis) 
Nightingale’s words stand out among nineteenth-century depictions for their 
unapologetic comparison of Mill to a strong female figure. Nightingale challenged the 
viewpoint, epitomised in the pages of Judy, that there could be no more demeaning way 
of representing an eminent Victorian man than to say that he was like a woman. 
Moreover, in stark contrast to Carlyle, James Fitzjames and Leslie Stephen, and others, 
Nightingale put the emphasis on Mill’s successful embodiment of knowledge and 
compassion. Above all, in her semantic experiments with combinations of passion and 
reason, she insisted that what Mill had achieved was a commendable balance rather 
than a lamentable imbalance – a balance that was exciting and inspirational. 
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Fig. 1. Newspaper clippings pasted into the front cover of Thomas Hardy’s copy of On Liberty. On the 
left, ‘A Glimpse of John Stuart Mill’ from the Times on 20 May 1906 and on the right, folded up, ‘John 
Stuart Mill’ by John Morley from the Times Literary Supplement on 18 May 1906. Image courtesy of 
Dorset County Museum.
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4. ‘My theoretic unconventionality broke down’: 
Millian Philosophy in the Fiction of Thomas Hardy 
 
It is not the fault of any creed, but of the complicated nature of human affairs, that rules 
of conduct cannot be so framed as to require no exceptions, and that hardly any kind of 
action can safely be laid down as either always obligatory or always condemnable. There 
is no ethical creed which does not temper the rigidity of its laws, by giving a certain 
latitude, under the moral responsibility of the agent, for accommodation to peculiarities 
of circumstances; and under every creed, at the opening thus made, self-deception and 
dishonest casuistry get in. There exists no moral system under which there do not arise 
unequivocal cases of conflicting obligation. These are the real difficulties, the knotty 
points both in the theory of ethics, and in the conscientious guidance of personal 
conduct. They are overcome practically with greater or with less success according to 
the intellect and virtue of the individual; but it can hardly be pretended that anyone will 
be the less qualified for dealing with them, from possessing an ultimate standard to 
which conflicting rights and duties can be referred. (297–8) 
Utilitarianism, 1861  
But I was a coward – as so many women are – and my theoretic unconventionality broke 
down. (213) 
Jude the Obscure, 1895  
 
 Pasted into the front cover of Thomas Hardy’s copy of On Liberty are two 
newspaper clippings (see Figure 1). One is a tribute to Mill by John Morley, published in 
the Times Literary Supplement on 18 May 1906, to mark the one hundredth anniversary 
of Mill’s birth. The other is ‘A Glimpse of John Stuart Mill’, a letter Hardy wrote to the 
Times in response to Morley’s article. These early twentieth-century assessments of Mill 
bring together many of the themes I have discussed in the previous chapters, and 
provide a useful starting point for thinking about the ways in which Hardy engages with 
Millian philosophy throughout his fiction.  
In his review of Mill’s achievements, Morley insisted that the defining feature of 
the philosopher’s greatness was a seamless connection between his theory and his 
practice: ‘His life was true to his professions, and was no less tolerant, liberal, unselfish, 
singleminded, high, and strenuous than they were’ (173). The link between theory and 
action was obvious and automatic for Mill, Morley suggested: ‘His postulate of a decided 
predominance of the active over the passive meant devotion of thought to practical 
ends. His life was not stimulated by mere intellectual curiosity, but by the resolute 
purpose of furthering human improvement’ (174). Morley presented Mill’s 
accomplishments in reverential and religious terms, asserting that Mill saw ‘life as a 
sacred instrument for good purposes’, that he was ‘held in general honour as a sort of 
oracle’ and that he ‘really succeeded in procuring a sort of popular halo round the 
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dismal and derided name of philosopher’ (174). ‘Only those who can recall the social 
odium that surrounded heretical opinions before Mill began to achieve popularity’, 
maintained Morley, ‘are able rightly to appreciate the battle in which he was in many 
aspects the protagonist’ (174). Here he alluded to difficulties – a time before Mill 
achieved renown, the hostile reaction provoked by heterodox opinions – but in his 
retrospective overview he also conveyed a sense of inevitability about Mill’s central role 
in the struggle.  
It is only when Morley described Mill’s entrance into politics, ‘during a short and 
a bad Parliament’ that a stronger sense of disjunction between theory and practice crept 
in (174). Fellow parliamentarians ‘felt that his presence was in some way an honour to 
them’, Morley recalled, ‘and they listened with creditable respect to speeches that were 
acute, well-argued, apt for the occasion, and not too long nor too many. But, after all, 
Mill was not of them, and he was not at home with them’ (174). In the centenary piece, 
Morley repeated Disraeli’s sneering comment about Mill being a ‘finishing governess’, 
but did so matter-of-factly, without the hint of collusion in this viewpoint which, as I 
noted in chapter three, he conveyed in his Reminiscences (174). On the contrary, in his 
record of Mill for posterity, Morley affirmed Mill’s manliness by asserting that he was a 
protagonist in the battleground of public opinion, and that he was involved in ‘an 
incessant and manful wrestle for what he thought was true and right’ (174). 
While Morley considered Mill from the point of view of his confirmed position in 
the history of philosophy and social change, Hardy’s ‘footnote’ conveyed a far greater 
sense of uncertainty, of provisionality. Hardy dwelt on the idea, shared by many of the 
commentators discussed in chapters two and three, of Mill not being at home at a public 
meeting – ‘a man out of place’. Observing the philosopher on the hustings, he saw a 
series of contrasts and tensions. Mill, the author of On Liberty, was unexpectedly 
transplanted from his writing desk to the open air as a parliamentary candidate. Mill, 
‘one of the profoundest thinkers’ of the nineteenth century became Mill, ‘a human 
personage in his actual form and flesh’. In seeking to personalise Mill’s experience as a 
public intellectual, Hardy created a strikingly visceral portrait of the man of letters.  
Hardy’s Mill is a figure of intellectual authority who is also an individual taking a 
personal risk. Mill’s ‘religious sincerity’ and ‘personified earnestness’ are juxtaposed 
with the ambivalent crowd, not fully committed to understanding, or capable of 
comprehending, what they hear. The group watching Mill on the hustings are like his 
fellow parliamentarians when he does get elected: aware that they are in the presence 
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of greatness, but somewhat bewildered by it. Hardy reflects on the potential for 
philosophers and teachers to be misunderstood. His description of Mill’s head draws 
attention to the philosopher’s physical vulnerability as he faced a potentially agitated or 
violent crowd. Even the appearance of Mill’s profile against St Paul’s Church suggested 
antagonism, evoking as it did for Hardy Mill’s views on religion, which ran counter to 
the prevailing ones. ‘The cameo clearness of his face ... against the blue shadow of a 
church’ recalls the beginning of Under the Greenwood Tree (1872) and the description of 
Dick Dewey walking to choir practice at dusk: ‘his profile appearing on the light 
background like the portrait of a gentleman in black cardboard’ (12). Hardy’s portrayal 
of a great philosopher is not dissimilar to his depiction of a common working man, thus 
providing another counterpoint to the grandeur of Morley’s terms: ‘sacred instrument’, 
‘sort of oracle’ and ‘popular halo’. Nevertheless, the sense of contingency extends to 
Hardy in his role as spectator, too. The viewpoint Hardy offers is that of ‘the man in the 
street’. Having gained fame and recognition himself by the time he wrote the letter, he 
recalls a time when he was an anonymous part of the crowd, observing an 
extraordinary philosopher. The contrast between Mill’s fame and Hardy’s anonymity is 
nicely captured in the heading given to the letter by the Times, ‘A Glimpse of John Stuart 
Mill’.  
The letter encapsulates Hardy’s interest in the role that eminent theorists and 
well-known theories can play in ordinary, everyday lives and is significant when 
considering how he engaged with Millian philosophy in his fiction. Hardy turned 
Morley’s statement into a question: what does it mean to say that a person’s life is true 
to their professions? This question, which animated many of the depictions of Mill 
discussed in the previous chapters, is also a question that runs through Hardy’s fiction, 
from Under the Greenwood Tree – when the vicar says ‘“You know Dewy, it is often said 
how difficult a matter it is to act up to our convictions and please all parties. It may be 
said with equal truth that it is difficult for a man of any appreciativeness to have 
convictions at all”’ (86) – to Jude the Obscure (1895) – when the narrator comments that 
with Sue Bridehead ‘things which were right in theory were wrong in practice’ (210). 
Far from the Madding Crowd (1874) is a novel particularly concerned with the 
relationship between philosophy and conduct. At the beginning of the story, when 
Gabriel Oak’s dog is shot after he chases his sheep over a precipice, it is ‘another 
instance of the untoward fate which so often attends dogs and other philosophers who 
follow out a train of reasoning to its logical conclusion, and attempt perfectly consistent 
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conduct in a world made up so largely of compromise’ (87). In the quotation from 
Utilitarianism at the head of this chapter, in which Mill defends his version of Bentham’s 
moral code, he concedes that adherence to any set of principles is affected by individual 
circumstances and complicated by difficulties. Hardy’s focus might be said to be 
resolutely on the ‘knotty points’ of ethics and personal conduct: how ties to family, 
friends, and communities, or receptivity to the views of others, can make forming or 
sticking to our own views problematic. 
The autobiographical Life and Work of Thomas Hardy (1984) contains a note 
Hardy wrote in 1882 on the value of theory as a guide in everyday life:  
Since I discovered, several years ago, that I was living in a world where 
nothing bears out in practice what it promises incipiently, I have troubled 
myself very little about theories ... .Where development according to 
perfect reason is limited to the narrow region of pure mathematics, I am 
content with tentativeness from day to day. (160) 
A passage written in 1901 reiterated his earlier note about theories: 
After reading various philosophic systems, and being struck with their 
futilities, I have come to this: – Let every man make a philosophy for 
himself out of his own experience. He will not be able to escape using terms 
and phraseology from earlier philosophers, but let him avoid adopting 
their theories if he values his own mental life. Let him avoid the fate of 
Coleridge, and save years of labour by working out his own views as given 
by his surroundings. (333, emphasis in original) 
Hardyean critics have often taken their cue from these declarations, offering readings of 
Hardy’s work which acknowledge the influence of multiple thinkers but definitive 
commitment to none. Robert Schweik, for example, warns that the diverse and 
overlapping sources for Hardy’s writing make it difficult to identify precise influences. 
He argues that ‘elements of contemporary thought in Hardy’s works tend to be 
embedded in a densely intricate web of imaginative connections and qualifications’ 
(54). Accordingly, Schweik very briefly examines Mill’s influence on Hardy as one 
among several others including Leslie Stephen, François Fourier, Herbert Spencer, 
Ludwig Feuerbach, Auguste Comte, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Eduard von Hartmann. 
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When other critics have considered Mill in relation to Hardy, they have also done 
so by considering at least part of this intricate web. Angelique Richardson and Jane 
Thomas have both considered Mill’s influence on Hardy in detail, but in the context of 
how Hardy also engages with Spencer and Darwin. In ‘Hardy and the Place of Culture’ 
(2009), Richardson argues that ‘Hardy was caught between biology and philosophy, 
between, in essence, Darwin and Mill, and not always able to accommodate both’ (55). 
In Thomas Hardy, Femininity and Dissent: Reassessing the ‘Minor’ Novels (1999) Thomas 
says that ‘Among the contemporary thinkers whose philosophical and ethical systems 
provided Hardy with ideas, terms and phraseology for his own views were Charles 
Darwin, Herbert Spencer and John Stuart Mill’ (12). In ‘Literature and Science: Hardy’s 
Response to Mill, Huxley and Darwin’ (1981), G. Glen Wickens explores the scientific 
context of Far From the Madding Crowd, emphasising parallels between the novel and 
definitions of nature in Three Essays on Religion, Origin of Species and Huxley’s Man’s 
Place in Nature (1863). 
In focusing solely on Hardy’s engagement with Mill, this chapter does not seek to 
dismiss the significance of other influences, but rather to offer an extended reading of 
the Millian terms and phraseology that Hardy could not escape using. For, even in 
disavowing particular philosophic systems, the philosopher that Hardy echoes is Mill, 
especially a line Hardy highlighted in his copy of On Liberty: ‘it is the privilege and 
proper condition of a human being, arrived at the maturity of his faculties, to use and 
interpret experience in his own way’ (64).1 In line with this emphasis on intellectual 
independence, Hardy’s fiction pays sustained attention to the disjunctions or 
correspondences between the inner and outer lives of its characters. Here, too, Mill’s 
terms come to mind. In On Liberty Mill wrote that ‘To what an extent doctrines 
intrinsically fitted to make the deepest impression upon the mind may remain in it as a 
dead belief, without being ever realized in the imagination, the feelings, or the 
understanding, is exemplified by the manner in which the majority of believers hold the 
doctrines of Christianity’ (46). Mill was concerned that, when it came to Christian 
morality, people inherited or adopted practices which were unconnected to theory on a 
personal level. In Hardy’s fiction this type of discontinuity is explored even in minor 
characters, like the pub landlord in A Laodicean (1881) who explains that he became a 
Methodist because the church was conveniently situated: ‘“ ’Twas owing to my taking a 
                                                 
1 For consistency with other chapters, page references to On Liberty and Utilitarianism given in this 
chapter are to the editions listed in the Works Cited and Consulted, rather than Hardy’s own copies.  
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house next to the chapel; so that what with hearing the organ bizz like a bee through the 
wall, and what with finding it saved umbrellas on wet Sundays, I went over to that faith 
for two years”’ (33). The weather-prophet in The Mayor of Casterbridge (1886) is 
uniquely placed to understand the disconnections between what people say about 
religion and superstitions and what they actually believe: ‘He was sometimes 
astonished that men could profess so little and believe so much at his house when at 
church they professed so much and believed so little’ (184–5). In spite of, or perhaps 
because of Hardy’s tentativeness about theorising, his fiction – as I shall show – often 
investigates Mill’s contention that, sets of beliefs, religious or secular, which are 
outwardly professed, should connect meaningfully with a person’s inner world, and 
provide consistency and coherence to the different parts of their existence. 
Hardy’s recourse to Mill to express ideas about intellectual independence and 
connected or disconnected thought provides a broad framework for approaching his 
fiction. At the same time, his annotations in copies of On Liberty and Utilitarianism, and 
his direct references to On Liberty in Jude the Obscure and to Utilitarianism in The Hand 
of Ethelberta, provide evidence of his specific engagements with Mill.2 I pay attention to 
the passages highlighted, underlined and annotated by Hardy in his own copies of On 
Liberty and Utilitarianism, but I also argue that Hardy’s fiction engages more broadly 
with ideas from the Logic, Auguste Comte and Positivism (1865), Subjection and Three 
Essays on Religion – works which Hardy may have become familiar with indirectly 
through the periodical press, even if he did not engage with them directly.3 The 
following sections of this chapter examine Hardy’s fictional treatment of several Millian 
concepts: overcoming deep-rooted ideas; the value of self-sacrifice; the link between 
personal happiness and general happiness; what makes life satisfactory; and language 
                                                 
2 Hardy’s copy of On Liberty is in the Hardy Collection at Dorset County Museum. His copy of 
Utilitarianism is in the Richard L. Purdy Collection of Thomas Hardy at Yale’s Beinecke Rare Book and 
Manuscript Library – it is marked with crosses and lines in the margins, but no comments. In Thomas 
Hardy: A Critical Biography (1954), Evelyn Hardy (who was not related to Thomas Hardy), describes how 
the annotations to On Liberty are more extensive than other books in Hardy’s library: ‘It is more heavily 
scored and underlined than any other of Hardy’s extant books which it has been my privilege to examine. 
There are as many as fifty marked passages, a paper marker, and, in addition, several annotations. His 
statement that he knew the essay “almost by heart” is visually corroborated when we see the intense 
study which he gave to it in young manhood’ (69).  
3 Jane Thomas argues that this is quite likely to be the case with Subjection, for example. She notes: 
‘Hardy’s Literary Notebooks show that periodicals such as the Saturday Review, the Fortnightly Review and 
the Nineteenth Century provided him with an endless fund of information, opinion and anecdote. These 
periodicals functioned as a forum for debate on subjects related to the general emancipation of women as 
well as containing reviews and notices of works such as John Stuart Mill’s On the Subjection of Women and 
articles clearly informed by the ideas of leading contributors to the “Woman Question”’ (28). 
115 
as ‘the conservator of ancient experience’. Finally, this chapter considers how Hardy 
draws on Mill to theorise about ‘The Profitable Reading of Fiction’ (1888), and reflects 
on how reading Mill alongside Hardy defamiliarises parts of Mill’s writing by making 
them unexpectedly applicable to literary endeavours. 
 
4.1 Overcoming Deep-Rootedness 
An image that recurs in Mill’s writing, and in Hardy’s, is that of deep-rooted 
feelings and opinions in need of excision. The corollary to this is the often 
insurmountable difficulty of overcoming notions which are entrenched – in public 
opinion, communities, and individuals – in order to bring about social change. Mill 
opens Subjection by calling attention to the difficult terms of the debate about the social 
position of women: ‘there are so many causes tending to make the feelings connected 
with this subject the most intense and most deeply-rooted of those which gather round 
and protect old institutions and customs’ (471). Mill’s frustration about the way society 
views issues of female freedom is comparable to Elfride’s complaint about her father’s 
domineering in A Pair of Blue Eyes (1873): ‘He is either biassed in favour of a thing, or 
prejudiced against it. Argument is powerless against either feeling’ (90). In ‘The Utility 
of Religion’ Mill considers the tremendous power given to religious beliefs by their early 
inculcation: 
Now it is especially characteristic of the impressions of early education, 
that they possess what it is so much more difficult for later convictions to 
obtain – command over the feelings. We see daily how powerful a hold 
these first impressions retain over the feelings even of those, who have 
given up the opinions which they were early taught. While on the other 
hand, it is only persons of a much higher degree of natural sensibility and 
intellect combined than it is at all common to meet with, whose feelings 
entwine themselves with anything like the same force round opinions 
which they have adopted from their own investigations later in life; and 
even when they do, we may say with truth that it is because the strong 
sense of moral duty, the sincerity, courage and self-devotion which 
enabled them to do so, were themselves the fruits of early impressions. 
(81) 
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For Mill, it is the early exposure to religious ideas that makes them so compelling, rather 
than anything inherent in religion itself. Other ideas which people are exposed to during 
childhood will therefore be similarly commanding, and involve a lifelong process of 
negotiation. Always an advocate of intellectual independence, Mill still recognises that it 
takes exceptional strength to successfully disentangle opinions acquired in adulthood 
from early associations when the two conflict, and even then the groundwork for 
success must have been laid in childhood. 
Jude the Obscure explores exactly these difficulties in negotiating and overcoming 
deep-seated conventions and feelings. When Sue Bridehead agrees to marry Phillotson 
in the first instance, she does so because of her sensitivity to gossip – gossip provoked 
when she stays away from her teaching training college all night with Jude: ‘“I became 
rather reckless and careless about conventions. Then you know what scandals spread ... 
Of course I, of all people, ought not to have cared what was said, for it was just what I 
fancied I never did care for. But I was a coward – as so many women are – and my 
theoretic unconventionality broke down”’ (213). Sue’s comment about female 
cowardice registers her sense that women in particular may find difficulty challenging 
the prevailing attitudes and social arrangements that restrict them. In ‘Theoretic and 
Practical Unconventionality in Jude the Obscure’ (1965), William J. Hyde reads Sue’s 
retreat from theoretic unconventionality as a failure of character, without taking into 
account Hardy’s recognition of the strength of prevailing attitudes and social 
arrangements – such as the unacceptability of male–female relationships outside of 
marriage, the lack of liberty within marriage, narrow educational and vocational 
opportunities for women – impinge upon her.4 Nevertheless, the idea that women are 
essentially less courageous than men, and will therefore be less likely to actively 
challenge conventions, crops up several times in Hardy’s fiction. George Somerset in A 
Laodicean is angered by Paula Power’s refusal to make a formal announcement of her 
love for him: ‘He silently reproached her, who was apparently so independent, for 
                                                 
4 Hyde defines practical as a ‘natural state’ or ‘liberty unhampered by theory’ (158). He conceives of four 
levels of existence in Jude the Obscure: the ‘natural state’; a variation of Matthew Arnold’s Hebraic world 
of right conduct; a Hellenic world of joy and intellectual freedom; and finally, ‘J.S. Mill’s ideal of a fusion of 
worlds, “a Greek ideal of self-development, which the Platonic and Christian ideal of government blends 
with, but does not supersede”’ (155). He considers how the different characters in the novel move 
between these different levels. In particular, he argues that the ‘natural state’ occupied by Arabella can 
appear in its practice to be like Mill’s ideal fusion of worlds, with Arabella ‘acting instinctively on 
advanced notions of liberty’ (158), because of her strong character. In comparison, he insists that Sue fails 
to act upon Mill’s words because of her weaker, less energetic personality.  
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lacking independence in such a vital matter. Perhaps it was mere sex, perhaps it was 
peculiar to a few, that her independence and courage, like Cleopatra’s, failed her 
occasionally at the last moment’ (240). Edred Fitzpiers in The Woodlanders (1887) 
thinks that it is Grace’s naiveté, as opposed to her boldness, which leads her to imply 
that she had a sexual relationship with Giles Winterbourne: ‘His wide experience of the 
sex had taught him that, in many cases, women who ventured on hazardous matters did 
so because they lacked imagination gross enough to feel their full force’ (332). Viviette 
Constantine in Two on a Tower (1882) immediately and irrevocably abandons her plans 
to let Swithin St Cleeve pursue his astronomical research uninterruptedly, on 
discovering that she is pregnant. Just as ‘Hardy is ambivalent, conflicted, contradictory 
on the place of culture’ (Richardson 55), he is uncertain about women’s commitment to 
putting theory into practice. 
In Jude the Obscure when Sue decides to leave Phillotson, she returns to her 
position of theoretic unconventionality, using her reading of On Liberty to support and 
justify her actions, and eliciting a wearied response from her husband: 
 ‘She, or he, “who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan 
of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of 
imitation”. J.S. Mill’s words, those are. I have been reading it up. Why can’t 
you act upon them? I wish to, always’.  
‘What do I care about J.S. Mill!’ moaned he. ‘I only want to lead a quiet 
life’. (215) 
For Rosemarie Morgan, Sue’s recourse to Mill signifies her limits rather than her 
advancement. In Women and Sexuality in the Novels of Thomas Hardy (1988) she argued 
that Sue ‘has available only a language invented by men for men ... she has no radical 
feminist guidelines, no inspiring models, nor even the literature of liberation beyond 
Mill’ (122). However, in the sense that Mill’s language of liberty offers Sue clarification 
and fortification – of the same kind implied by Hardy when he says that he and other 
students of Mill knew On Liberty ‘almost by heart’ and that the section on individuality 
was one of his ‘cures for despair’ (The Life and work of Thomas Hardy 59) – it signifies 
possibility rather than limitation. Sue draws strength and solace from her engagement 
with On Liberty. ‘Reading it up’ and quoting from it is a constructive process, a means of 
articulating and rationalising an emotive and unconventional request, a bridge from 
thought to action, and a practical aid to disassociating herself from ingrained feelings 
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about propriety. In the exchange of notes across the schoolroom which follows, Sue 
underscores the value she sees in Mill’s language of liberty by referring to a quotation 
from Phillotson’s own reading, which also happens to be the epigraph to On Liberty. Sue 
insists: ‘To produce “Human development in its richest diversity” (to quote your 
Humboldt) is to my mind far above respectability’ (216). In contrast to Sue, Phillotson 
gains no consolation or clarification from philosophy, even though he is well-versed in 
it. Like Hardy, Phillotson professes to favour his own experience over his reading. 
However, Phillotson is similar to Sue in that he is painfully aware of the conflict 
between that which has been deeply-rooted in him since childhood and his current 
position. His conventional ideas of marital propriety, implanted in him by his early 
religious education, clash with his strong inclination to respond sympathetically to Sue’s 
distress. He tells his friend Gillingham: ‘“I know I can’t logically, or religiously, defend 
my concession to such a wish of hers; or harmonize it with the doctrines I was brought 
up in ... I am simply going to act by instinct, and let principles take care of themselves”’ 
(222). He later tells his friend: ‘“I’m a feeler, not a reasoner”’ (223). While disregarding 
Mill’s theory in name, Phillotson is able to put it into action, but only by denying that his 
action has anything to do with argument or logic. He acts according to his own wishes, 
and in a way that grants Sue liberty, but he describes it in terms that Mill would 
question. Mill complained that ‘[f]or the apotheosis of Reason we have substituted that 
of Instinct; and we call everything instinct which we find in ourselves and for which we 
cannot trace any rational foundation’ (Subjection 474), so he would probably argue that 
Phillotson misnames his motivation in calling it an instinct. In Richardson’s discussion 
of how Hardy was caught between Darwin and Mill, she observes that ‘For Hardy ... 
instinct is often related to a greater authenticity of feeling and action, a greater truth 
value [than it is for Mill]’ (61). Though Hardy may have thought that Phillotson correctly 
attributes his actions to inscrutable instincts, this does not make it any the less difficult 
for Phillotson to deal with the reaction to his unconventionality, and the deep-rooted 
attitudes of others.  
Phillotson succeeds in giving precedence to his sympathetic feelings for Sue up to 
a certain point, facing the ignominy of defending his actions to the school board, the 
hostile reaction of the ‘respectable’ citizens within his local community, and the violent 
‘support’ of a group of assorted itinerants. But as Phillotson prepares to marry Sue 
again, Gillingham wonders if these difficulties will lead him to a lapse from liberalism, 
where he is crueller to Sue than he has formally been kind.  
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[Phillotson] ... did not care to admit clearly that his taking Sue to him 
again had at bottom nothing to do with repentance of letting her go, but 
was, primarily, a human instinct flying in the face of custom and 
profession. He said, “Yes. I shall do that. I know woman better now. 
Whatever justice there was in releasing her, there was little logic, for one 
holding my views on other subjects”. (354) 
At the same time that Phillotson exercises his right to interpret experience in his own 
way, causing a clash between his advanced and traditional beliefs, he illustrates the 
danger of denying a consistent theoretical framework or basis for ideas, whether of our 
own construction or derived from someone else: kindness can more easily give way to 
cruelty. The impulse to defy custom is insufficient without a corresponding attempt to 
implant supporting opinions. 
After the tragedy of their children’s deaths, both Sue and Jude conceive of their 
new and opposing world views in terms of rootedness. Sue now inverts Mill’s image of 
deep-rootedness, thinking of her unconventionality as something embedded within her 
and in need of removal: ‘“I wish my every fearless word and thought could be rooted out 
of my history”’ (334). On the other hand, Jude’s conventional views have been 
successfully displaced: ‘“You root out of me what little affection and reverence I had left 
in me for the church as an old acquaintance”’ (339). Jude’s problem in overcoming early 
education relates instead to his view of Christminster. Though he now recognises its 
inequalities, it remains inextricably bound up with the aspirations he formed in 
childhood: ‘“it is the centre of the universe to me, because of my early dream: and 
nothing can alter it”’ (308). Jude’s awareness that ‘“It takes two or three generations to 
do what I tried to do in one”’ (316) and Sue’s that ‘“Everybody is getting to feel as we do. 
We are a little beforehand, that’s all”’ (276) connect with Mill’s prediction in 
Utilitarianism, that in the course of removing the sources of human suffering from the 
world (which Mill believed to be entirely achievable) ‘a long succession of generations 
will perish in the breach’ (286).  
In The Human Predicament in Hardy’s Novels (1985) Jagdish Chandra Dave 
quotes the same piece of Utilitarianism to argue that: 
Hardy did not share the liberal hope and the view of evolution as progress 
with his contemporary thinkers ... . Hardy, in fact, never envisaged a 
success in the distant future, or failure for that matter, for he was neither 
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an idealist visionary nor a pessimist. What seems important to him is the 
struggle against evils today irrespective of the eventual result. (147) 
It is clear that Hardy was concerned with the struggle of his characters in their moment, 
but more debatable that he did not anticipate any societal improvements. For example, 
many of his novels might be said to look to a time when laws relaxed ‘the adamantine 
barrier of marriage’ (The Woodlanders 277). Moreover, in his copy of On Liberty, Hardy 
annotated text which expressed ideas about a time of improvement in the future. He put 
a cross in the margin next to Mill’s assertion that ‘At present individuals are lost in the 
crowd’ and linked it to a line from Tennyson’s ‘Locksley Hall’ (1842) – ‘And the 
individual withers, & the world is more & more’ (see Figure 2). He also put a cross in the 
margin next to the phrase ‘The despotism of custom is everywhere the standing 
hindrance to human advancement ...’ and annotated this with the words ‘“Custom – 
heavy as frost”, Wordsworth’. This is a reference to lines from ‘Ode: Intimations of 
Immortality’ (1807): ‘Full soon thy Soul shall have her earthly freight, / And custom lie 
upon thee with a weight / Heavy as frost, and deep almost as life!’ (129–131). Mill’s 
view of conformism in British society, which Hardy considered to be anticipated in 
Wordsworth’s and Tennyson’s poems, was highly contentious. Andrew Pyle explains in 
his introduction to Liberty: Contemporary Responses to John Stuart Mill (1994) that most 
reviewers responded to ‘Mill’s warning that the pressures of public opinion could turn 
Victorian Britain into a nation of dull conformists. ... with incredulity and outright 
denial. ... Clearly, Mill’s portrait of Victorian Britain was unrecognizable to many’ (viii–
ix). When Hardy was writing Jude the Obscure, over thirty years after the publication of 
On Liberty, he found this controversial portrait of mid-nineteenth-century British life 
more relevant than ever. 
Though Sue says that ‘the general question is not our business’, they are both 
representatives of more general problems (276). Hardy calls Jude and Sue ‘the 
supersensitive couple’ (293) and in Subjection, as discussed in chapter three, Mill 
equates sensitivity in both men and women with spirit, passion, and latent ability to 
inspire others, and to bring about societal change. In Jude’s impromptu speech to the 
crowds at Christminster, gathered to watch the university celebration day procession, 
he becomes the representative of Mill’s injunction to think and act independently: 
‘It is a difficult question, my friends, for any young man – that question I 
had to grapple with, and which thousands are weighing at the present  
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Fig. 2. Annotated page from Hardy’s copy of On Liberty. Image 
courtesy of Dorset County Museum. 
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Fig. 3. Annotated page from Hardy’s copy of On Liberty. Image 
courtesy of Dorset County Museum. 
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moment in these uprising times – whether to follow uncritically the track 
he finds himself in, without considering his aptness for it, or to consider 
what his aptness or bent may be, and reshape his course accordingly. I 
tried to do the latter, and I failed. But I don’t admit that my failure proved 
my view to be a wrong one, or that my success would have made it a right 
one; though that’s how we appraise such attempts nowadays – I mean not 
by their essential soundness, but by their accidental outcomes’. (316) 
Hardy gives far more space than Mill to the ramifications of failure. But Jude’s plea for 
connected thought is very Millian: people should not only critically appraise their own 
circumstances and potentialities. They should strive to understand the links between a 
person’s practice and the theory that informs it, rather than satisfy themselves with a 
more superficial judgement concerning consequences.  
The plot of Tess of the D’Urbervilles (1891) also turns on Mill’s idea about the 
power of early education, specifically Angel’s inability to live up to the advanced ideas 
he develops in adulthood. After Tess makes her wedding-night revelation about the 
rape/seduction, the narrator says: ‘over them both there hung a deeper shade than the 
shade which Angel perceived, namely, the shade of his own limitations. With all his 
attempted independence of judgement this advanced man was yet slave to custom and 
conventionality when surprised back into his early teachings’ (264–5). His newly-
acquired thoughts are only effective when not subjected to a practical test. The impact 
 of Angel’s failure to connect progressive thoughts with his everyday life is life-altering 
for Tess, who ‘wept for the beloved man whose conventional standard of judgement had 
caused all these latter sorrows ...’ (301). In Tess of the D’Urbervilles, Hardy explores the 
ways in which family ties complicate individual freedom, for ‘though legally at liberty to 
do as he chose...’, it causes Angel pain to disturb his parents’ world view by forging a life 
with Tess (165).  
Angel’s father is a religious fanatic who ‘had in his raw youth made up his mind 
once for all on the deeper question of existence, and admitted no further reasoning on 
them thenceforward’ (157). Although Angel is opposed to his father’s dogmatism, he 
admires his determined attempts to convert others and his lack of concern for material 
gain. At the same time he feels a sense of superiority to the limited and insufficiently 
reflective outlook of his brothers. Both Felix and Cuthbert Clare are blinkered by the 
institutions of which they are a part – Felix by the church and Cuthbert by the academy:  
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Neither had an adequate conception of the complicated forces at work 
outside the smooth and gentle current in which they and their associates 
floated. Neither saw the difference between local truth and universal 
truth; that what the inner world said in their clerical and academic 
hearing was quite a different thing from what the outer world was 
thinking. (159–60) 
Angel sees more value in his father’s misguided self-sacrifice because though his views 
are fixed, his work unflinchingly confronts the knotty points in other people’s lives. Felix 
and Cuthbert Clare fail to see the difficulties which afflict those who are less privileged 
and they fail to notice that the declarations of their milieu might not have wider 
applications. 
In pursuit of mental liberty, Angel initially grows ‘away from old associations’ 
(118). Hardy uses a subterranean image to explain Angel’s lack of sympathy for Tess’s 
plight: ‘Within the remote depths of his constitution, so gentle and affectionate as he 
was in general, there lay hidden a hard logical deposit, like a vein of metal in a soft loam, 
which turned the edge of everything that attempted to traverse it’ (241). Buried within 
Angel’s apparent flexibility is an intractable element. The narrator calls it a logical 
deposit, but elsewhere the narrative works to question Angel’s power of perception. 
Angel thinks that he sees things more clearly than Tess, but in misunderstanding his 
own unorthodoxy he misunderstands hers. In Millian terms he assumes his own 
infallibility. He thinks that thoughts original to Tess ‘could only have been caught up ... 
by rote’ (126) and that she has ‘automatic orthodoxy’ (164).  
In fact, Tess’s experiences cause her to question much around her, to the extent 
that her ‘passing corporeal blight had been her mental harvest’ (124). The narrator 
suggests, though, that this is just an extension of Tess’s predisposition to be questioning 
and receptive, in contrast to her mother, Joan Durbeyfield, who seems to be just as 
pacified by the ceaseless ‘nick-knock, nick-knock’ of the cradle as her babies are (20). 
Tess perceives a disconnection between the language of religious orthodoxy and its true 
meaning. She tries to convince the Vicar – who had spent ten years endeavouring to 
‘graft technical belief on actual scepticism’ (96) to give her baby a Christian burial by 
imploring: ‘Don’t for God’s sake speak as saint to sinner, but as you yourself to me 
myself – poor me!’ (97). She challenges a man who paints biblical texts on stiles and 
walls for a living to connect his outer life with his inner – ‘“Do you believe what you 
paint?”’ – but he responds indifferently in a ‘trade voice’ (80). Similarly, she cannot sing 
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Fig. 4. Annotated page from Hardy’s copy of On Liberty. Image 
courtesy of Dorset County Museum. 
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a hymn with the ‘phlegmatic passivity’ and unquestioning spirit of her younger siblings 
(357). Not believing as they do in a benevolent God, Tess is impelled to action on her 
family’s behalf: as they are forced to leave their home, ‘it behoved her to do something; 
to be their Providence’ (357). Action, in her limited world, means returning to Alec, and 
the sacrifice of her own well-being. Tess repeatedly strives to connect religious beliefs 
to individual experience, to humanise and personalise doctrine that others do not 
interrogate.  
Hardy annotated his copy of On Liberty with thoughts on Christian morality, 
underlining the words indicated in the following passage: 
It holds out the hope of heaven and the threat of hell, as the appointed and 
appropriate motives to a virtuous life: in this falling far below the best of 
the ancients, and doing what lies in it to give to human morality an 
essentially selfish character, by disconnecting each man’s feelings of duty 
from the interests of his fellow-creatures, except so far as a self-interested 
inducement is offered to him for consulting them. (56) 
Next to this Hardy pencilled: ‘Do unto others as you would they should do unto you’ (see 
Figure 4). Mill goes on to remark that ‘even in the morality of private life, whatever 
exists of magnanimity, high-mindedness, personal dignity, even the sense of honour, is  
derived from the purely human, not the religious part of our education ...’ (56). Next to 
this Hardy put a question mark, perhaps preferring the more succinct ‘Love one 
another’ he pencilled in the margin (see Figure 4). Hardy’s annotations to On Liberty 
correspond almost exactly to Mill’s ‘ideal perfection of utilitarian morality’ which is ‘To 
do as one would be done by, and to love one’s neighbour as oneself’, which Hardy also 
highlighted with double lines in the margin, in his copy of Utilitarianism (288). In ‘The 
Utility of Religion’ Mill proposes a replacement for, or progression from, religious belief. 
He suggests that: 
A morality grounded on large and wise views of the good of the whole 
[world], neither sacrificing the individual to the aggregate nor the 
aggregate to the individual, but giving to duty on the one hand and to 
freedom and spontaneity on the other their proper province, would 
derive its power in the superior natures from sympathy and benevolence 
and the passion for ideal excellence: in the inferior, from the same feelings 
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cultivated up to the measure of their capacity, with the superadded force 
of shame. (108) 
This Mill calls the Religion of Humanity, after Comte’s system. In Auguste Comte and 
Positivism he credits Comte with being the first to recognise the full scope of such an 
idea: ‘The power which may be acquired over the mind by the idea of the general 
interest of the human race, both as a source of emotion and as motive to conduct, many 
have perceived; but we know not if any one, before M. Comte, realized so fully as he has 
done, all the majesty of which that idea is susceptible’ (74). 
Tess of the D’Urbervilles hints at the possibility of a religion of humanity, though it 
is everywhere met with resistance. Angel’s parents fail to see the use of an education 
which serves humans rather than religion. Tess, who always seeks to humanise religion 
challenges Alec:  
‘Why, you can have the religion of loving-kindness and purity at least, if 
you can’t have – what do they call it – dogma’. 
‘O no! I’m a different sort of fellow from that! If there’s nobody to say, 
“Do this, and it will be a bad thing for you”, I can’t warm up. Hang it, I am 
not going to feel responsible for my deeds and passions if there’s nobody 
to be responsible to; and if I were you, my dear, I wouldn’t either!’ (330) 
Alec’s response encapsulates Mill’s concerns about the divisiveness and self-interest 
which can result from belief in an afterlife. But Alec also fails to see other people’s needs 
as a motive to action and, feeling no shame in this respect, he would also fail to meet 
even Mill’s inferior category for participation in a religion of humanity. 
After Tess’s revelation, Angel’s path to self-awareness begins with an accusation 
of impracticality against ‘great and wise men of all ages’ who recommend working on as 
usual through difficulties (259). An image of Tess, and their life together, is so integral 
to his agricultural plans that Angel cannot work on as before and ‘he concluded that not 
one of those great and wise men had ever gone so far outside themselves as to test the 
feasibility of his own counsel’ (259). His coming to consciousness is achieved via the 
words of a cosmopolitan stranger he meets on his travels. These have a greater 
influence on him than ‘all the reasoned ethics of the philosophers’ (341). Though this is 
Hardy’s injunction to form an individual philosophy based on experience and 
surroundings, by the time Angel returns from Brazil ‘mentally aged a dozen years’ 
(340), his view of Tess’s predicament corresponds with a line from Utilitarianism: ‘The 
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morality of the action depends entirely upon the intention – that is, upon what the agent 
wills to do’ (290, note, Mill’s emphasis). Hardy questions the power of personal intellect 
and virtue to overcome deep-rooted ideas, but in Angel he creates a character who 
learns ‘that hardly any kind of action can safely be laid down as either always obligatory 
or always condemnable’ (Utilitarianism 157). 
 
4.2 The Value of Self-Sacrifice 
The image of Tess on the stone of sacrifice at Stonehenge, and the tragic 
consequences of Jude’s and Sue’s challenges to conventionality, suggest that society 
insatiably exacts personal sacrifice (this is an important theme in Mona Caird’s writing, 
too, as I discuss in chapter five). Hardy also addresses this issue in The Mayor of 
Casterbridge, a novel which ascribes different value to different kinds of self-sacrifice. 
Readings of The Mayor of Casterbridge by Simon Gatrell and Mary McBride have argued 
for its links to On Liberty, but, as I shall show, the novel is also deeply engaged with the 
concerns of Utilitarianism and Subjection.5 In Utilitarianism Mill says that self-sacrifice 
should be a means to an end, not an end in itself: ‘The utilitarian morality does 
recognize in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good 
of others. It only refuses to admit that the sacrifice itself is a good. A sacrifice which does 
not increase, or tend to increase, the sum total of happiness, it considers as wasted’ 
(288). In The Mayor of Casterbridge Hardy distinguishes between the types of sacrifices 
made by Susan Henchard and those made by her daughter Elizabeth-Jane according to 
this utilitarian model.  
In ‘The Influence of On Liberty on Thomas Hardy’s The Mayor of Casterbridge 
(1984)’, McBride draws several specific parallels between Mill’s text and the novel. 
Commenting on the violation of the principle of liberty in the auction of Susan, she 
compares Mill’s view ‘that an individual cannot be allowed to sell himself even if such a 
sale is personally desirable and endurable’ (14).6 However, the novel is not concerned 
with Susan’s loss of liberty at the hands of a despotic husband in such a straightforward 
                                                 
5 Gatrell’s ‘The Mayor of Casterbridge: The Fate of Michael Henchard’s Character’ (2000) argues for strong 
links between Mill’s definition of energetic character in On Liberty and Hardy’s depiction of Henchard. 
6 McBride also notes that ‘Mill uses the example of a corn dealer to illustrate the difference between 
freedom of opinion and freedom of action’ (13), Henchard’s oath of sobriety is a self-imposed version of 
what Mill recommends as a way to deal with misconduct which results from drunkenness, and that 
‘Henchard’s attempt to mediate between his own energetic individuality and society’s conventional 
expectations’ (16) is based on ideas of Millian individualism. 
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way as McBride suggests. After the infamous wife-sale at the beginning of the novel, 
Susan ‘went out of the tent, sobbing bitterly, and apparently without a thought that she 
was not strictly bound to go with the man who had paid for her’ (13). That Susan’s self-
immolation is wasted is suggested by the slight narrative importance accorded to her 
experiences with Newson in Canada: ‘The history of Susan Henchard’s adventures in the 
interim can be told in two or three sentences’ (25). Susan’s helpless acquiescence is 
contrasted with Elizabeth-Jane’s purposeful selflessness: ‘If there was one good thing 
more than another which characterized this single-hearted girl, it was a willingness to 
sacrifice her personal comfort and dignity to the common weal’ (42). While Susan’s self-
sacrifice is attributed to her simplicity, Elizabeth-Jane’s forms part of her growing 
intellectual awareness, and her need to create a consistent philosophy out of her own 
experience. Elizabeth-Jane’s contribution to the ‘common weal’ is linked to self-respect 
and a craving for self-improvement. When Susan re-marries Henchard, Elizabeth-Jane is 
restrained about buying new clothes ‘because it was inconsistent with her past life to 
blossom gaudily the moment she had become possessed of money’ (94). She regrets the 
increased attention she does pay to her appearance because she perceives a mismatch 
between the status it confers and her level of education: ‘“Better sell all this finery and 
buy myself grammar-books, and dictionaries, and a history of all philosophies!”’ (95). In 
preference to making herself more attractive to men, Elizabeth-Jane educates herself. 
She seeks consolation from study when Farfrae rejects her in favour of Lucetta. In this 
she adheres to the hierarchy of pleasures in Utilitarianism where mental pleasures are 
seen as superior to bodily ones. Elizabeth-Jane also fulfils the ideal which Mill puts 
forward in Utilitarianism: she makes an automatic link between her personal happiness 
and the happiness of others.  
In addition to exploring the ways in which utilitarian morality figures in 
Elizabeth-Jane’s everyday life, Hardy evokes passages in Subjection in his depiction of 
her restricted opportunities. Susan is said to have ‘long perceived how zealously and 
constantly the young mind of her companion was struggling for enlargement; and yet 
now, in her eighteenth year, it still remained but little unfolded. The desire – sober and 
repressed – of Elizabeth-Jane’s heart was indeed to see, to hear, and to understand’ (26). 
This recalls one of the most vivid phrases in Subjection, when Mill talks about women 
who ‘pine through life with the consciousness of thwarted vocations, and activities 
which are not suffered to expand’ (579). In Subjection Mill conveys a striking sense of 
restriction, limitation and ‘disparity of privilege’, a sense which resonates in Hardy’s 
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portrayal of Elizabeth-Jane (472). Rather than gaining access to any kind of educational 
opportunity, Elizabeth-Jane is shown to be constitutionally prone to reflection: ‘When 
she walked abroad she seemed to be occupied with an inner chamber of ideas, and to 
have slight need for visible objects’ (93). Thus Elizabeth-Jane’s mind unfolds by her own 
strenuous efforts to educate herself. Her ability to observe closely and to philosophise 
allows her to expand as a human being, and gives her consolation for disappointments, 
but also causes her pain: ‘There was something curious in the way in which Elizabeth, 
though the younger, had come to play the part of experienced sage in these discussions 
... . Elizabeth, who in spite of her philosophy was very tender-hearted’ (173). Like Sue 
and Jude her sensitivity reveals her latent abilities but is the source of much anguish: 
‘She had learnt the lesson of renunciation, and was as familiar with the wreck of each 
day’s wishes as with the diurnal setting of the sun. If her earthly career had taught her 
few book philosophies it had at least well practised her in this’ (178). In accordance 
with Hardy’s stated scepticism about ‘book philosophies’ the emphasis here is on the 
greater relevance of lived experience.  
Nevertheless, Elizabeth-Jane’s situation at the end of the novel brings to mind 
Mill in Utilitarianism considering what constitutes happiness: ‘not a life of rapture; but 
moments of such, in an existence made up of few and transitory pains, many and 
various pleasures, with a decided predominance of the active over the passive, and 
having as the foundation of the whole, not to expect more from life than it is capable of 
bestowing’ (284). In accordance with Mill’s definition of happiness, Elizabeth-Jane puts 
her self-education to work for the greater good by becoming a teacher of modest 
ambition: 
As the lively and sparkling emotions of her early married life cohered into 
an equable serenity, the finer movements of her nature found scope in 
discovering to the narrow-lived ones around her the secret (as she had 
once learnt it) of making limited opportunities endurable; which she 
deemed to consist in the cunning enlargement by a species of microscopic 
treatment, even to the magnitude of positive pleasure, those minute forms 
of satisfaction that offer themselves to everybody not in positive pain; 
which thus handled, have much of the same inspiriting effect upon life as 
wider interests cursorily embraced. (322) 
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Her route to this point also accords with Mill’s assertion that ‘the conscious ability to do 
without happiness gives the best prospect of realizing such happiness as is attainable’ 
(288) – a sentiment Hardy highlighted in his own copy of Utilitarianism by drawing 
double lines next to it in the margin.  
In many ways, Elizabeth-Jane’s character plays out the type of societal 
improvements Mill envisaged. In ‘Nature’ Mill accuses his own generation of a lack of 
precision in deciding on a standard from which to ‘deduce rules of actions’ – instead 
they ‘live in a kind of confusion of many standards’ – this allows people to alter and 
manipulate their arguments to suit what is currently fashionable rather than developing 
‘steady moral convictions’ (11). Elizabeth-Jane, unlike Lucetta with her artificial poses, 
attempts to create a consistent philosophy out of her own experience. The ‘equable 
serenity’ of Elizabeth-Jane’s eventual partnership with Farfrae is also significant. 
Farfrae is shown to recognise the need for equality in marriage. He promises to defer to 
Lucetta’s wishes once they are married and carries out his promise. He recognises that 
‘It is I who have come to your house, not you to mine’ (212). As a couple they are 
described as ‘a bee and a butterfly in league for life’ (232). They are different but 
complementary and therefore achieve an effective partnership: the type that Mill 
praised in Subjection (though, after the revelations about Lucetta’s past, Farfrae does 
not hold on to ideas of reciprocity). In Subjection Mill says ‘I believe that equality of 
rights would abate the exaggerated self-abnegation which is the present artificial ideal 
of feminine character, and that a good woman would not be more self-sacrificing than 
the best man’ (516). In The Mayor of Casterbridge, Susan’s ‘exaggerated self-abnegation’ 
precipitated by Henchard’s tyranny over her gives way to the more balanced conditions 
of her daughter’s life: marriage to Farfrae, who is capable of imagining marriage on 
equal terms, and Elizabeth-Jane’s own attempts to balance her concern for the 
happiness of those around her with her own, albeit humble, individuality.  
The relationship between self-sacrifice and education is central to The Return of 
the Native (1878), where Clym Yeobright’s plan to teach is based on the Comtean theory 
he discovers in France: ‘Yeobright loved his kind. He had a conviction that the want of 
most men was knowledge of a sort which brings wisdom rather than affluence. He 
wished to raise the class at the expense of individuals rather than individuals at the 
expense of the class. What was more, he was ready at once to be the first unit sacrificed’ 
(170). In Auguste Comte and Positivism Mill critiques Comte’s self-abnegating concept of 
altruism, and the kind of readiness to relinquish personal interests Clym evinces. For 
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Mill, Comte’s fundamental error was over-estimating the importance of unity and 
systemization, and denying the importance of individual inclinations: 
... M. Comte infers that the good of others is the only inducement on which 
we should allow ourselves to act; and that we should endeavour to starve 
the whole of the desires which point to our personal satisfaction, by 
denying them all gratification not strictly required by physical necessities. 
The golden rule of morality, in M. Comte’s religion, is to live for others, 
‘vivre pour autrui’. To do as we would be done by, and to love our 
neighbour as ourself, are not sufficient for him: they partake, he thinks, of 
the nature of personal calculations. We should endeavour not to love 
ourselves at all. (76) 
Clym Yeobright’s family and community likewise question the value and achievability of 
this Comtean altruism and they do so by constantly drawing attention to the difference 
between theory and practice.  
On hearing of Clym’s plan to open a school, the local barber Fairway predicts that 
‘“He’ll never carry it out in the world”’ (169). Mrs Yeobright wants Clym’s efforts to 
bring affluence not knowledge. She blames Eustacia for Clym’s persistence in his 
altruistic scheme, but only because she provides a too-compelling reason to stay on the 
heath:  
‘Well, I know you had decided it before you saw her; but that would have 
ended in intentions. It was very well to talk of, but ridiculous to put into 
practice. I fully expected that in the course of a month or two you would 
have seen the folly of such self-sacrifice, and would have been by this time 
back again to Paris in some business or other’. (188) 
Clym might have rejected the ‘flashy business’ of Paris (173), but Eustacia reminds him 
that his appreciative view of the heath is partly dependent on the perspective-altering 
privilege of experiencing a new culture. When Clym says ‘“I remember when I had the 
same longing for town bustle. Five years of London or Paris would be a perfect cure for 
that”’, Eustacia replies ‘“Heaven send me such a cure”’ (184). (Just as when Stephen in A 
Pair of Blue Eyes complains that his life is ‘“solitary as death”’ and Elfride, keenly aware 
of her circumscribed circumstances, responds sharply ‘“The death that comes from a 
plethora of life?”’, 22.) Clym has some freedom to renounce, while Eustacia’s starting 
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point is far more restricted. After Clym studies so much in pursuit of his plan that he 
damages his eyesight, Eustacia complains to Wildeve: ‘“He’s an enthusiast about ideas, 
and careless about outward things. He often reminds me of the apostle Paul.”... though 
Paul was excellent as a man in the Bible he would hardly have done in real life”’ (271–
2). The traditional Mrs Yeobright and the non-conformist Eustacia represent very 
different world-views, but both consider their practical knowledge a corrective to 
Clym’s abstractions. In their view Clym’s dedication to helping strangers is a form of 
selfishness. 
Hardy dwells on the conflicting obligations which Clym’s personal attachments 
give rise to (evoking the representations of Mill as passionate but chaste as he does so): 
Three antagonistic growths had to be kept alive: his mother’s trust in him, 
his plan for becoming a teacher, and Eustacia’s happiness. His fervid 
nature could not afford to relinquish one of these, though two of the three 
were as many as he could hope to preserve. Though his love was as chaste 
as that of Petrarch for his Laura it had made fetters of what previously 
was only a difficulty. A position which was not too simple when he stood 
whole-hearted had become indescribably complicated by the addition of 
Eustacia. (197) 
As Mill argues in his critique of Comte, placing too much importance on self-abnegation 
can be counter-productive. Moreover, it is almost impossible to sustain because 
personal interests, even if these take the form of relationships with others, will always 
intrude. Clym resists compromise, but has compromise foisted upon him. After the 
death of Mrs Yeobright, and then of Eustacia, Clym is still driven to educate others, but 
his approach to the practical implementation of his beliefs changes: ‘He had tested and 
weighed his convictions again and again, and saw no reason to alter them, though he 
had considerably altered his plan’ (385). In his eventual role as an itinerant preacher he 
draws on both secular and religious texts and leaves ‘alone set creeds and systems of 
philosophy, finding enough and more than enough to occupy his tongue in the opinions 
and actions common to all good men’ (389). In the end Clym’s position is the same as 
that which Hardy advocates: he interprets his experiences to create his own philosophy. 
Nevertheless, he is isolated, lonely, and regretful, suggesting the possible drawbacks of 
true intellectual independence. 
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4.3 The Link between Personal Happiness and General Happiness 
As long as self-sacrifice was a means to an end rather than an end in itself, Mill 
believed that education and public opinion should promote an automatic continuity 
between individual and general happiness so that: ‘a direct impulse to promote the 
general good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of action’ (289). 
Hardy placed a single line next to the passage containing this phrase in his copy of 
Utilitarianism, and, and in addition to exploring its relevance to Elizabeth-Jane’s self-
education and Clym’s teaching, considered its implications in relation to multiple 
national and individual interests including war, astronomy, art, social mobility and 
marriage.  
In The Trumpet-Major (1880) Hardy considers the link between personal and 
general happiness in the context of the Napoleonic wars, exploring ideas of patriotism, 
and the challenges it poses for individual liberty, in his depiction of brothers John and 
Bob Loveday. In Auguste Comte and Positivism Mill avers the benefits of military training 
in promoting a habitual desire to be useful and dutiful to others: ‘Something has been 
lost as well as gained by no longer giving to every citizen the training necessary for a 
soldier’ (80–1). And in ‘The Utility of Religion’ he sees patriotism as the precursor to a 
state of universal fellow feeling: ‘When we consider how ardent a sentiment, in 
favourable circumstances of education, the love of country has become, we cannot judge 
it impossible that the love of that larger country, the world, may be nursed into similar 
strength, both as a source of elevated emotion and as a principle of duty’ (107). In 
Hardy’s novel, the Trumpet-Major, John Loveday, is attractive to women because of his 
‘love of country’ – it is known that ‘he was not a soldier from necessity, but from 
patriotism’ (95). However, John Loveday never reflects on the source of his patriotism 
or the purpose of his role as a soldier, and the novel’s ending casts doubt on the value of 
such unquestioning national feeling in one devastating line – as Anne Garland says 
goodbye to John and his comrades, the narrator says: ‘Of the seven upon whom these 
wishes were bestowed, five, including the trumpet-major, were dead within the few 
following years, and their bones left to moulder in the land of their campaigns’ (300). 
There is no reciprocity between John Loveday’s patriotism and his personal happiness: 
duty annihilates individuality. 
 In contrast, John’s brother, Bob Loveday, is a sailor with a less than wholehearted 
commitment to seafaring – a disposition presented as more promising for his survival 
and future happiness then John’s unquestioning loyalty. Bob is forced to reflect on his 
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patriotism when he is pursued by a press-gang determined to deprive him of his liberty. 
His impulse is to evade capture, but by doing so, with the help of his lover Anne and his 
one-time fiancée Matilda, his sense of self-worth and manliness is damaged:  
In four-and-twenty hours Bob had recovered. But though physically 
himself again, he was not at all sure of his position as a patriot. He had 
that practical knowledge of seamanship of which the country stood much 
in need, and it was humiliating to find that impressment seemed to be 
necessary to teach him to use it for her advantage. Many neighbouring 
men, less fortunate than himself, had been pressed and taken; and their 
absence seemed a reproach to him. He went away by himself into the mill-
roof, and surrounded by the corn-heaps, gave vent to self-condemnation. 
(236–7) 
As a result of his self-reproach Bob presents himself before Nelson’s captain, Captain 
Hardy, and is accepted for service on board The Victory. Bob convinces himself he has 
some agency in the proceedings by evading the press-gang only to seek out the Captain, 
and by asking to join a prestigious ship. His request is initially met with bewilderment 
by the individuality-denying Captain, but granted when Bob reminds him that both their 
families come from the same part of the world. Bob returns home to tell his family: ‘“The 
press-gang has been here, and though I showed them that I was a free man, I am going 
to show everybody that I can do my duty”’. (245). He escapes direct coercion, but ‘the 
tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling’ proves a more effective force (On Liberty 
9). Nonetheless, Bob’s struggle to balance a sense of personal freedom with duty to his 
country is ‘a source of elevated emotion’, whereas in A Laodicean, published the year 
after The Trumpet Major, Hardy links lack of national feeling to selfishness and 
unscrupulousness in his portrayal of the photographer William Dare. Dare declares “‘I 
am a citizen of the world. I owe no country patriotism, and no king or queen obedience”’ 
(124) – his lack of national feeling denotes licence, rather than liberty.  
In Two on a Tower, the national interest at stake is scientific rather than 
militaristic. Viviette Constantine self-consciously grapples with the problem of 
reconciling her individual happiness with potential advances in scientific knowledge. In 
its portrayal of Viviette’s support for Swithin St Cleeve’s career in astronomy, Two on a 
Tower evokes the discussion in Subjection about women’s practical abilities, and the 
advantage of intelligent female companionship for men whose work involves 
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abstraction and speculation. Like Elfride, Elizabeth-Jane and Ethelberta, Viviette is 
dissatisfied with both her emotional and intellectual life. Her attractive younger lover 
Swithin saves her from despair and in return she provides practical help and morale-
boosting conversation. Viviette recognises that her support for Swithin is not 
disinterested – part of Swithin’s draw is his potential to be successful and well-regarded 
in the future. She thus blames herself for his loss of scientific focus as their relationship 
develops and they marry in secret. On discovering that her marriage to Swithin is illegal 
because her previous husband was still alive at the time of the ceremony, and that 
Swithin’s misogynistic uncle has made a provision for him in his will on the condition 
that he does not marry before he turns twenty-five, Viviette questions herself rigorously 
about how much importance to accord her personal interests: 
That in immolating herself by refusing him, and leaving him free to work 
wonders for the good of his fellow-creatures, she would in all probability 
add to the sum of human felicity, consoled her by its breadth as an idea, 
even while it tortured her by making herself the scapegoat or single unit 
on whom the evil would fall. Ought a possibly large number, Swithin 
included, to remain unbenefited, because the one individual to whom his 
release would be an injury chanced to be herself? (215) 
Viviette is able to anticipate Swithin’s future success and her own future unhappiness, 
but she does not foresee how her pregnancy will impact upon her carefully-reasoned 
resolutions: 
She realized a condition of things that she had never anticipated, and for a 
moment the discovery so overwhelmed her that she thought she must die 
outright. In her terror she said she had sown the wind to reap the 
whirlwind. Then the instinct of self-preservation flamed up in her like a 
fire. Her altruism in subjecting her self-love to benevolence, and letting 
Swithin go away from her, was demolished by the new necessity, as if it 
had been a gossamer web. (227) 
In theory, Viviette rejects the counsel of Christian morality to ‘save thyself’ in favour of a 
more intellectually-appealing alternative. In practice, Hardy suggests here that the 
consolations of philosophy are insufficient to counter a biological imperative. As 
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discussed above, it is not clear if this narrative endorses an essentialist view of a female 
instinct for nurturing or critiques socially-constructed ideas of propriety.  
Viviette’s ‘cribbed and confined’ life is initially opened up by her partnership 
with Swithin, but then reduced to ideas of her ‘narrow honour’ in contrast to ‘the wide 
promise of his ability’, her propriety as against his ‘earthly utility’ (214, 215). As it turns 
out, Viviette is too late to stop Swithin departing on a research trip, which, like Clym’s 
time in Paris, alters his perspective on many things and offers ample discovery for self-
development. Viviette’s brother, keen to benefit financially from her re-marriage, has 
already engineered a proposal from a Bishop, and to save her reputation Viviette is 
forced to accept. Perceiving Viviette’s lack of attraction for him, the Bishop invokes 
ideas of sacrifice to the greater good in his addresses to her: ‘Even if there be a slight 
deficiency of warmth on your part, my earnest hope is that a mind comprehensive as 
yours will perceive the immense power for good that you might exercise in the position 
in which a union with me would place you, and allow that perception to weigh in 
determining your answer’ (189). But, the Bishop dies, and in melodramatic mode, 
Viviette is so overcome by Swithin’s eventual return to her that she dies in his arms. As 
she does so, Swithin turns his attention to Tabitha Lark, the local girl turned New 
Woman, whose time in London has enabled her to become confident in the connection 
between her principles and her actions. 
Like Sue Bridehead, Ethelberta in The Hand of Ethelberta (1876) turns to Mill’s 
writing at a time of crisis in her life. Where Sue reads On Liberty to back up her desire 
for independence, Ethelberta reads Utilitarianism to clarify her responsibilities in 
balancing her personal happiness with her family’s. As she contemplates marriage to a 
much older man whose only attraction is his ability to provide for herself and her 
family, Ethelberta reads Mill: 
The ingenious Ethelberta, much more prone than the majority of women 
to theorise on conduct, felt the need of some soothing defence of the 
actions involved in any ambiguous course before finally committing 
herself to it. 
She took down a well-known treatise on ethics which she had perused 
once before, and to which she had given her adherence ere any instance 
had arisen wherein she might wish to take it as a guide. Here she 
desultorily searched for argument, and found it; but the application of her 
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author’s philosophy to the marriage question was an operation of her 
own, as unjustifiable as it was likely under the circumstances. (287) 
If, as Tim Dolin has argued, The Hand of Ethelberta is a novel about Hardy’s ‘suspicion of 
slavishness, of unoriginality in thought and opinion’ in both the producers and 
consumers of mass fiction (‘Introduction’ xxvi), then the episode where Ethelberta 
reads Utilitarianism also dramatises the risks Hardy saw in being an insufficiently 
detached and critical reader of philosophy. Made vulnerable by her family’s precarious 
social and financial circumstances, Ethelberta defers to the authority of the ‘well-known 
treatise’ and fails to adequately interrogate how her theoretical assent to the ideas in 
Utilitarianism will translate into lived realities.  
As Ethelberta is lulled into a false sense of comfort, her reading experience is 
replicated for the reader, with extended quotation from Utilitarianism: 
‘The ultimate end’, she read, ‘with reference to and for the sake of 
which all other things are desirable (whether we are considering our 
own good or that of other people) is an existence exempt as far as 
possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point 
of quantity and quality ... . This being, according to the utilitarian 
opinion, the end of human action, is necessarily also the standard of 
morality’. 
It was an open question, so far, whether her own happiness should or 
should not be preferred to that of others. But that her personal interests 
were not to be considered as paramount appeared further on: – 
‘The happiness which forms the standard of what is right in conduct is 
not the agent’s own happiness but that of all concerned. As between his 
own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as 
strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. 
As to whose happiness was meant by that of ‘other people’, ‘all 
concerned’, and so on, her luminous moralist soon enlightened her: – 
‘The occasions on which any person (except one in a thousand) has it 
in his power to do this on an extended scale – in other words, to be a 
public benefactor – are but exceptional; and on these occasions alone is 
he called on to consider public utility; in every other case private 
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utility, the interest or happiness of some few persons, is all he had to 
attend to’. 
And that these few persons should be those endeared to her by every 
domestic tie no argument was needed to prove. That their happiness 
should be in proportion to her own well-doing, and power to remove 
their risks of indigence, required no proving either to her now. 
By a sorry but unconscious misapplication of sound and wide 
reasoning did the active mind of Ethelberta thus find itself a solace.  
(287–9) 
The work is not directly identified as Utilitarianism, and Mill is not named as the author, 
but the powerful influence of both is inferred by the space given to the quotations. 
Ethelberta’s ‘luminous moralist’ is deceptively clear, and in the tricky task of balancing 
personal concerns with domestic ties, Ethelberta ends by giving too much credence to 
the value of self-sacrifice. Looking for legitimation in her philosophical reading, 
Ethelberta only achieves a false position as a ‘pseudo-utilitarian’ (289, emphasis in 
original).  
In Far from the Madding Crowd, Gabriel Oak’s utilitarian code of morality is 
automatic, not consciously adopted like Ethelberta’s but he similarly struggles to 
balance his own happiness and that of others. Bathsheba recognises that: 
Boldwood, who seemed so much deeper and higher and stronger in 
feeling than Gabriel, had not yet learnt, any more than she herself, the 
simple lesson which Oak showed a mastery of by every turn and look he 
gave – that among the multitude of interest by which he was surrounded, 
those which affected his personal well-being were not the most absorbing 
and important in his eyes. Oak meditatively looked upon the horizon of 
circumstances without any special regard to his own standpoint in the 
midst. That was how she would wish to be. (354–5) 
Gabriel is willing to risk his life in saving Bathsheba’s corn from the rain, mindful of the 
potential loss of food for humans and animals, but also motivated by his individual 
desire for Bathsheba’s favour. Despite his feelings for Bathsheba, when he hears the 
news of Boldwood’s losses during the storm, he realises that the greatest good would 
have been accomplished by helping Boldwood. The novel considers the problems which 
140 
Gabriel’s ‘direct impulse to promote the general good’ causes for him on an individual 
level. It means he is not calculating enough in his personal plans: ‘Oak was an intensely 
humane man: indeed, his humanity often tore in pieces any politic intentions of his 
which bordered on strategy, and carried him on as by gravitation’ (86). In 
superintending Bathsheba’s farm he is heedless of the right moment for personal action, 
compromising his own chances of success: ‘Men thin away to insignificance and oblivion 
quite as often by not making the most of good spirits when they have them as by lacking 
good spirits when they are indispensable’ (94). Though active in his concern for the 
general good, Gabriel is too passive with regard to his own self-development. 
In The Pursuit of the Well-Beloved (1892) and The Well-Beloved (1897), two 
versions of the same story, Hardy explores the ramifications of a more strategic 
approach to life. Patricia Ingham has argued that the protagonist in both narratives, 
Jocelyn, ‘reveals himself to be a literary artist in relation to his own tyrannical acts as he 
skilfully turns morally undesirable conduct into aesthetically pleasing forms’ 
(‘Introduction’ xxv). Jocelyn’s actions are impelled by his search for his ideal woman and 
this pursuit provides inspiration for sculptures which are a critical and commercial 
success, though his pursuit of his Well-Beloved is paralleled artistically by his attempts 
to create a perfect statue of Aphrodite. The narrator asserts that: ‘He would not have 
stood where he did stand in the ranks of an imaginative profession if he had not been at 
the mercy of every sentiment of fancy that can beset a man. It was his in his weakness as 
a citizen and a national unit that his strength lay as an artist, and he felt it childish to 
complain of susceptibilities not only innate but cultivated’ (The Pursuit of the Well-
Beloved 80). Jocelyn’s practice is true to his professions, but his professions are 
designed to make his own self-interest, and exploitation of women, sound more 
appealing. Hardy’s portrayal of Jocelyn in the Well-Beloved stories suggests that 
susceptibility can be a useful quality, but only if (like Phillotson’s defiance of custom), it 
has some kind of moral ballast.  
 
4.4 What Makes Life Satisfactory 
In The Woodlanders Hardy explores the hierarchy of the pleasures which Mill 
establishes in Utilitarianism, in which sensual or bodily pleasures are lower down the 
scale than mental or intellectual ones. Mill argues that anyone who is acquainted with 
both types will prefer higher pleasures. He warns that: ‘next to selfishness’: 
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... the principle cause which makes life unsatisfactory, is want of mental 
cultivation. A cultivated mind – I do not mean that of a philosopher, but 
any mind to which the fountains of knowledge have been opened, and 
which has been taught, in any tolerable degree, to exercise its faculties – 
finds sources of inexhaustible interest in all that surrounds it; in the 
objects of nature, the achievements of art, the imaginations of poetry, the 
incidents of history, the ways of mankind past and present, and their 
prospects in the future. (285) 
Moreover, anyone who endeavours to indulge ‘animal appetites’ while also maintaining 
‘nobler feelings’ will ultimately fail: ‘many in all ages, have broken down in an 
ineffectual attempt to combine both’, argues Mill (282). Hardy tests this supposition out 
in The Woodlanders through the storylines involving Felice Charmond and Edred 
Fitzpiers. Both are well-educated, but both prefer to seek sexual satisfaction rather than 
learn about the history of Hintock or integrate themselves into community life.  
Mrs Charmond has ‘a mien of listlessness which might either have been 
constitutional, or partly owing to the situation of the place’ (59). She is aware that in 
theory she should be more active, though she cannot achieve it in practice: ‘“I am the 
most inactive woman when I am here”, she said. “I think sometimes I was born to live 
and do nothing, nothing, nothing but float about, as we fancy we do sometimes in 
dreams. But that cannot be really my destiny, and I must struggle against such fancies”’ 
(59–60). Felice Charmond’s torpidity is contrasted with Grace’s kindness and 
appreciativeness, and with Marty South’s uncomplaining industry. Her character 
highlights the difficulties involved in reconciling individual and communal desires. Mrs 
Charmond complains bitterly about: 
‘The terrible insistencies of society – how severe they are, and cold, and 
inexorable – ghastly towards those who are made of wax and not of stone. 
Oh, I am afraid of them; a stab for this error, and a stab for that – 
correctives and regulations pretendedly framed that society may tend to 
perfection – an end which I don’t care for in the least. Yet for this all I do 
care for has to be stunted and starved’. (197) 
On the one hand, her boredom can be attributed to her selfishness, and her lack of 
interest in the common good, but on the other, she complains that restrictive ideas of 
sexual propriety inhibit the expression of her individuality. 
142 
 Fitzpiers has an enervated disposition which corresponds to Mrs Charmond’s. 
Unexpectedly for a doctor, he ‘was not a practical man, except by fits, and much 
preferred the ideal world to the real, and the discovery of principles to their application’ 
(122). Like Mrs Charmond he finds village life oppressive: 
... whether he meditated the Muses or the philosophers, the loneliness of 
Hintock life was beginning to tell upon his impressionable nature. Winter 
in a solitary house in the country, without society, is tolerable, nay, even 
enjoyable and delightful, given certain conditions; but these are not the 
conditions which attach to the life of a professional man who drops down 
into such a place by mere accident. They were present to the lives of 
Winterbourne, Melbury and Grace; but not to the doctor’s. They are old 
association – an almost exhaustive biographical or historical acquaintance 
with every object, animate and inanimate, within the observer’s horizon. 
(125) 
In Mill’s scheme of things, the desire for knowledge must be animated by moral and 
human interest, not idle curiosity, otherwise it will lead to indifference. And the same 
applies in The Woodlanders. Mrs Charmond’s and Fitzpiers’s boredom results from a 
failure to see the archive of human interest in their surroundings. In this sense, for both 
Mill and Hardy, old associations are constructive rather than damaging: they enliven 
individual interactions with the environment and animate otherwise narrow existences. 
In ‘The Profitable Reading of Fiction’ (1888) Hardy invoked a version of the utilitarian 
hierarchy of pleasures in his view of fit subjects for fiction: 
The higher passions must ever rank above the inferior – intellectual 
tendencies above animal, and moral above intellectual – whatever the 
treatment, realistic or ideal. Any system of inversion which should attach 
more importance to the delineation of man’s appetites than to the 
delineation of his aspirations, affections, or humours, would condemn the 
old masters of imaginative creation from Aeschylus to Shakespeare. (245) 
Again, old associations, this time literary ones, inform current-day practice. The writing 
of meaningful fiction must be enervated by knowledge of what mattered to literary 
forebears, just as successful village life depends on a knowledge of local landscape and 
history. The fates of Mrs Charmond and Fitzpiers, who lack moral aspirations or 
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constant affections, certainly suggest that Hardy gives credence to the utilitarian 
hierarchy of pleasures: Felice is shot dead by a disappointed lover and Fitzpiers’s future 
cohabitation with Grace rests on his ability to become a more practical man. 
A Laodicean engages with the sources of interest which Mill says should be alive 
to the cultivated mind, but also considers the dissatisfactions this can foster: receptivity 
to new ideas can clash with a romantic view of the past; an appreciation of art and 
poetry can conflict with the need to earn a living. The central characters, George 
Somerset, an architect, and Paula Power, a railway heiress and the Laodicean of the title, 
are both interested in nature, art, history and the human predicament. Forced to 
abandon an unsuccessful poetical career in order to train as an architect, the narrator 
compares Somerset’s return to professional pursuits to a horse being broken in:  
The operation called lunging, in which a colt having a rope attached to its 
head is made to trot round and round a horsebreaker with the other end 
of the rope in his hand, till it makes the beholder dizzy to look at them, is a 
very unhappy one for the animal concerned. During its progress the colt 
springs upward, across the circle, stops still, flies over the turf with the 
velocity of a bird, and indulges in all sorts of graceful antics; but he always 
ends in one way – thanks to the knotted whipcord – in a level trot round 
the lunger with the regularity of a horizontal wheel, and in the loss for 
ever to this character of the bold contours which the fine hand of Nature 
gave it. Yet the process is considered to be the making of him. (6) 
This image strikingly captures Mill’s concerns about loss of individuality and how 
society works to ensure conformity. Somerset’s openness to ideas about art – ‘the 
modern malady of unlimited appreciativeness’ (7) – causes him to delay specialising in 
architecture and hampers his chances of commercial success compared to more 
thoughtless peers who ‘had blunderingly applied themselves to whatever form of art 
confronted them at the moment of making a move’ (7). This concern with the difficulties 
attached to a receptive worldview recalls Mr Maybold’s comment in Under the 
Greenwood Tree that ‘it is difficult for a man of any appreciativeness to have convictions 
at all’ (86). Mr Maybold’s comment is disingenuous, designed to further his aim of 
replacing Mellstock choir with a church organ, but Somerset and Paula’s confusion is 
genuine. 
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As Somerset watches Paula Power, in a Baptist chapel built by her father, he sees her 
about to be baptised in line with her father’s dying wishes, but then change her mind 
and refuse to proceed with the ceremony (unlike the astronomer Swithin in Two on a 
Tower, who goes ahead with being confirmed to please Viviette rather than because he 
believes in the ceremony). As Somerset watches her he imagines that she ‘was even at 
that moment living, a clandestine, stealthy inner life which had very little to do with her 
present outward one’ (12). In Millian terms there is no disconnection between 
Paula’s inner and outer lives: she is ambivalent about religion and therefore refuses to 
go through with the baptism.7 In A Laodicean a strong inner life is shown to be both a 
hindrance in the practical world and a source of strength which is necessary to non-
conformism. George Du Maurier’s illustration in Figure 5 depicts this incident in the 
novel: Paula is far from ‘lost in the crowd’ in Mill’s famous phrase from On Liberty but 
glows with the spotlight of surveillance cast by the minister, the congregation and 
                                                 
7 In Thomas Hardy, Femininity and Dissent Jane Thomas argues, in relation to this scene, that ‘The collision 
between the happiness of the individual and the demands of the status quo is a strong motivating force in 
Hardy’s writing’ ... (103–4). She also points out that A Laodicean, and Jude the Obscure, articulate ‘the 
insurmountable difficulties that beset the pioneer spirit and the “comforting”, and at times irresistible, 
pull of tradition and the urge to conform. Paula, by virtue of her gender, occupies a position between the 
pioneer and the conformist’ (104). 
 
Fig. 5. ‘But my dear lady, you promised’. Illustration for A Laodicean in Harper’s New 
Monthly Magazine (1880) by George Du Maurier. 
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Somerset (73). As Somerset watches, he begins to sense that Paula’s ability to withstand 
the disapproval of the minister and the congregation is not as autonomous as it first 
appears: ‘it seemed to him more than probable that this young woman’s power of 
persistence in her unexpected repugnance to the rite was strengthened by wealth and 
position of some sort, and was not the unassisted gift of nature’ (15). Circumstances 
have differentiated her from the other parishioners who belong ‘to that vast majority of 
society who are denied the art of articulating their higher emotions, and crave dumbly 
for a fugleman – respectably dressed working people, whose faces and forms were worn 
and contorted by years of dreary toil’ (10). Somerset betrays an undertone of 
resentment for the increased choices which Paula’s inheritance opens up for her, and 
his resentment continues when she prevaricates about her choice of husband. 
Paula Power inhabits the De Stancy castle, bought by her railway magnate father, 
after the improvident Sir William De Stancy is forced to sell his ancestral home. The 
friendship between Sir William’s daughter Charlotte and Paula Power, who are 
‘diametrically different ... in associations, traditions, ideas, religion’ appeals to the part 
of Somerset prone to daydreams about human progress, which has been necessarily 
superseded by his material needs (40). He praises the liberal and forward-looking spirit 
of their friendship. Like Somerset, Paula is receptive to new ideas, but here, and in her 
view of history, she lacks the critical insight she has into religious matters: ‘Every 
philosopher and man of science who ventilates his theories in the monthly reviews has 
a devout listener in her’ (150). Somerset favours a sceptical view of the De Stancy family 
portraits, feeling ‘that it required a profounder mind than his to disinter from the 
lumber of conventionality the lineaments that really sat in the painter’s presence, and to 
discover their history behind the curtain of mere tradition’ (21). But Paula is drawn to 
Charlotte’s brother Captain De Stancy because of his ‘Protean quality ... by means of 
which he could assume the shape and situation of almost any ancestor at will’ (170). 
Paula and Captain De Stancy openly discuss the practical advantages their marriage 
would bring. The Captain thinks that a marriage between aristocracy and new money is 
a neat fit, but true to her non-compliance in church at the beginning of the novel, Paula 
says: ‘I hope I am not so calculating as to risk happiness in order to round off a social 
idea’ (302). The end of A Laodicean suggests a middle ground between appreciating the 
past and embracing a modern spirit. Paula marries Somerset, and when Dare, Captain 
De Stancy’s illegitimate son, sets fire to the castle, Somerset and Paula decide not to 
restore it but to ‘build a new house from the ground, eclectic in style’ next to the ruins 
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(378). The architectural compromise is parallel to Paula’s agnosticism – Paula is ‘one of 
a body to whom lukewarmth is not an accident but a provisional necessity, till they see a 
little more clearly’ (376). 
 
4.5 Language as ‘the conservator of ancient experience’ 
Although the desirability of overcoming deep-rooted ideas is a powerful idea in 
both Mill’s and Hardy’s writing, there are also overlaps between the ways in which they 
conceive of the benefits of deep-rootedness. On the subject of the useful knowledge 
which resides in language, which can be used as guide for conduct, Hardy showed 
remarkable affinity with Mill’s view. In the Logic Mill said that language is ‘the 
conservator of ancient experience; the keeper-alive of those thoughts and observations 
of former ages, which may be alien to the tendencies of the passing time’ (680). In the 
Logic, concerned with establishing the requisites of a philosophical language, Mill 
suggests that the average person has little or no awareness of the richness and 
complexity of their day-to-day language and the implications this has for their conduct. 
He observes that:  
... nothing is more common than for propositions to be mechanically 
repeated, mechanically retained in the memory, and their truth 
undoubtingly assented to and relied on, while yet they carry no meaning 
distinctly home to the mind; and while the matter of fact or law of nature 
which they originally expressed is as much lost sight of, and practically 
disregarded, as if it had never been heard of at all. (8: 681) 
This is an idea which Mill returns to in On Liberty when making the case for free 
discussion. Hardy drew a line beside the following passage in his own copy: 
All languages and literatures are full of general observations on life, both 
as to what it is, and how to conduct oneself in it; observations which 
everybody knows, which everybody repeats or hears with acquiescence, 
which are received as truisms, yet of which most people first truly learn 
the meaning, when experience, generally of a painful kind, has made it a 
reality to them. How often, when smarting under some unforeseen 
misfortune or disappointment, does a person call to mind some proverb 
or common saying, familiar to him all his life, the meaning of which, if he 
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had ever before felt it as he does now, would have saved him from the 
calamity. (49) 
Versions of the above passage from On Liberty occur several times in Hardy’s novels. 
Like his friend, Mona Caird, whose work I discuss in next chapter, Hardy paid careful 
attention to Mill’s concept of the difference between living language and beliefs, and 
dead ones, and the need for frequent discussion of familiar ideas to keep them relevant.8 
Faced with the news that her husband Fitzpiers may have been injured, Grace 
Melbury in The Woodlanders feels more sympathy for his mistresses, Felice Charmond 
and Suke Damson, than for her husband. This experience makes Grace aware of the 
inadequacy of conventional language:  
It was well enough, conventionally, to address either one of them in the 
wife’s regulation terms of virtuous sarcasm, as woman, creature, or thing. 
But life, what was it, and who was she? She had, like the singer of the 
Psalm of Asaph, been plagued and chastened all the day long; but could 
she, by retributive words, in order to please herself, the individual, ‘offend 
against the generation’, as he would not? (261) 
The Preface to the 1896 edition of The Woodlanders struck a very Millian note in 
relation to this subject. The assumption referred to in the following extract is that 
‘matrimonial divergence’ (that is, interest in a third party once married) is depraved: 
From the point of view of marriage as a distinct covenant or undertaking, 
decided on by two people fully cognizant of all its possible issues, and 
competent to carry them through, this assumption is, of course, logical. 
Yet no thinking person supposes that on the broader ground of how to 
afford the greatest happiness to the units of human society during their 
brief transit through this sorry world, there is no more to be said on this 
covenant; and it is certainly not supposed by the writer of these pages. 
(368) 
Here Hardy links ideas from On Liberty and Utilitarianism, by proposing that discussion 
of individual stories about marriage is the way to work towards the greater good. It 
                                                 
8 On Hardy’s friendship with Caird, see Richardson, Love and Eugenics, 193, note.  
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evokes Mill’s warning against the complacency which sets in when a topic ‘is not fully, 
frequently, and fearlessly discussed’ (On Liberty 40). 
In Far from the Madding Crowd, the narrator considers the disconnection 
between Troy’s words and his feelings, as he attempts to seduce Bathsheba: 
The wondrous power of flattery in passados [forward movement – a term 
from fencing] at women is a perception so universal as to be remarked 
upon by many people almost as automatically as they repeat a proverb, or 
say that they are Christians and the like, without thinking much of the 
enormous corollaries which spring from the proposition. Still less is it 
acted upon for the good of the complemental being alluded to. With the 
majority such an opinion is shelved with all those trite aphorisms which 
require some catastrophe to bring their tremendous meanings thoroughly 
home. (221) 
Here there is an allusion to both Mill’s concern about the intellectual origins of religious 
faith, and the stock of common proverbs and aphorisms which are unheedingly 
repeated until adverse experiences reveal that what is supposedly banal is actually 
replete with meaning. People fail to perceive the emptiness of Troy’s words and 
therefore fail to perceive that ‘his reason and his propensities had seldom any 
reciprocating influence, having separated by mutual consent long ago’ (220).  
A Laodicean explores the way that proverbs can also be manipulated – or 
manufactured – to appease individual consciences and justify morally dubious actions. 
Sir William De Stancy, who has gambled away his fortune, litters his conversation with 
proverbs and sayings about frugality. George Somerset feels that Sir William is a man 
‘who flattered his own understanding by devising Machiavellian theories after the 
event, to account for any spontaneous action of himself, or his daughter, which might 
otherwise seem eccentric or irregular’ (40–1). The pub landlord observes that ‘“Sir 
William, so full as he is of wise maxims, never acted upon a wise maxim in his life, until 
he had lost everything, and it didn’t matter whether he was wise or no”’ (41). Sir 
William’s method of dealing with the disjunction between words and action is to 
embrace sophistry. By this means he can create a consistent account of his own 
behaviour (he asserts that he has applied the principles of frugality to his life from his 
youth) and deal with the anxiety that actions may be perceived as unconventional.  
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In A Pair of Blue Eyes, Knight’s words, both written and spoken, diminish and 
disparage Elfride. Yet when they first meet, she perceives a lack of spontaneity and 
originality in them: ‘There was a hard square decisiveness in the shape of his sentences, 
as if, unlike her own and Stephen’s, they were not there and then newly constructed, but 
were drawn forth from a large store ready-made’ (146). Knight’s lack of individuality is 
indicated from his first introduction to the narrative when Stephen, in an attempt to 
convey Knight’s status, says ‘his personality, and that of several others like him, is 
absorbed in a huge WE, namely, the impalpable entity called THE PRESENT – a social and 
literary Review’ (60). This lack of character is no bar to his making authoritative 
statements, however. The epigraph to Chapter XIII, from Ecclesiastes, is ‘He set in order 
many proverbs’, indicating the confidence Knight reposes in his view of the world, 
(120); in Millian terms he relies too greatly on a sense of his own infallibility. Knight’s 
intellectual output is likened to the common store of trite maxims. However, as he falls 
in love with Elfride his experiences defamiliarise his own pronouncements. Knight 
becomes aware that his own writing has been a mechanical exercise, unconnected to 
lived experience. As he considers how best to act, he realises that his writing is an 
untapped resource: 
‘What was he coming to? It was very odd to himself to look at his theories 
on the subject of love, and reading them now by the full light of a new 
experience, to see how much more his sentences meant than he had felt 
them to mean when they were written. People often discover the real 
force of a trite maxim only when it is thrust upon them by a chance 
adventure; but Knight had never before known the case of a man who 
learnt the full compass of his own epigrams by such means. (177) 
Ultimately, though, Knight is paralysed by the conflict which this realisation brings. 
Though he comes to a theoretical understanding of his own fallibility, he is unable to 
translate this into practice. When he belatedly has promptings to ‘stand forward, seize 
upon Elfride, and be her cherisher and protector through life’ he is able to ‘reason her 
down’ by dwelling on her supposed ‘indifference to decorum’ (317). That he has 
previously written about issues of decorum in ‘the pleasant social philosophy and satire 
of his essays’ becomes a source of shame rather than a catalyst for self-development 
(317). 
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 Tess of the D’Urbervilles explores the qualifier that Mill adds to his analysis of 
proverbs and common sayings: ‘there are many truths of which the full meaning cannot 
be realized, until personal experience has brought it home’ (49, emphasis in original). 
If before going to the D’Urbervilles’ she had rigorously moved under the 
guidance of sundry gnomic texts and phrases known to her and to the 
world in general, no doubt she would never have been imposed on. But it 
had not been in Tess’s power – nor is it in anybody’s power – to feel the 
whole truth of golden opinions when it is possible to profit by them. She – 
and how many more – might have ironically said to God with Saint 
Augustine, ‘Thou hast counselled a better course than Thou has 
permitted’. (98) 
Tess’s reproach to her mother – ‘“Why didn’t you tell me there was danger?”’ (82) –
points to Mill’s insistence on the importance of unwearied discussion: ‘But much more 
of the meaning even of these would have been understood, and would have been far 
more deeply impressed on the mind, if the man had been accustomed to hear it argued 
pro and con by people who did understand it’ (On Liberty 49, emphasis in original). In 
‘The Profitable Reading of Fiction’, discussed below, Hardy says that fiction has become 
a guide to conduct for young people and Tess laments her lack of access to such a guide, 
thinking that ‘Ladies know what tricks to guard against’ because they use novels as a 
means of sex education (82).  
 
4.6 Philosophy in Fiction, Fiction in Philosophy 
In this chapter I have argued that in his fictional treatment of Millian ideas, 
Hardy is ever alert to the difficulties of putting philosophical ideals into practice, but 
that equally, he sometimes draws on Mill’s own terms to problematise the relationship 
between theory and practice, and he sometimes champions Millian ideals. In ‘The 
Profitable Reading of Fiction’ in 1888 Hardy also insisted on the importance of 
individual interpretation, warning against taking fiction too literally as a moral guide: 
If it be true, as is frequently asserted, that young people nowadays go to 
novels for their sentiments, their religion, and their morals, the question 
as to the wisdom or folly of those young people hangs upon their methods 
of acquisition in each case. A deduction from what these works exemplify 
by action that bears evidence of being a counterpart of life, has a distinct 
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educational value; but an imitation of what may be called the philosophy 
of the personages – the doctrines of the actors, as shown in their 
conversation – many lead to surprising results. They should be informed 
that a writer whose story is not a tract in disguise has as his main object 
that of characterizing the people of his little world. A philosophy which 
appears between the inverted commas of a dialogue may, with propriety, 
be as full of holes as a sieve if the person or persons who advance it gain 
any reality of humanity thereby. (246) 
If novels have replaced family or community as sources of moral guidance for young 
people, this would seem to make a wider and more independent engagement with the 
world possible; more possible than in A Pair of Blue Eyes, for instance, where Mr 
Swancourt tells Elfride that she must defer to the views prevalent in their county, 
‘which is the world to us’ (80). But Hardy emphasises that it is the way people read 
novels that is meaningful: it must be in an interrogative mode, ever alert to both 
fictional devices and the inconsistencies of life. Hardy’s theory of how to read fiction 
evokes On Liberty, and the phrase used in Jude the Obscure: ‘He who lets the world, or 
his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty 
than the ape-like one of imitation’ (65). 
Mill was interested in the way in which theory is understood to be distinct from 
or opposed to practice: not in Hardy’s sense of disavowing theories and theorising, but 
of the practical as a corrective to the speculative, with each element necessary to 
balance the other. In Subjection Mill avers the benefits of an intelligent female 
companion for a man involved in theorising: 
A woman seldom runs wild after an abstraction. The habitual direction of 
her mind to dealing with things as individuals rather than in groups, and 
(what is more closely connected with it) her more lively interest in the 
present feelings of persons, which makes her consider first of all, in 
anything which claims to be applied to practice, in what manner persons 
will be affected by it – these two things make her extremely unlikely to 
put faith in any speculation which loses sight of individuals, and deals 
with things as if they existed for the benefit of some imaginary entity, 
some mere creation of the mind, not resolvable into the feelings of living 
beings. (534–5) 
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My main reason for drawing attention to this quotation from Subjection is not to engage 
with Mill’s supposition that women’s abilities might be different to men’s (a position 
frequently drawn attention to as at odds with other arguments in Subjection9). Rather, it 
is to note, that like the practical women in Mill’s Subjection, Hardy’s primary concerns 
are keeping sight of individuals within the group (as well as the philosopher upon the 
hustings) and understanding how speculations are resolvable into the feelings of living 
beings; even though, he is, of course, working in the realm of imaginary entities and 
creations of the mind. Mill’s description of women’s practical abilities is inadvertently a 
useful way of thinking about Hardy’s novelistic skills. 
In Hardy’s copy of On Liberty he highlighted Mill’s contention that: ‘the only way 
in which a human being can make some approach to knowing the whole of a subject, is 
by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and 
studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every character of mind’ (25). Though 
Mill was not talking about literature, this sounds like the way a reader of fiction, or a 
novelist, might engage empathically with a variety of characters. Hardy’s multivocal 
engagement with Millian philosophy enhances our understanding of the holes in the 
sieve, the knotty points and the places where theory breaks down, but also reminds us 
of the value of book philosophies, the cultivated mind and the enthusiast about ideas. 
 
 
                                                 
9 For a nineteenth-century example of this objection, see Edith Simcox, in an otherwise celebratory piece 
on ‘The Influence of John Stuart Mill’s Writings’ (1873) for the Contemporary Review: ‘Mr Mill, as if bad 
reasoning were contagious, sometimes consents to speak, like his opponents, of the “nature of women” as 
a fixed and ascertainable quantity’ (315). For a more recent reading of this part of Subjection, see, for 
example, William Stafford’s John Stuart Mill (1998). Stafford suggests that although Mill ‘runs the risk of 
bringing natural difference, and natural inferiority, back in’ to the discussion here, ‘he never concludes 
that there are essential differences of character, aptitude and ability between men and women’ (134–5, 
emphasis in original). 
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5. Liberating Conversations:  
Millian Free Discussion in the Fiction of Mona Caird 
 
They plunged into still more intimate talk, as if in truth they were old friends meeting 
again after long absence. Claudia brought floating to the surface all sorts of ideas that her 
companion had not definitely known were in his mind, as if she had set going in him a 
creative, liberating process. (36) 
The Stones of Sacrifice, 1915 
Mrs Ellwood had no difficulty in persuading Dick to tell her more about his life and his 
surroundings. She listened to him in amazement. The picture that he drew had all the 
qualities of a work of art. The critical faculty in her made her appreciation as delicate and 
perfect as his own unconscious masterpiece. (72) 
‘A Romance of the Moors’, 1891 
He never lectured or declaimed, or engrossed the talk. He paused at due intervals, to 
hear what others had to say; and not merely heard, but took in, and embodied that in his 
reply. With him, talk was, what it ought to be, an exchange of information, thought and 
argument, when it assumed the form of discussion; and an exchange of sympathies when 
the feelings were concerned. He did not care to converse on any other terms than perfect 
mutuality. (189) 
Alexander Bain, John Stuart Mill, A Criticism: with Personal Recollections, 1882 
Representative assemblies are often taunted by their enemies with being places of mere 
talk and bavardage. There has seldom been more misplaced derision. I know not how a 
representative assembly can more usefully employ itself than in talk, when the subject of 
the talk is the great public interests of the country, and every sentence of it represents 
the opinion either of some important body of persons in the nation, or of an individual in 
whom some such body have reposed their confidence. (283) 
John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, 1861 
 
Mona Caird was an essayist and novelist who became well known at the end of 
the nineteenth century for her unflinching criticism of marriage laws and customs in an 
article for the Westminster Review entitled ‘Marriage’ (1888). Caird’s controversial 
article initiated a thoroughgoing nationwide debate about the marriage question, 
conducted through the letters columns of the Daily Telegraph and other national 
publications.1 In 1910, the writer and editor Elizabeth A. Sharp declared that Caird’s 
essays and novels ‘have been potent in altering the attitude of the public mind in its 
approach to and examination of such questions, in making private discussion possible’ 
(142). Caird not only encouraged debates about marriage during the 1880s and 1890s, 
she made liberty of discussion one of the major themes of her fiction. Discussion was 
                                                 
1 Most recent discussion of Caird gives an account of the ‘Marriage’ controversy, starting with Lucy’s 
Bland’s Banishing the Beast: English Feminism and Sexual Morality, 1885–1914 in 1995 (126–34). See also, 
for example, Tracey S. Rosenberg’s ‘Breaking out of the Cage: Mona Caird and her Reception in the 
Victorian Press’ in 2004 (9–12). 
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also important to the form her fiction took. Her novels and short stories consist largely 
of dialogue: it drives her plots and through it her characters are created. This chapter 
considers the links between Caird’s fictional exploration of open and unrestricted 
discussion and On Liberty, Subjection, Mill’s Autobiography and his ‘Nature’ essay. 
Throughout the seven novels she wrote, Caird engages with the forms of free discussion 
Mill argues for in On Liberty and the model of self-developmental conversation he sets 
out in his Autobiography. In doing so she offers an ideal of ‘creative, liberating’ 
conversation and explores many deviations from this ideal, including persuasion, 
manipulation, mockery, banality and silence.  
The first section of this chapter sets Caird’s treatment of discussion, and her 
recourse to Mill, in the context of fin-de-siècle New Woman debates and recent 
scholarship on this topic. The second section outlines the model of conversational 
excellence that was such a powerful influence on Caird’s fiction, as Mill describes it in 
his Autobiography and Bain describes it in John Stuart Mill – A Criticism: with Personal 
Recollections (1882). The remaining sections consider the ways in which Caird’s fiction 
scrutinises the relationship between discussion and social change. As I noted in the 
introduction, her nineteenth-century novels – Whom Nature Leadeth (1883), One That 
Wins (1887), The Wing of Azrael (1889), The Daughters of Danaus (1894) and The 
Pathway of the Gods (1898) – focus on private conversations in upper-class domestic 
settings. The Daughters of Danaus and The Pathway of the Gods begin to explore how 
these private conversations relate to public debate; and her early twentieth-century 
novels – The Stones of Sacrifice (1915) and The Great Wave (1931) – depict political and 
scientific discussion groups, which are accessible to a greater diversity of participants, 
and consider directly how private conversational practices can translate into public 
discourse. I also show how conversation is of central importance to Caird’s short stories 
‘A Romance of the Moors’ (1891) and ‘The Yellow Drawing Room’ (1892) and to a 
polemical play about animal rights The Logicians: An Episode in Dialogue (1905). 
 
5.1 New Women: Debates and Scholarship 
In 1989, when The Feminist Press published The Daughters of Danaus, Caird’s 
best-selling fourth novel, it was the first time that one of Caird’s novels had been 
reprinted since the original editions. Since that publication there has been a revival of 
interest in Caird. Ann Heilmann’s 1996 article, ‘Mona Caird (1854–1932): Wild Woman, 
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New Woman, and Early Radical Feminist Critic’,2 as well as her 2004 book New Woman 
Strategies: Sarah Grand, Olive Schreiner and Mona Caird, established the importance of 
Caird’s work to New Woman scholarship and the history of feminism, focusing on 
Caird’s insights into the social construction of marriage and motherhood. In 2010, 
Valancourt Books re-published The Wing of Azrael, Caird’s third novel which appeared 
in the wake of the ‘Marriage’ controversy. Edited and introduced by Tracey S. 
Rosenberg, it contains an appendix of contemporary responses to the novel. Pickering & 
Chatto also published The Wing of Azrael in 2010 as volume three of New Woman 
Fiction, 1881–1899, edited by Alexandra Warwick. Since The Feminist Press edition of 
The Daughters of Danaus in 1989, digital reprints of Caird’s works are increasingly 
available and selections from Caird’s journalism and fiction are anthologised in The 
Late-Victorian Marriage Question: A Collection of Key Texts (1998), edited by Heilmann.  
  In her afterword to The Feminist Press edition, Margaret Morganroth Gullette 
declared that The Daughters of Danaus – which tells of the stultifying domestic and 
social arrangements that thwart Hadria Fullerton’s musical talent – was the novel in 
which Caird most successfully combined feminist convictions with literary achievement. 
Perhaps aware that acknowledging Caird’s polemicism would cast doubt on her artistic 
credentials, Gullette contrasts her with Mill, observing that in The Daughters of Danaus 
‘Caird made the inequities/iniquities of the [marriage] system exceptionally vivid – far 
more vivid than Mill had done in his scrupulously reasoned essay on The Subjection of 
Women in 1869. Clearly what this author valued were women’s points of view: their 
subjectivity and their subjection’ (497, Gullette’s emphasis). Given the space that Mill 
devotes to discussing female writers in Subjection and the possibility of ‘a literature of 
their own’ (548), it seems likely that he had more interest in female subjectivities than 
Gullette credits him with. When it came to marriage, Mill, like Caird, paid attention to 
‘how the unthinkable is worked out in daily detail’ (Wing of Azrael 2: 167). Vivid also 
seems an apt word to describe the heartfelt vocabulary of Subjection: the sense of 
crushed, thwarted and stunted potential is forceful and memorable and these words 
resonate through Caird’s prose. Gullette was making the case for the importance and 
                                                 
2 Biographical and archival sources for Caird are scarce. Heilmann’s article represents the fullest 
biographical account, based on interviews with Caird’s descendants. Tracey S. Rosenberg’s unpublished 
thesis ‘Gender Construction and the Individual in the Work of Mona Caird’ (2006) also contains some 
biographical information. There is no archive of Caird’s letters or other papers. 
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authority of Caird’s voice in the New Woman debates of the 1890s and her continued 
relevance to feminist studies in the twentieth century, but in so doing she overlooked 
the complexity of Caird’s engagement with Millian philosophy – Caird sought to align 
herself with Mill as a voice of reason, but also as a voice of sympathy and compassion. 
  Most critical accounts of Caird mention Mill and Subjection in order to position 
Caird’s work in the context of first-wave feminism and to note that Caird borrows a 
Millian rhetorical strategy when she likens women’s position under nineteenth-century 
marriage laws and customs as equivalent to, or worse than, that of slaves.3 However, it 
was Angelique Richardson’s Love and Eugenics in the Late Nineteenth Century (2003) 
which established the extent to which ‘Mill’s ideas on nature, society, and the individual 
had a formative influence on Caird’s thinking’ (187). In Love and Eugenics Richardson 
demonstrated that by ‘positioning Mill’s ideas on individual liberty in a biological 
context’ Caird was able to offer a powerful challenge to biological determinism and the 
eugenic discourses of other New Women writers such as Sarah Grand (207). By paying 
close attention to how Millian ideas of freedom permeate her journalism and fiction, and 
the way she, like Mill, ‘exposes the social and economic concerns which underpin 
discourses on the natural’, Richardson made clear that Caird held very different views 
from many of the New Women writers with which she is habitually grouped (187).4  
In an interview with the Women’s Penny Paper in 1890 Caird said that reading 
Mill had had a formative role in her intellectual development. In the interview, she 
described her childhood as one of instinctive rebellion against current thought and of 
resistance to the influence of her surroundings. Owing to her father’s ill health her 
childhood was one of seclusion, where personal influence played little part in her 
development and she was forced to ‘scramble up’ (‘Interview: Mrs Mona Caird’ 421). 
She said that writing was her habitual form of expression, but that she was prevented 
from writing when she became too absorbed by it. Her family’s expectations for her 
were the conventional ones of marriage and domesticity: literary pursuits were not 
                                                 
3 In Subjection Mill said that ‘I am far from pretending that wives are in general no better treated than 
slaves; but no slave is a slave to the same lengths, and in so full a sense of the word, as a wife is’ (504). For 
discussion of how Caird uses the slavery analogy, see Patricia Murphy’s Time is of the Essence: 
Temporality, Gender and the New Woman in 2001 (163), Lisa Surridge’s Bleak Houses: Marital Violence in 
Victorian Fiction in 2005 (192) and Warwick’s introduction to The Wing of Azrael (viii). 
4 Rosenberg’s unpublished thesis also considers Mill as an intellectual influence on Caird, emphasising 
their shared views on gender construction: neither denied the existence of biological differences, but both 
refused to accept these as an argument for determining social position (28). 
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compatible with this. When asked if she was influenced by any women in forming her 
views about gender equality she responded: ‘“No, not particularly. I knew so few whose 
intellect I respected. My views were pronounced at an early stage. John Stuart Mills [sic], 
I think, was the first to help me to bring these thoughts and feelings into form by his 
writings”’ (421). Reading Mill enabled her to move from the disorder of inadequate 
education and scarce opportunities for expression, to a place of greater security, 
structure and clarity.  
Caird also named Shelley, Tyndall, Huxley, Spencer and Darwin as influences on 
her work, mentioning that ‘“I came in contact with no leading minds, except in their 
writings, but these were more than sufficient education”’ (421). Despite having no 
personal contact with poets, philosophers and scientists in her early years, Caird 
confidently conveyed a sense of intellectual equality with these leading male figures 
based on her reading of their work. Caird (along with Olive Schreiner) became a 
member of The Men and Women’s Club – a London-based discussion group which was 
founded in 1885. Lucy Bland has suggested that many of the female members felt 
themselves to be intellectually inferior to the men (Banishing the Beast 6), but Caird 
does not appear to have shared this sense of inequality. In the Women’s Penny Paper 
interview she conveyed a fearless approach to canonical texts and authors, respectful of, 
but not intimidated by, voices of male authority. In 1890, the Women’s Penny Paper 
illustrated the difficulties faced by women seeking intellectual independence, by 
following Caird’s comments about her self-education with the sentence: ‘Here the 
entrance of tea and of Mrs Caird’s husband put a stop to our conversation’ (421). The 
interviewer, like some diarists and reviewers of Caird’s work in the periodical press, 
was sympathetic to Caird and her earnest advocacy of women’s rights, but sought to 
reconcile her controversial views with an image of serene and tasteful domesticity.5 
                                                 
5 The positive review of The Wing of Azrael in the Young Folks Paper, for example, includes the following 
picture of Caird’s domestic life: ‘She had one child, a bright little fellow of five years of age, and a well-
known writer recently described to us a charming scene which he had just left – the author of “The Wing 
of Azrael” sitting in the garden correcting the proofs of her new book, while her mother assisted her in the 
arduous task of revision, but the novelist with eyes much more constantly on the frolicsome youngster 
(rolling about on the grass with his pet lamb “Peter”) than on her literary task’ (‘The Literary Mirror’. 
350). And Katherine Tynan’s diary entry of 2 July 1889 discusses the controversy caused by Caird’s 
‘Marriage’ article at the same time as observing: ‘She was a very agreeable surprise to those who met her. 
She was a pretty young woman, with a look of honest sunburn about her, and very true, gentle brown 
eyes, and she dressed charmingly. That summer we were all wearing streamers to our hats, and I have a 
vivid memory of her green ribbons, going well with the browns of her face and eyes and hair’ (300). 
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After reporting Caird’s account of ‘literary work ... done under adverse circumstances’ 
(421) the interviewer apparently sees no sense of irony in the abrupt end to a 
discussion of Caird’s intellectual influences. In her fiction she explores the impact of 
such interrupted and halted conversations or provides a space for their continuation.  
The Women’s Penny Paper interview points to an interest, explored throughout 
Caird’s work, in the potential for cooperation between men and women. The most 
productive conversations she imagines take place between men and women in a spirit 
of friendship and collaborative work. Her advocacy of women’s rights has been well-
established, and this critical focus has tended to obscure the importance she places 
more broadly on human rights.6 While Heilmann has observed that Grand ‘combined 
social purity discourses with an at times spectacular exploration of female libidinal 
desire’ (New Woman Strategies 3), Caird’s work shows a preoccupation with intimate 
but Platonic friendship between the sexes, unrestricted by possible accusations of 
impropriety. In The Morality of Marriage (1897) a collection of her essays which had 
first appeared in the periodical press, she asserted that ‘It is certain that we shall never 
have a world really worth living in, until men and women can show interest in one 
another without being driven either to marry, or to forego altogether the pleasure and 
the profit of frequent meeting’ (‘A Moral Renaissance’ 103). Accordingly, there is very 
little flirtatious conversation in Caird’s fiction and when it does occur it is deeply 
problematic. As I discuss further below, Caird’s Platonic ideal is reminiscent of Mill’s 
account of his relationship with Harriet Taylor, where ‘all subjects of intellectual or 
moral interest [were] discussed between them in daily life, and probed to much greater 
depths than are usually or conveniently sounded in writings intended for general 
readers’ (Autobiography 183–4). 
In her introduction to The Morality of Marriage Caird linked Mill’s philosophy 
with journalism by saying that ‘What John Stuart Mill saw so clearly about half a century 
ago is gradually and slowly coming to be recognised and proved, bit by bit, through 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Heilmann’s New Woman Strategies: ‘Both [Caird and Sarah Grand] employed male 
points of view because they wanted to school women readers in what Judith Fetterley has called “the 
process of exorcising the male mind that has been implanted within us”’ (163). See also Patricia Murphy’s 
analysis of The Daughters of Danaus and ‘the ruinous effects wrought by patriarchal culture’s stringent 
regulation of a woman’s time through numbing domestic routine’ (Time is of the Essence 151). However, 
Lucy Bland notes that ‘To facilitate contact and open friendship between the sexes, she advocated co-
education, and the breaking down of sex segregation in the work place’ (Banishing the Beast 129). 
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observation and research directed to the subject’ (13–14). Caird quoted from Subjection 
to illustrate what Mill saw so clearly: that the whole organisation of society tended to 
the distortion of women’s natures, so that it had become impossible to say what their 
true character and capacities were. In her fiction, Caird took as her point of departure 
Mill’s assertion in Subjection that the discussion about women’s legal and social position 
‘must be a real discussion, descending to foundations, and not resting satisfied with 
vague and general assertions’ (492). Millian conversation is invariably rigorous and 
demanding and Caird takes her cue from this serious tone in order to insist on the 
importance of free discussion in the face of those who wish to mock, dismiss or 
undermine it. In ‘Foibles of the New Woman’ (1896) Ella W. Winston, a little-known 
American writer who had previously written against women’s suffrage, suggested that 
the New Woman ‘is a stranger to logic’ and ‘she has made many strange statements’ 
(170). For many, Mill’s voice was the voice of logic and reason, and yet he was also a 
controversialist, no stranger to making challenging statements which commanded 
attention. By filling her work with allusions to Mill’s ideas and prose style, Caird claims 
him as her ally in challenging the accusations of illogicality and irrelevance made by 
Winston and many other commentators. And, as I will show, Caird valued highly the 
compassion which she thought animated Millian rationality. 
Caird made the case for Mill’s enduring relevance at a time when others 
associated him with an old-fashioned perspective. George Bernard Shaw’s You Never 
Can Tell was published in 1897, the same year as The Morality of Marriage. References 
to John Stuart Mill in the stage directions are used to indicate Mrs Clandon’s out-of-date 
approach to life: ‘Mrs Clandon is a veteran of the Old Guard of the Women’s Rights 
movement which had for its Bible John Stuart Mill’s treatise on The Subjection of 
Women ... passion in her is humanitarian rather than human; she feels strongly about 
social questions and principles, not about persons’ (219–20). In the Preface to The Wing 
of Azrael, written in the wake of the controversy caused by her article ‘Marriage’ for the 
Westminster Review, Caird had been anxious to refute the idea that her characters were 
representatives of social questions and principles: ‘Human affairs are too complex, 
motives too many and too subtle, to allow a small group of persons to become the 
exponents of a general principle, however true. An argument founded on this narrow 
basis would be without value, though it were urged with the eloquence of a 
Demosthenes’ (viii). Reviewers debated whether The Wing of Azrael had artistic value, 
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or whether it was purely a didactic work. The Academy declared that: ‘It is avowedly a 
story with a purpose ... Yet there is abundance of cleverness in it’ (‘New Novels’ 355), 
while a reviewer in the Young Folks Paper was far more laudatory of Caird’s skills: ‘She 
has wit, humour, dramatic intensity, and tragic force, and with these qualities so highly 
developed as they are with her, she may achieve a wide and enduring fame’ (‘The 
Literary Mirror’ 350).  
Today, ‘The Yellow Drawing Room’ is perhaps the most well known piece of 
Caird’s fiction, anthologised in Women Who Did: Stories by Men and Women 1890–1914 
(2002), edited by Angelique Richardson. As Richardson’s introduction to that collection 
shows, the short story form ‘was perfectly suited to give expression to the turbulence 
and uncertainties of the late nineteenth century’ (xlvii). In contrast, Caird’s first four 
novels are multi-volume works – One That Wins was published in two volumes, Whom 
Nature Leadeth, The Wing of Azrael and The Daughters of Danaus were all triple-deckers. 
Heilmann describes Whom Nature Leadeth as ‘a sensation novel with a tortuous plot’ 
(New Woman Strategies 212) and Rosenberg describes The Wing of Azrael as a 
‘sprawling three-volume novel, primarily of interest because it presents the seeds of 
many of Caird’s later ideas’ (‘Introduction’ ix). Though Caird’s fiction, for the most part, 
may have conformed to an old-fashioned format, the numerous subplots and minor 
characters required to populate the pages of these lengthy novels gave her additional 
space to explore her ideal of creative, liberating conversation, and deviations from it. 
 
5.2 Millian Conversation 
The art of conversation is the keynote of Mill’s Autobiography. It is an analysis of 
the manner and modes in which discussion is conducted, not just of the opinions 
professed. The Autobiography culminates in Mill deploying, as a member of parliament, 
the discussion skills he has been developing all his life. Throughout the Autobiography, 
Mill is concerned with the concept of ‘personal ascendancy’ by virtue of conversational 
ability. Those with outstanding conversational abilities have the power to change the 
world, though they accomplish nothing else. Their influence ‘deserves to be accounted 
an historical event’ (75). Among Mill’s peers, the legal philosopher John Austin’s 
vigorous and expressive conversation was instructive and character-building. His lack 
of achievement in other areas, due to a debilitating perfectionism, was compensated for 
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by his conversational ability. His brother Charles Austin, a barrister, was a 
controversialist, taking risks with what he said, deliberately trying to provoke and 
startle, and taking pleasure in his own audacity. He thus created far-reaching, though 
paradoxical, impressions of what constituted utilitarian belief. Discussing Jesus as a 
historical figure in On Liberty, Mill remarks that it was his ‘life and conversation’ that left 
such an enduring impression of ‘moral grandeur’ (30). The quotation from 
Considerations on Representative Government at the head of this chapter acts as a useful 
summary of the importance Mill accords to ‘mere talk’: at the highest level it has the 
power to transform society for the good.  
In terms of the personal influence he was exposed to and the structure of his 
education, Mill’s childhood could not have been more different from Mona Caird’s 
‘scramble up’. Mill’s conversation is seemingly always at an adult level – he has little 
contact with his peers as a child. From his early years, conversation is a formalised, 
work-related activity. In the walks he describes with his father, talking is linked to a 
sense of learning and of achievement. He has to give verbal summaries of the books he 
has read, using slips of paper to aid his memory. (In his biography of Mill, Richard 
Reeves suggests that the Latin phrase solivitur ambulando, literally interpreted as ‘the 
solution comes through walking’, could have been Mill’s epitaph, 468.) In the 
Autobiography a positive connection is established between walking and talking: there 
is something structured and purposeful in the way father and son literally walk through 
problems as they talk, but perhaps also something liberating in that this takes place 
outdoors, among ‘green fields and wild flowers’ (29). Early on Mill also learns about the 
history of dialogue and discussion by studying classical oratory. All aspects of public 
speaking are anatomised: composition and delivery of speeches, timing, gauging the 
effect likely to be had on an audience, elocution and precise understanding of the units 
which compose speech. Mill is the heir to all of this through his education. The idea that 
people will pay attention to the minutiae of what he says is normalised and reinforced 
when his father makes him define the words ‘idea’ and ‘theory’. Every word and 
sentence has significance and may need to be defended. It is normal to have opinions 
and articulate them privately and publicly – to argue and to press your point. This risks 
censure, but saying nothing is not an option. Mill is alert to the role education plays in 
building a child’s confidence to speak out in this way. 
162 
 
The daily discussion group Mill convenes as a young man further formalises 
conversation. It makes it a consciously productive process, a form of work, with 
participants who are very aware of its potential contribution to the public good. The 
discussion is unapologetically specialist: methodical, detailed, intense, searching and 
lengthy. It fosters attributes such as tenacity in problem-solving. The group is beneficial 
in helping individuals to work through ideas, reach their own conclusions and bring 
new ideas to the surface. Conversation is collaborative, leading to writing and 
publishing. Mill says the Logic came directly out of the discussions with this group. It 
was also transformational, turning Mill into ‘an original and independent thinker’ (105). 
Afterwards Mill develops his public speaking skills in a newly formed debating society. 
Again the discussion is intense, detailed and precise. Mill thinks that this helped him to 
improve his writing style by giving him a sense for smoothness, rhythm, telling 
sentences and effect on an audience. His attitude to his own public speaking abilities is 
functional rather aspirational: though he lacked fluency and grace – as many 
commentators were keen to emphasise – he could make himself listened to. 
Mill describes his father’s conversational virtuosity in the most laudatory terms, 
implying that with him conversation really was an art form. James Mill could make his 
most carefully thought out ideas accessible in ‘colloquial discussion’ (91). There was no 
disconnection between his ‘great mental resources’ and the language in which he 
expressed them (91). He also had a sense of humour, and of story. James Mill’s 
conversational skills acted as a catalyst for the thoughts of other men. His enthusiasm 
‘warmed into life and activity every germ of similar virtue that existed in the minds he 
came into contact with’ (92). He evoked a desire for his approval in his interlocutors 
and offered moral support to people with the same aims via his conversation. This 
private activity was suffused with public spirit and an awareness of its relation to 
power, progress and improvement. Conversation with James Mill was never idle: it was 
always about either work or intellectual sympathy or both. It also seems never to have 
been personal, and it is lack of conversation on this level that contributed to Mill’s 
mental crisis in his early twenties: ‘I sought no comfort by speaking to others of what I 
felt. If I had loved any one sufficiently to make confiding my griefs a necessity, I should 
not have been in the condition I was’ (113). In later life, Harriet Taylor fulfils the role of 
his ‘almost infallible counsellor’ (192). Just as the Logic came out of his discussion 
group, his later works emanate from his discursive life with Harriet. When Harriet dies, 
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her daughter Helen Taylor steps into the role of ‘companion, stimulator, adviser, and 
instructor’ (196). In his own family life, Mill expands his father’s unrelentingly 
intellectual approach to conversation into something less competitive and manipulative, 
more tolerant and sympathetic. 
In contrast, Mill finds conversation in what he terms ‘General Society’ dull and 
unpleasant. He observes a difference between social interaction in French and English 
society. English society inhibits profession of high feelings or principles; it tends to 
‘sneering depreciation’ (62). Intellectual or improving conversation will not be had in 
the normal run of things, so it is necessary to seek out the people who will provide this 
and create formal groups or arrangements to pursue it. France has a ‘culture of the 
understanding’ which permeates all classes, unlike England (62). English conversation 
is more restricted, more reserved, and less friendly, and assumes that other people are 
bores or enemies. English feelings and intellects are perpetually diminished or limited 
by ‘the habit of not speaking to others, nor much even to themselves, about the things in 
which they do feel interest’ (63). Controversy and argument are not allowed and the 
English, unlike the French, have neglected ‘the cultivation of the art of talking agreeably 
on trifles’ (173) due to being less lively and sociable. Mill does not dismiss the idea of 
small talk, just believes that the English are no good at it. English conversation is always 
concerned with matters of personal advancement or ‘compliance with custom’ (173) 
and people are fearful of breaking out of conventional modes. Intelligent people who 
participate in General Society will therefore be damaged by it. They will become 
demoralised by having to remain silent on important issues and unconsciously begin to 
adopt the same modes of interaction. Because English conversation is not open, Mill 
closes himself off from it. 
Despite Mill’s own account of being highly selective in his choice of interlocutor, 
in his John Stuart Mill, A Criticism: with Personal Recollections Bain insists that Mill was 
not reluctant to talk to ‘ordinary mortals’ (187). He also dismisses views of Mill as shy, 
awkward, hesitant, slow and humourless, and Carlyle’s description of his conversation 
as ‘sawdustish’ (190). Instead he offers the laudatory portrait of Mill’s conversational 
power quoted at the head of this chapter. Mill’s conversational mode, according to Bain, 
demonstrated an unsurpassed intellectual generosity: ‘He poured himself out in 
conversation, and his ideas were caught up and used, with or without 
acknowledgement’ (155). In Bain’s view, he put into practice his own advice about the 
164 
 
benefits of ‘correcting and completing his own opinions by collating it with those of 
others’ (On Liberty 25); his verbal authority was based on the openness he advocated in 
his writing. He actively listened, was willing to be guided by his interlocutors as to the 
direction of the conversation, and was contemptuous of ‘monologue talkers’ (190). 
Mill’s conversational virtuosity was not limited to the intellectual – he also displayed 
understanding when discussing people’s feelings and had a sympathetic rather than 
mocking sense of humour. Speculating on the role Harriet played in his work (though in 
order to suggest that it was not as significant as Mill believed) Bain suggests that she 
induced him to ‘exert his powers in talk, which was a standing pleasure of his life’ (173). 
(In The Voice of Harriet Taylor Mill, Jo Ellen Jacobs imagines the corresponding benefits 
for Harriet in a fictionalised diary entry: ‘I adore my children, but what a joy to have 
some retreat into adult conversation when Mr Mill arrives to talk about ideas’ (15, 
Jacobs’s emphasis).) 
On Mill’s view of conversation in England, Bain observed that ‘General Society is 
a very large phrase; it comprises coteries where such a man as Mill would be out of his 
element, and others where he might discuss any subject, and utter any opinions that he 
pleased’ (162). Caird seems to have participated far more enthusiastically in general 
society than Mill, living for part of each year ‘at a pleasant house in South Hampstead, in 
the midst of quite a little colony of artists and literary people’, attending and hosting 
parties (‘The Literary Mirror’ 350). Caird’s participation in society life did not stop her 
from being extremely critical of ‘the washed-out flattened humanity of the British 
drawing-room’ (One That Wins 1: 146), however. While Mill rejects the world of small 
talk, Caird examines its complexities, offering as an alternative to its rituals and 
superficiality an extraordinarily well-worked-out ideal of meaningful conversation 
between pairs and larger networks of people. Ever-present in her fiction is the contrast 
Mill establishes between harmful small talk or conventional phrases, and meaningful 
conversation. Several other of the themes in the Autobiography also underpin her work: 
the association of walking and outdoor spaces with productive talk; conversation on an 
adult level (in One That Wins one of the characters refers scornfully to the ‘Bedlamite 
tongue reserved for intellectual communication with infancy’, 90); attention to the 
intricacies of language and the precise meanings of words, and perhaps most 
importantly, the image of conversation warming ideas into life and activity. The way in 
which Caird’s characters conform to or deviate from the Millian ideal of mutuality in 
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verbal exchange, including Bain’s version, of it is always indicative of their morality and 
intelligence. The detailed readings which follow attempt to trace all of these threads 
through Caird’s stories. 
 
5.3 ‘A medley of broken phrases’ in Whom Nature Leadeth 
Mona Caird’s first novel Whom Nature Leadeth, published under the pseudonym 
G. Noel Hatton in 1883, establishes many of the prevailing themes in her later fiction. 
Caird’s heroine is Leonore Ravenhill, an heiress who struggles to reconcile her 
intellectual curiosity and love of freedom with the conventional values repeatedly 
impressed upon her. Both aspects of Leonore’s psychology evoke passages in Mill’s 
writing. Her openness to new ideas and experiences calls to mind Mill’s description of a 
cultivated mind in Utilitarianism. Throughout Caird’s fiction, perceptive and sensitive 
characters are interested in nature, art, history and public-spiritedness, but they are 
also very aware of the disconnection between their own outlooks and those of narrow-
minded and conformist people around them. In Whom Nature Leadeth, Leonore’s 
hunger for knowledge and experience is shown to be in tension with inclinations 
towards flirtation and vanity. This recalls Mill’s description in Subjection of how women 
are trained to devote too much time to making themselves attractive to men. During the 
course of the novel Leonore’s world contracts. From the possibilities represented by 
pursuit of her talent for painting, she becomes mired in domestic and maternal 
responsibilities. This is represented in her dialogue: at the start of the novel she speaks 
out impulsively against restrictions to her freedom but towards the end she has been 
reduced to socially acceptable wit and epigram infused with bitterness. Leonore’s 
relationships with three suitors – Crawford Stephens, George Meredith (it seems that no 
comparison to the real-life novelist was intended) and Austin Bradley – are 
characterised by the level of communication she can achieve with each. The novel also 
features numerous subplots which explore unhappy relationships between men and 
women. Each of the couple’s discontents are revealed through their conversational 
traits. Thus Josephine’s open-minded attitude to travel and culture, and her disposition 
to talk through her problems, is contrasted with her fiancée’s destructive gambling 
addiction, and his reluctance to communicate his debt problems with her. Alfred Leigh 
is a man who has become withdrawn and reluctant to talk by marrying a woman devoid 
of all personal interests. Estelle Leigh’s early training in securing a wealthy husband is 
166 
 
blamed for her vacuousness. On a light-hearted but pointed note, Lady Alderstone 
discourages her husband from pursuing and discussing his avocation for insects: ‘the 
one pursuit which led his thoughts from the pettiness of self and selfish pleasures to the 
problems and mysteries of nature’ (2: 85). 
Leonore’s young life takes the form of a confrontation with her Machiavellian 
stepmother Mrs Ravenhill. Denied a constructive outlet for her power, Mrs Ravenhill 
finds every opportunity she can to assert it illegitimately: her interventions in the lives 
of her social circle were ‘a masterpiece of management, combining delicate yet firm-
handed adjustment of the finest modes of speech and action’ (2: 152). She cultivates her 
husband’s dependence on her opinions and uses her sway to suggest her much older 
brother as a suitable husband for Leonore. The potential for this type of misplaced 
female energy and ambition is one of Mill’s concerns in Subjection, and he suggests that 
equality of vocational opportunities would eliminate such abuse of power within 
families. Mrs Ravenhill only becomes seriously interested in Leonore when she becomes 
of marriageable age. Until this point Mrs Ravenhill ‘used to amuse herself by exciting the 
child to talk upon any subject that came uppermost’ (1: 29). Paradoxically, as the 
accepted method of educating girls is so defective, her stepmother’s lack of care for her 
charge as a child has a beneficial effect on Leonore’s mental development. Therefore 
when she attempts to control her stepdaughter as a young woman, Leonore speaks out 
spontaneously in Millian phrases, saying to her stepmother: ‘“Do you want to curtail my 
liberty, regulate my coming and going, chalk out my thoughts for me, and draw a map of 
my future feelings?’” (1: 19). Mrs Ravenhill’s response is to quote the epigraph to 
Madame de Staël’s Delphine (1802), which Mill draws attention to in Subjection: ‘Un 
homme peut braver l’opinion, une femme faut [Mill says ‘doit’] s’y soumettre’ (1: 19–20, 
Subjection 498). Leonore declares: ‘“I will give the lie to that clever saying”’ (1: 20). 
Having had opportunities to form her own opinions as a child, Leonore can articulate 
her desire to disprove the idea that men can brave public opinion while women must 
submit to it. She draws attention to the misleadingly epigrammatic expression of a 
restrictive sentiment. Her bold and direct statements also implicitly challenge 
apparently innocuous aphoristic language which hides harmful judgements within it. In 
Millian terms she is defying the dead dogma of inherited language. The fact that she has 
arrived at her opinions independently and speaks them with conviction means that she 
expresses herself in a living language.  
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Mrs Ravenhill’s treatment of Leonore as a child establishes another theme which 
Caird returns to repeatedly: the difference between those who are in earnest when they 
speak and those who joke out of malevolence, indifference or thoughtlessness. What is 
serious to Leonore is a game to Mrs Ravenhill and her companions, whose coarseness is 
barely covered by a veneer of social etiquette. Caird’s contemporaries did not perceive 
her to be an author without a sense of humour. Indeed, a contemporary reviewer of The 
Wing of Azrael remarked: 
It is a tragedy, and the note of gloom and misery is struck constantly 
throughout the book from the fascinating opening to the terrible close; yet 
it is so lightened with a never-ending play of humour and with such acute 
and delightful depicture of nature and humanity, that it may be read with 
keen enjoyment even by those who hate tragic stories. (‘The Literary 
Mirror’ 350) 
However, Caird was ever alert to the exhibition of cruelty through laughter. This may be 
another reason that she found so much affinity with Mill’s writings. In Subjection, for 
example, he argues that the situation is so dire and the ill-effects so keenly felt by so 
many women, that humour is insulting and undermines the urgency of the need for 
change. Mill deliberately juxtaposes ‘lovers of fun’ or ‘those who find it easier to draw a 
ludicrous picture of what they do not like, than to answer the arguments for it’ with ‘the 
dull and hopeless life’ many women are reduced to (580). Bain noted that Mill’s sense of 
humour was of the sympathetic rather than the mocking kind, and that he was unable to 
render it in well in writing and so did not attempt to do so (John Stuart Mill 189–90).  
In Whom Nature Leadeth, Leonore goes to live with her relatives, the Merediths, 
a family who are disposed to treat most people ‘with familiar jibes and jeers’ (1: 5). In 
the clamour of the Meredith household, where conversation is as savage as fox hunting, 
Caird’s passionate opposition to animal cruelty and her belief in the value of free 
discussion are brought together:  
It was very seldom that the most dextrous member of the family, much 
less Mrs Meredith, succeeded in finishing a sentence of any length; the old 
lady spoke slowly, and her daughters spoke quickly, so that she was, as 
they technically expressed it, ‘quite out of the hunt’... . Then the 
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conversation again closed in, becoming a medley of broken phrases, 
impossible to reproduce. (1: 81) 
In a drawing room where conversation resembles hounds barking and yelping as they 
close in on a fox, self-improvement is impossible.7 Not only is there no chance for ideas 
to be brought to fruition before they are killed off, dissentient opinions are laughable: 
There was a feeling of stagnation in this constant intercourse with one set 
of people; in the evitable sameness of opinion, of language, even of jokes ... 
She felt it would be a relief if only someone would appear and rudely 
disagree with the whole family. But after all, of what avail? For the 
Merediths would regard a person who differed from them seriously as too 
puerile to oppose. They would endeavour rather to draw out that quaint 
and harmless lunatic, assembling to enjoy together the grotesqueness of 
his delusions. (1: 176–7) 
Here Caird considers how people wield power by their flexibility and quick-wittedness 
in speech, by the speed and effectiveness with which they can put thoughts into words. 
The Merediths, however, give nobody a chance to fully work through their thoughts, 
breeding an atmosphere of homogeneity, desperately in need of a serious opponent or 
devil’s advocate to unsettle their complacency. Caird’s image of broken phrases can be 
applied to Leonore’s plight: her bold statements are eventually broken down into trite 
remarks.  
Caird provides another striking portrait of dysfunctional conversation in Whom 
Nature Leadeth. The figure of Mrs Bleek is a mixture of Millian ideas. She is represented 
as a woman whose originality and intellectual ability have been stunted by conversing 
with less intelligent people than herself. Her mental power still seeks an outlet, though, 
                                                 
7 If Caird was aware of Mill’s reputation for kindness to animals, as discussed in chapter three, then this 
must have added to his appeal as a touchstone for her. She would surely have approved of the way Morley 
linked Mill’s concern for women’s rights with his concern for animal rights in his centenary piece for the 
Times Literary Supplement: ‘The same wrath that blazes in him when he is asked to use glozing words 
about the moral atrocities of Nature to man, breaks out unabated when he recounts the tyrannical 
brutalities of man to woman. Nor even did the flame of indignation burn low, when he thought of the 
callous recklessness of men and women to helpless animals – our humble friends and ministers whose 
powers of loyalty, attachment, patience, fidelity so often seems to deserve as good a word as human or 
better’ (174). 
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and this results in a lifetime of sophisticating: ‘Mrs Bleek shut herself away from all 
fresh influences, exerting her very originality in forming ingenious explanations of 
manifold revered but irrational doctrines’ (2: 237). Mrs Bleek’s contributions to group 
discussions therefore command attention, but for all the wrong reasons: 
... by dint of taking up audacious positions, entirely ignoring the point, 
together with a system of wildly inapposite repartee, she generally 
managed to have the laugh on her own side. The rest of the party sat 
watching the fray in rapt attention. The combatants were well matched; 
Crawford’s stubborn materialism and stern logic being pitilessly teased 
and tormented by the erratic fancies of his adversary, and by the sudden 
attitudes of moral elevation to which she resorted when driven into a 
corner. ... It would be hard to state the subject of the discussion, for Miss 
Bleek’s strategical methods rendered a line of connected argument on one 
topic impossible, but it ran towards the original question of good and evil 
... . (2: 242–3) 
Leonore explores different possibilities for escape from such damaging conversation. 
Crawford Stephens is the friend with whom she first has the opportunity to indulge ‘the 
luxury of verbal expression’, walking and talking with him despite her stepmother’s 
accusations of impropriety (1: 26). However, Crawford’s scepticism means that he 
cannot see past the element of coquetry in Leonore’s confidences and she senses that he 
does not take her completely seriously. Leonore seeks conversations which transgress 
class boundaries, and has ‘extraordinary discussions’ with the gardener about ‘Rhine 
wines, black-beetles, life after death, and Heaven knows what ...’ (1: 190–1). Her 
encounters with the gardener, however, are merely offered as a suggestion and not 
pursued in depth as a serious possibility. It is with the writer Austin Bradley that 
Leonore finds engrossing discussion and a sense of intellectual equality. On a journey to 
London their conversation progresses like the train itself: ‘It swam swiftly and smoothly 
on, each word and tone instantly conveying its meaning, as if, for the time being, the two 
minds had actually become one’ (2: 230). With Austin she discovers the pleasures of 
mutual understanding; each perceives a perfect connection between what is thought 
and what is said. In contrast, Leonore’s conversation with her cousin George is 
ominously halting and awkward. He struggles to keep pace with the flow of her 
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thoughts. Like Caird, Leonore pays close attention to verbal exchange: ‘She was fond of 
studying the formation and expression of ideas, she told George. Some people let them 
ooze lazily out without superintendence – these were generally stupid people. Others on 
the contrary, appeared to take pride and pleasure in their fit: they liked to feel the 
vigorous grasp of two colliding minds’ (1: 198). Despite their obvious mismatch 
intellectually and conversationally, Leonore convinces herself that George belongs to 
the second category of people and marries him.  
Marriage, motherhood, and frustrated artistic ambition then petrify Leonore’s 
yearnings to voice different ideas, and damage her cerebral relationship with Austin. 
When Austin sees Leonore in the domestic role she has taken on he initially 
misinterprets her demeanour: ‘She was entirely self-possessed, and had plenty of 
brilliant small-talk. Sometimes a witty little epigram would escape her, though it was 
always given with such grace and suavity that few people noticed its bitterness. As 
Austin had prophesied, Leonore had fallen into to her position, and became it 
admirably’ (3: 235). In response to this, Austin becomes a spokesperson for Millian 
liberty, articulating the concepts which came so readily to Leonore at the beginning of 
the novel, challenging her and his sister Patricia to recognise the underlying social 
reasons for their behaviour and doing all in his power to entreat them to change. The 
novel ends with a wide-ranging conversation between Austin and Leonore, which takes 
place beside the sea, Caird’s favourite liminal space. It is the Millian model of male–
female friendship, but ultimately, with Leonore married to George, it cannot be mutually 
beneficial, and Austin heads off to satisfy his ‘world-hunger’ (298). Despite the collapse 
of Leonore’s ambitions and opportunities, the last chapter does point to a way forward. 
The conversation is of the most serious, searching kind, going to the foundations, 
seeking for the deepest meanings and a clearer understanding of the way to live. 
Leonore is left with the consolations of philosophy rather than the emptiness of 
epigram. 
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5.4 One That Wins: ‘think only of the thing said’ 
Caird’s 1887 novel, One That Wins, is sometimes reminiscent of Henry James’s 
novella of 1878, ‘Daisy Miller’. Set mostly in Rome, the plot revolves around Launcelot 
Sumner’s relationships with the passionate but troubled artist Oenone and the 
seemingly unremarkable Nelly Erskine. Nelly’s willingness to talk to the hall-porter 
recalls Daisy Miller’s rapport with her courier; the way her volubility is misread by her 
social circle, including her eventual husband Launcelot, evokes Daisy’s enigmatic 
qualities. Like Leonore in Whom Nature Leadeth, Nelly is caught between the desire to 
expand her intelligence and the urge to behave in an accepted way. Her interlocutors 
therefore detect unevenness in her conversation and she is misunderstood and 
underestimated: her startling comments are dismissed as humourous nonsense and her 
seriousness is mistaken for frivolity. One That Wins has, however, perhaps the most 
optimistic and positive tone of Caird’s novels and finishes on a very different note to 
‘Daisy Miller’ and indeed Whom Nature Leadeth. The ending of Caird’s novel is 
inconclusive, but suggests a domestic arrangement achieved through open discussion, 
involving Nelly, Launcelot and Oenone, which will enable one of ‘a thousand possible 
unions of spirit’ with the potential to ‘fill the world with freshness and joy’ (3: 149). 
Instead of female characters focalised through the view of a male narrator as in ‘Daisy 
Miller’, the narratorial mode of One That Wins is established on a much broader basis, 
purporting to a kind of documentary style, recording moments of conversation that 
would otherwise be forgotten and allowing readers to eavesdrop. Thus One That Wins 
opens with Launcelot and his friend Joe Hazlitt and ‘a random dive into the stream of 
their conversation’ (1: 7). This demonstrates Launcelot’s generous nature, in contrast to 
his friend’s ‘immovable definiteness of view’ which ‘rendered it impossible to engraft 
upon his mind any really foreign idea’ (15). The image of engrafting strongly recalls 
Mill’s image of intellectual development in his Autobiography: integration and 
accommodation of different viewpoints by constantly weaving anew the fabric of his 
opinions. In this open-minded mode, Launcelot is captivated by both Oenone and Nelly 
as speakers. Conversing with them leads him to modify his view of the world in different 
ways.  
Launcelot’s conversations with Nelly and Oenone also draw on the idea Mill 
expresses in On Liberty that ‘There must be discussion to show how experience is to be 
interpreted ... .Very few facts are able to tell their own story, without comments to bring 
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out their meaning’ (25). Oenone’s conversation with Launcelot, in which she relates 
how her stepmother stifled her own and her father’s artistic and intellectual 
development, is a meaningful exchange. Both she and Launcelot interpret the effects of 
her past experiences on her present life, and the process is initially a cathartic one for 
Oenone, though it becomes unsettling. Oenone appreciates the way in which Launcelot 
breaks with traditional expressions of romantic love and refrains from complimenting 
her beauty. Lancelot listens respectfully and is able to make connections between 
Oenone’s inner and outer life. Oenone can talk freely to Launcelot, but switches to a 
rigid observation of etiquette when her studio is opened up to the general society of 
Rome. Talking to Oenone makes ‘the world anew’ for Launcelot in both positive and 
negative ways (1: 55). Oenone’s ability to narrate the events of her own life has a 
powerful effect on him. He recognises her potential to influence others with her 
eloquence, but is shocked by her frank statements about the indignities of her marriage. 
Convinced by Oenone’s suggestion that Nelly is intellectually lightweight, 
Launcelot is startled by her burgeoning resistance to her conventional upbringing when 
he talks to her for the first time. Unexpectedly, as Nelly endeavours to expand her own 
view of the world, she provokes new insights for Launcelot: ‘Previous unregarded hints 
that he had met in reading, in conversation, flashed back upon his memory, no longer 
dead and unmeaning, but clothed with vivid significance. Nelly had become their 
unconscious interpreter’ (1: 137). Throughout One That Wins the power of discussion to 
translate previous experience into something more meaningful for the future is 
emphasised. While Launcelot is attracted to Oenone’s potential as an artist, with Nelly 
he is sympathetic to her struggle to make the most of an average intellect. Nelly is aware 
of her limitations, but striving to be the best that her capabilities will allow. The 
potential Launcelot sees in Nelly recalls the ending of Middlemarch when George Eliot’s 
narrator says of Dorothea: ‘the effect of her being on those around her was incalculably 
diffusive: for the growing good of the world is partly dependent on unhistoric acts’ 
(785). Others also find conversation with Nelly productive in modest ways: her suitor 
Sir Rupert gets practical ideas for his philanthropic projects from her and she draws 
Launcelot’s narrow-minded friend Joe Hazlitt beyond his ‘half-scoffing habit of speech’ 
and his ‘veil of slang and cynicism’ (3: 156, 173). 
A moment of class consciousness punctuates Nelly and Launcelot’s relationship 
when she tells him that she dislikes people of their own class because of the 
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homogeneity of their views. Though Launcelot assures her that he is committed to 
making friendships which pay no heed to class boundaries, this is not sustained 
throughout the novel. Later on, in an effort to reassure Nelly about her powers of 
perception, he insists that the peasants of an Italian village have no consciousness of the 
sublime qualities of the landscape in which they live. In contrast, Nelly has a full 
appreciation of its beauty, sparking her complex trains of thought. Echoing Mill’s 
famous dictum that ‘it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied’ 
(Utilitarianism 140), Launcelot tells Nelly ‘“Once realize what the curtailment of 
consciousness means, and no one can wish for it who does not wish to lose his 
personality’” (2: 167). For both Nelly and Launcelot, lessening of consciousness is bound 
up with the claustrophobia of uncommunicativeness. As they talk beside a fountain, 
Nelly contemplates the drops on the surface of the water: ‘They were like human lives, 
she thought, each so round and individual, till, in a moment, the form breaks up, and the 
bubble melts into the general tide. But why that fevered little journey across the basin, 
why that dividing into drops, if the end of it all was merely this ruthless submerging?’ 
(2: 170). The communicative connection she has with Launcelot, she realises, means 
sympathy and happiness in a way which gives purpose to life and makes her 
individuality reconcilable with contemplation of non-existence. Life without the 
transformative potential of talking to Launcelot would be akin to death: like being 
‘closed in with walls of silence’ (172). 
Dialogue between the female characters in One That Wins is also constructive. 
Caird introduces the comic figure of Miss Goblin who facilitates the freest of discussion: 
Those evenings at the pension had a flavour quite their own; there was a 
refreshing absence of personality in the conversation, an atmosphere of 
mutual respect and generous feeling which gave a sense of spiritual 
expansion, and a delightful vividness of feeling to all were susceptible to 
these subtle influences. Nelly’s whole nature, mind and heart, opened like 
a flower to the sunshine. (2: 158). 
Miss Goblin is also Oenone’s confessor and ‘safety valve’ allowing her to say whatever 
she pleases when she becomes frustrated by the need for moderation in speech and 
behaviour (1: 44). She is plain-speaking and sincere, offering Oenone the consolations of 
philosophy, as Austin does to Leonore in Whom Nature Leadeth, and reminding her that 
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the mark of a true connection between people is the ability to talk through difficult 
issues: ‘“there is no more certain sign of distance between two persons than the 
banishment of all painful topics from their talk”’ (2: 58–9). 
Oenone thinks that life with Nelly will be silence and darkness for Launcelot, but 
the novel ends with a creative, liberating conversation between the two women, which 
is revelatory, consolatory and developmental. Oenone seeks to be Nelly’s mentor, 
breaking through the crust of her early training and raising her some way to Launcelot’s 
intellectual level. Still underestimating Nelly’s abilities, Oenone tells her: ‘“... I want you 
to try and put the thing I say to your mind and your heart, not to your social instincts 
and sense of propriety. Don’t think who it is that says it, or how, or why, or how 
extraordinary; think only of the thing said”’ (3: 192, Caird’s emphasis). Real 
conversation is considering the force and sense of the thing said, rather than who says 
it, its strangeness to our ears, our assumptions about the speaker’s motivations or what 
we have been educated to believe is normal. This opens the way for new modes of 
living. Caird also foregrounds the rarity of the skill of active listening. Nelly 
acknowledges that Oenone’s words cause her to think more deeply and to develop 
intellectually; however, the process is not just one way. Nelly reminds Oenone that 
there needs to be practical application of knowledge gained through talking: 
‘“Remember we are in a real world of desperate issues ...”’ (3: 192). 
 
5.5 The Wing of Azrael and ‘the disease of words’ 
In The Wing of Azrael, published in 1889, it is the desperate issues which come to 
the fore: the novel ends with Viola Sedley stabbing her abusive husband Philip 
Dendraith and then committing suicide. The Wing of Azrael explores what happens 
when ideas and discussion are suppressed and language becomes a destructive force. 
The central character Viola is, in Millian terms, one of those people with ‘promising 
intellects combined with timid characters’ (On Liberty 36). As discussed in previous 
chapters, Mill equates sensitivity with spirit, passion, leadership and the ability to 
inspire others: a woman with a nervous temperament betrays latent talent. Viola’s 
timidity is the result of a deficient education. Her mother is passively obedient to 
Christian morality recalling both On Liberty, when Mill argues that most people derive 
their creed from the people around them, and his essay on ‘Theism’ (1874) when he 
juxtaposes ‘thoughtful unbelievers’ with ‘unthoughtful believers’ (126, 138). She is also 
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unfailingly submissive to her husband and the Sedley household is therefore one of 
silenced discussion. Mrs Sedley tries hard to pass on her received opinions about 
religion to Viola. However, Viola’s response to reading the Bible, and to watching the 
wildlife in her garden, is to be filled with a tumult of questions, putting her firmly in 
Mill’s ‘thoughtful unbelievers’ category. Encouraged by her mother to suppress her 
questions about religion and nature, Viola internalises her sensitivity to cruelty and 
suffering: ‘she wondered as painfully as ever at the strange conflict and struggle of 
Nature, though she closed her lips and let the problem eat deeper and deeper into her 
soul’ (1: 14–15). Though Mrs Sedley consciously aims to crush Viola’s questioning spirit, 
she succeeds only in limiting her ability to articulate her thoughts. Other clever girls in 
the novel, such as Adrienne Lancaster, are shown to adopt accepted and customary 
forms of speech in order to provide an outlet for their intelligence. Viola, however, has a 
keen sense of the disjunction between ordinary phrases and their true meaning. As a 
consequence she is left incapable of speech at decisive moments in her life. When faced 
with Viola’s pained silences, both her father and Philip Dendraith attempt to make her 
parrot their words. When her father demands to know whether or not she will accept 
Philip’s proposal of marriage he lambasts her for her silence, taunting her for being the 
result of the inadequate education with which he has provided her. Her ‘somnambulistic 
repetition of her father’s words ... brought down upon her head a series of consequences 
for which she was totally unprepared’ (2: 3). Caird’s portrayal of Viola movingly 
captures the feeling of powerlessness in childhood which can result from an inability to 
verbalise thoughts and feelings. She then turns her attention to the terrifying 
repercussions of an education which does not allow for progression beyond this state in 
adulthood. 
The formative event of Viola’s childhood is an enactment of Mill’s observation 
that ‘Men do not want solely the obedience of women, they want their sentiments. All 
men, except the most brutish, desire to have, in the woman most nearly connected with 
them, not a forced slave, but a willing one; not a slave merely, but a favourite. They have 
therefore put everything into practice to enslave their minds’ (Subjection 436). Having 
broken free of her claustrophobic home Viola is wandering on the cliffs. Here she 
happens upon Philip Dendraith, in conversation with Harry Lancaster and Caleb Foster. 
Unable to enter into discussion with anyone, Viola’s intellectual curiosity manifests 
itself in listening secretly to others. When her pet dog betrays her presence, Philip 
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physically restrains her, declaring: ‘“it is of no use fighting, for I am stronger than you; 
but I don’t want to make you stay here against your will; I want you to stay willingly, 
and to say that you forgive me, and that you like me very much”’ (1: 92–3). Even when 
Philip is more subtle in his approach to Viola, attempting to distract her by ‘cleverly 
spinning stories’, she remains aware of the disconnection between his charming 
manners and his capacity to laugh at suffering (1: 95).  
Later in the novel, his ‘honeyed phrases’ (2: 17) are contrasted to his capacity for 
cruelty towards a frightened horse. As Viola struggles to escape from Philip she 
accidentally pushes him over the cliff-edge on which he is perched. Harry, in an attempt 
to search for Philip, becomes stranded on a ledge of rock, while Caleb Foster continues 
the search. Harry, concerned for Viola’s wellbeing suggests that she communicates with 
him by throwing pebbles if she can hear him. This ‘pebble language’ represents the way 
accepted forms of language can conspire to silence and repress individuality: the stones 
are worn by the waves until they all appear the same (1: 110). Later in the novel, Harry 
puts this in even stronger terms, by speaking of conventional language as a devouring 
and destructive force. He speaks sadly to his friend Sibella of the division which he now 
feels from his sister Adrienne, after the openness of their childhood communications: 
‘“She belongs to that vast band who suffer from what I call the disease of words; who are 
eaten up by words, as some wretched animal is devoured by parasites. Adrienne 
pronounces to herself (for instance) the word ‘duty’ or ‘right’ and lets it fasten upon her 
soul and feed there as a leech”’ (201, emphasis in original). This striking image seems 
like an elaboration of Mill’s warning about what happens when opinions become 
habitual: 
The words which convey it, cease to suggest ideas, or suggest only a small 
portion of those they were originally employed to communicate. Instead 
of a vivid conception and a living belief, there remain only a few phrases 
retained by rote; or, if any part, the shell and the husk only of the meaning 
is retained, the finer essence being lost. (On Liberty 45) 
In Caird’s re-imagining of this concept, the disconnection between words and their true 
meaning becomes even more frightening, actively threatening health and survival. 
Philip survives his cliff-edge plummet and cultivates Viola’s guilt as she grows up, 
eventually bullying her into marrying him. Philip uses his cold and unfeeling mastery of 
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language to dominate and subdue. Viola is as unequal to his verbal onslaught before 
their marriage as she is to his sexual violence after it. He is the type of power-loving 
domestic tyrant Mill describes in Subjection, delighting as much in her speechlessness as 
her physical subjugation. As a married woman, individual words take on unwonted 
significance: ‘Freedom was an unknown word; the only words that ruled in that red-hot 
Purgatory were right, duty, submission’ (2: 169).When Viola is finally forced to attempt 
to use her own words, Philip maintains that he cannot understand her nonsense talk.  
The Wing of Azrael offers various alternatives to the domineering figures of Mr 
Sedley and Philip Dendraith. Harry Lancaster is funny, provocative and empathic. Able 
to recognise his own fallibility, but willing to dare an extreme opinion, Harry uses 
conversation to provoke, stimulate and advise. While Philip laughs at suffering, Harry’s 
sense of humour has a positive role. In his verbal sparring with the witty but superficial 
Lady Clevedon, he uses comedy to challenge her most cherished convictions in a non-
threatening way, seeking to pin down the precise meaning of words such as ‘gentleman’. 
In his attempts to rescue Viola from her desperate situation, his language becomes 
increasingly reminiscent of Mill’s. Harry’s words are straightforward and truthful, but 
also heartfelt and passionate. He tells Viola that he wants to find out what her true 
nature is: 
‘... I know that underneath the crust of your acquired sentiments there lies 
some feeling which responds to mine. We can break the loneliness and 
silence for each other; we can piece together some of our broken 
fragments, and be more clearly whole and sane, more nearly complete 
beings, together than apart. If the artificial crust has so far prevailed, yet I 
am sure that if I only had a fair chance to make you understand your own 
latent self, I should prevail ...’ (2: 70) 
Viola does not have the verbal resources to respond to what he says, replying that she 
can only cling to the ideas which she has been raised on. Viola’s life plays out the idea 
Mill expresses in Subjection and his essay on ‘The Utility of Religion’ of the often 
insurmountable difficulty in overcoming that which is deeply rooted – in ourselves from 
childhood, or in public opinion. Viola’s brother Geoffrey is nevertheless shown to 
develop over the course of the novel, moved by conversations with Viola to become 
more thoughtful. His education at Eton encourages a frivolous and carefree attitude to 
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life, in stark contrast to the austerity of Viola’s upbringing. After their mother’s illness 
and death they realise that they must reassess the religious convictions on which she 
raised them and reach their own conclusions: ‘The conversation was an epoch in 
Geoffrey’s life, and the strengthening of a new impetus in Viola’s. It was also the 
beginning of a friendship on fresh foundations between brother and sister, which 
entirely altered the development of Geoffrey’s character’ (3: 100). Caleb Foster is 
Caird’s most fully realised working-class character – a scholar and philosopher whom 
Harry has rescued from poverty. Caird conveys the sense in which there is more at stake 
for Caleb in ensuring rigorous discussion of the way to live, by the way he is 
‘persistently philosophic’, ‘taking up the lost thread of conversation with his usual 
pertinacity’ (1: 82, 1: 87). As a child, listening to Caleb excites Viola’s intellectual 
curiosity and as an adult she finds relief in being carried away into his ‘cold, clear, 
sorrowless world of “pure reason”’ (3: 80). It is Harry’s friend Sibella, though, who 
finally provides Viola with a true conversation: 
Before half-an-hour has passed Viola was speaking as she had never 
before spoken to a human being; her cheeks were flushed, her eyes burnt 
with excitement. The unwonted utterance had thrown a confused light 
upon her own emotions, while the comments of her companion, flinging 
brilliant cross-flashes, frightened and allured at the same time. (3: 7) 
In the end, Viola’s ‘heart stirred beneath its crust of acquired sentiment, but she felt as if 
she could curse the man and woman who had disturbed that crust, and awakened her to 
a new and more exquisite anguish’ (3: 67). Though she agrees to Harry and Sibella’s 
plans for leaving Philip, she falters because she cannot escape the deep-rootedness of 
the ideas of her subjugation. She responds to something in their entreaties, but has not 
made the ideas her own convictions through thought and experience.  
 
5.6 Short stories: ‘A Romance of the Moors’ and ‘The Yellow Drawing Room’  
Conversation causes a revolution in the lives of the characters in Caird’s 1891 
short story set in Yorkshire, which offers the art of conversation as a means of social 
mobility and intellectual development. It strikes a far more positive tone than The Wing 
of Azrael in that crusts of acquired sentiments are successfully broken through. Dick 
Coverdale is a farmer’s son who has been sent to the University of St Andrews. 
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Discontented with manual labour after he returns to work on the farm, Dick happens 
upon a book of Shelley’s poems. These are a revelation to him, making him feel less 
isolated. Just as reading Wordsworth allows Mill to recover from his mental crisis, the 
language of Romantic poetry gives Dick access to his feelings and the ability to describe 
them. In a dull and stifling social circle, where talk is of trivial local interest, Bessie’s 
pretty face stands out, and he mistakes the rapturous emotions the poetry has 
awakened in him for being in love with her. Dick considers how he might make Bessie 
happy, at the same time as recognising how she will restrict his progress. When he 
meets Mrs Ellwood, an artist and New Woman, walking on the moors, he has an 
awareness of class difference which he resents – he feels that she creates an ‘imaginary 
mental form’ for him (58). However, their dialogue breaks through the class barrier, 
disrupting Mrs Ellwood’s preconceptions, and transforming Dick’s solitary feelings into 
ones of hope. This story contains the memorable image quoted at the head of the 
chapter. Rather than writing a poem or painting a picture, Dick takes the stuff of his 
everyday life and translates it into artful talk. The image also stresses the exceptional 
skill involved in active listening. Dick’s parents expect him to marry Bessie and he 
confesses to Mrs Ellwood that he feels horribly trapped by this. She counsels him not to 
marry Bessie, for Bessie’s own sake. The story explores how Bessie’s desire for marriage 
exists through inexact language and masks of politeness and small talk. As Mill 
contends, conventions thrive through vague language – to give precision to your desires 
or objections is to overcome restriction. With Mrs Ellwood Dick exists in and through 
meaningful language, with Bessie he is outside of it. Dick tells Bessie he does not return 
his love and she becomes distraught, running off on the moors and causing a scandal 
among the ‘evil-speaking’ local gossips (181). Mrs Ellwood also counsels her, as Oenone 
does Nelly, advising her on how to act if she does marry Dick. In the end, Bessie says she 
will not marry him and Mrs Ellwood encourages her to pursue her own life, arguing that 
this will in fact bring her closer to Dick. Mrs Ellwood is direct and fluent in her speech, 
acting as counsellor and advisor to Bessie and Dick, bringing them to consciousness of 
the role of language in their life. 
In Caird’s 1892 short story, ‘The Yellow Drawing Room’ the floundering narrator 
St Vincent is discomposed by New Womanly eloquence rather than assisted by it. In 
contrast to her aunt’s visitors, who attempt to keep conversation within the bounds of 
propriety by not referring to the colour of the drawing room, and to St Vincent who 
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paces the terrace uselessly, Vanora is eloquent, speaking with passion, conviction and 
directness. She initiates and draws out the conversation between herself and St Vincent, 
striving to understand his position, but not without a sense of humour at his confused 
response to her unorthodox behaviour. St Vincent, on the other hand, is out of control 
conversationally, as his narration reveals: ‘I replied crazily’ (27), ‘I plunged headlong’ 
(28), ‘I pleaded like a lunatic, argued, urged’ (29). His desire to dominate Vanora is 
worthless because he can’t convincingly articulate it, only mutter it inaudibly: ‘“She shall 
love me, and she shall learn, through love, the sweet lesson of womanly submission”, I 
said to myself ...’ Where Vincent is discomposed by Vanora’s conversational mastery – 
and longs for the ‘conversational repose’ (24) that her quiet sister Clara would provide 
– she is clear-sighted in her interpretations of his doctrines and how they would 
translate into restriction of freedom and unhappiness. She also recognises that though 
St Vincent’s sentiments are deeply rooted, he is an inheritor rather than an adopter of 
those opinions: ‘they seem to me like soap-bubbles; full of emptiness’ (28). St Vincent’s 
wish to study his encounter with Vanora scientifically, brings ‘Daisy Miller’ to mind 
again, with its subtitle ‘A Study’. But though Vanora’s conversational prowess is 
narrated by St Vincent, it has the power to disrupt and unhinge in its sheer 
unconventionality. 
 
5.7 The Daughters of Danaus and the ‘Preposterous Society’ 
  Though The Daughters of Danaus tells the story of Hadria’s thwarted musical 
career, much of the novel depicts how she, like Vanora, demonstrates her artistry 
through her conversation. The first chapter focuses on a meeting of the Preposterous 
Society, a forum for debate among the Fullerton siblings. The name Preposterous 
Society points to four important issues within the novel which connect to both the 
arguments and rhetorical strategies of On Liberty and Subjection. First, the outrageous 
state of a society in which women are politically and socially subordinate. In Subjection 
Mill repeatedly draws attention to the disconnection between women’s subjection and 
the improving spirit of the age, declaring it to be ‘a monstrous contradiction to all the 
principles of the modern world’ (557). Second, the deep-rooted viewpoint that it is not 
the current arrangements, but the idea of changing them, that is nonsensical. Though 
the subjection of women is an anomalous component of modern life, Mill argues, it is 
also woven into people’s feelings to such an extent that ‘any departure from it quite 
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naturally appears unnatural’ (484). Third, the role of discussion in individuality, family 
life and wider society. Fourth, an insistence on the seriousness of the issue in the face of 
mockery and humour that constantly tries to undermine it.  
For Caird’s heroine Hadria, and her sister Algitha, discussion is a serious 
business because it is how they interpret their circumstances, define their position and 
decide what action to take. With the Preposterous Society, they formalise discussion 
because, like Caleb in The Wing of Azrael, so much is at stake for them. Though their 
brothers are part of this group, their role is more playful and flippant.8 The discussion 
the sisters have with each other, and later with their friends/mentors Professor 
Fortescue and Valeria Du Prel, is concerned with examining their own lives and how 
they fit into wider social arrangements. At the start of the novel discussion with her 
siblings precipitates Algitha’s decision to confront parental disapproval and leave for 
London to work with the poor. Much later on, a conversation between Algitha, Professor 
Fortescue and Hadria, which draws directly on the ideas in On Liberty about individual 
choice, culminates in an epiphany for Hadria, when she realises she has to leave her 
children and husband to pursue her musical career in Paris. The convictions she has 
gained through youthful discussion with her siblings in The Preposterous Society are a 
resource for her to draw on – part of her educated, upper-middle class identity that 
enables her to attempt to put her principles into action. Mill advises ‘He who knows only 
his own side of the case, knows little of that’ (On Liberty 42) and Hadria often 
deliberately steps into the role of devil’s advocate to bring about more searching 
discussion. As a result, Algitha admits to her brothers that she has changed the plan for 
her life by listening to Hadria’s ideas.  
More than just ‘Caird’s spokesperson of compassionate humanity and universal 
brotherhood’ as Heilmann has argued (New Woman Strategies 220), Professor 
Fortescue is Hadria’s friend and their relationship represents the benefits of a 
sympathetic and mutually beneficial male–female friendship grounded in intellectual 
equality. Professor Fortescue’s wide-ranging and inclusive interlocution is set against 
that of Hadria’s eventual husband, Hubert Temperley, whose conversation never 
descends below the surface. His speech betrays his closed-mindedness. Embodying the 
                                                 
8 The Preposterous Society inverts the normal order of precedence in the Fullerton family, just as the 
‘Shakespearean preposterous’ identified by Patricia Parker is concerned with ‘reversals of order, 
succession and sequence’ (196) – See ‘Preposterous Events’ (1992). 
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‘vague and general assertions’ which Mill says plague society (Subjection 492), ‘He 
swept away whole systems of thought that had shaken the world, with a confident 
phrase’ (77). Hubert says of Hadria and her siblings: ‘“They don’t know the real import 
of what they say”’ and then ‘hugged this sentence with satisfaction’ (134). Convinced of 
his own infallibility, Hubert perceives a disconnection between what they say and what 
they mean, when in fact it is his own words which are unreflectively uttered. Like The 
Wing of Azrael, this engages with a key argument in On Liberty about the characteristics 
of conventional language and how it is deployed to harmful effect. In The Daughters of 
Danaus, as in On Liberty, words should have a meaningful connection with a person’s 
inner life of reason and imagination. Heilmann has written about how Caird re-writes 
classical myth in The Daughters of Danaus, but the moment when Hadria lies ‘under a 
singular spell’ (137) also strongly recalls Mill in Subjection when he writes that if 
women had options other than marriage ‘few women, capable of anything else, would 
unless under an irresistible entraînement, rendering them for the time insensible to 
anything but itself, choose such a lot’ (501, Mill’s emphasis). Mill points out that just 
because most men do not take full advantage of their legal power over their wives, it 
does not mean that the law should remain unchanged. Hubert’s sister Henriette has 
coached him to engage with Hadria’s insistence on liberty by avowing that he won’t take 
full advantage of her legal subordination as his wife. However, Hadria recognises that 
there is a disconnection between what Hubert says and what the words actually mean 
and she is therefore compelled to ask him: “‘And you realise that I mean it, mean it, with 
every fibre of me”’ (142, Caird’s emphasis). 
In New Woman Strategies Heilmann argues that a ‘chorus of female voices’ (219) 
contributes to Hadria’s downfall. Reading the novel through a Millian lens it becomes 
clear that the main female characters each have a specific discursive role. Hadria has to 
contend with the ‘intellectual pacification’ of her mother’s banal domestic talk and the 
inane chitchat of her social group (On Liberty 38). Valeria, though opposing Hadria’s 
views is still an enabler of discussion – she is a sympathetic listener and more open-
minded than others. As with Hubert, there is a disconnection between what Henriette 
says and what she means, but she is more consciously engaged in persuading and 
manipulating Hadria. Having infiltrated the Fullerton family, Henriette insists on 
participating in a meeting of the Preposterous Society, oblivious to her incongruous 
appearance: ‘Henriette’s figure, in her well-fitting Parisian gown, looked singularly out 
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of place in the garret, with the crazy old candle-holder beside her, the yellow flame of 
the candle flinging fantastic shadows on the vaulted roof, preposterously distorting her 
neat form, as if in wicked mockery’ (123). Henriette has fitted herself into one of ‘the 
small number of moulds which society provides in order to save its members the 
trouble of forming their own character’ (On Liberty 72). She is therefore out of place in a 
forum for real discussion. Ill-equipped for real discussion on a basis of mutuality, 
Henriette has to retreat to a one-to-one discussion with Hadria in her own room, to 
narrow the opportunity for dissenting opinions which she cannot rebut. The really 
productive conversations in The Daughters of Danaus take place outdoors, in gardens 
and fields away from domestic restrictions. In Millian terms, Henriette, like Hubert, is an 
inheritor of opinions and Hadria is an adopter, so the result of both interactions is 
mutual incomprehension.  
Professor Theobald is the other character who talks to manipulate: he exploits 
ambiguity to skilfully flatter and seduce, by making lightweight utterances appear more 
interesting than they are. Caird explores how Hadria’s sexual attraction to Professor 
Theobald complicates her normal facility for negotiating the world through words. On 
the brink of being seduced she longs for clarifying conversation with Professor 
Fortescue to determine the moral acceptability of her infidelity. Eventually she brings 
the affair to a halt because of the way Professor Theobald compares unfavourably to 
Professor Fortescue: ‘Every cadence of their voices, every gesture, proclaimed the 
radical difference of nature and calibre’ (416). When Mill refers to ‘collision of adverse 
opinions’ in On Liberty (59) he is talking about people with equal seriousness and 
commitment to the debate, not collision between people who are in earnest and people 
who are playing, or attempting to manipulate their interlocutors. Collision of adverse 
opinions is an intellectual endeavour requiring ‘studied moderation of language, and the 
most cautious avoidance of unnecessary offence’ (On Liberty 61). However, discussion 
and debate is a game for the Fullerton brothers Ernest and Fred. While Hadria and 
Algitha contend with the weight of parental and societal expectation, their brothers are 
whimsical and light-hearted, they mock and laugh, secure in the knowledge of the 
choices that are open to them. They nevertheless demand that their sisters act in 
accordance with the convictions they have declared. Fred’s reaction to Hadria’s 
marriage leads to their estrangement: ‘For a long time he had regarded it all as a joke. 
He shook his head knowingly, and said that sort of thing wouldn’t go down. When he 
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was at length convinced, he danced with rage. He became cynical. He had no patience 
with girls. They talked for talking’s sake. It meant nothing’ (164).  
More than Caird’s other novels, The Daughters of Danaus also explores collision 
of opinion between people of different educational and social status. Servants are a 
troubling presence for Hadria as a frustrated artist, anticipating Virginia Woolf’s fraught 
relationship with her servants. Working class characters are representatives of the 
domestic worries which ultimately contribute to the ruin of Hadria’s musical ability. As 
such they are dismissed, mocked and inattentively engaged with. They are unwanted 
interruptions to Hadria’s edifying conversation with Valeria. Hadria’s problems are of 
an existential quality, as compared to the petty ‘manufactured’ problems of the cook 
(418). Hadria’s escape to Paris is predicated upon being accompanied by Martha’s nurse 
Hannah, to care for Martha and help with housework. While Martha’s intelligence is 
awakened by the trip, Hannah is too stupid to benefit from the new experience. Working 
class female characters are representatives of the domestic drudgery and sacrifice 
Hadria and Algitha must endure, rather than agents with similarly constricted 
opportunities.  
George Gissing’s 1893 novel The Odd Women is forthright on this breakdown of 
communication between the classes. Rhoda Nunn, a campaigner for women’s rights, 
unapologetically declares ‘“I think that as soon as we begin to meddle with uneducated 
people, all our schemes and views are unsettled. We have to learn a new language for 
one thing”’ (53). In The Daughters of Danaus an important counterpoint is provided by 
Professor Fortescue’s sympathetic inclusiveness: ‘“Poor cooks and dressmakers!”... 
“where are their serenities and urbanities?”’ (225, Caird’s emphasis). The most effective 
cross-class communication in the novel takes place between Hadria and the gravedigger 
Dodge. After Hadria’s marriage to Hubert he is the only person who ‘felt some curiosity 
as to the cause of a sadness in one so well treated by destiny’ (148) and their 
conversation is mutually consolatory. Though impeded in her attempts at expressing 
her artistry, Hadria’s ability to make sense of and create her life through discussion with 
others is ultimately hopeful and life-affirming. In On Liberty Mill emphasises the 
creativity of the process of conversation, the empathic skills it teaches: ‘the only way in 
which a human being can make some approach to knowing the whole of a subject, is by 
hearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and studying 
all modes in which it can be looked at by every character of mind’ (25). Even though he 
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is making the case for argument and logic – balanced, rational, calm, considered – he is 
also inadvertently making the case for imaginative work. And with Mill, as with Caird, 
argument is a vibrant, passionate force with life-changing power.  
 
5.8 ‘Leading questions’ in The Pathway of the Gods  
Caird’s 1898 novel The Pathway of the Gods explores many of the ideas in On 
Liberty and Subjection. It tells the story of a failed romance between Julian Ford and 
Anna Carrington. They meet in Rome fifteen years after they first knew each other, 
growing up in the stagnant environment of a small English town. Caird has both Julian 
and Anna assert the dictums of On Liberty to explain their decisions to break free from 
the restrictions of their upbringings in the face of family opposition. Julian thinks ‘One 
cannot live one’s life on other people’s motives’ (13) and Anna calls it ‘“the dreadful 
question”’: ‘“ought I to act on my own convictions, and see what life is and what I could 
do with it, before I died?’” (48). Anna notes and envies the greater freedom enjoyed by 
Julian in attempting to follow his own life plan. Anna’s family are pleased that she has 
given up youthful attempts ‘to make her living by journalism, or public speaking’ (18) 
and retreated to the domestic realm. Anna is in Rome as a governess-chaperone, while 
Julian has become a traveller and artist. Julian finds Anna’s intellectual abilities sadly 
reduced. Her story is the story of Mill’s women who ‘pine through life with the 
consciousness of thwarted vocations’ (Subjection 579). Nevertheless, Caird also 
considers how social arrangements have a harmful effect on men. 
Julian is so alert to Roman history that as he contemplates the city, visions of its 
past inhabitants appear to him. In Millian terms this is an exceptional skill, vital to 
understanding the present and striving to improve society: 
The truth is, that people of the present and the last two or three 
generations have lost all practical sense of the primitive condition of 
humanity; and only the few who have studied history accurately, or have 
much frequented the parts of the world occupied by the living 
representatives of ages long past, are able to form any mental picture of 
what society then was. People are not aware how entirely, in former ages 
the law of superior strength was the rule of life; how publicly and openly 
it was avowed ... (Subjection 477) 
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An acute awareness of the previous conditions of humanity pervades Caird’s fiction and 
in The Pathway of the Gods the reader has access to Julian’s mental pictures of bygone 
Roman brutality. He imagines the moment a gladiator meets his death: ‘“Habet! habet!” 
from thousands of lips were the last words in his ear, as his spirit passed away from the 
insults of the crowd’ (32). This is a terrifying realisation of Mill’s concern that 
‘individuals are lost in the crowd’ (On Liberty 73). The inexorable force of the crowd’s 
chanting and the victim’s voicelessness are in contrast to the transformational potential 
of one-to-one conversation, in this, as in all of Caird’s fiction. Just as the cry from the 
crowd signals the gladiator’s death, it is ‘one fatal sentence’ that causes Julian to be 
excluded from his family (13). After failing to establish himself in one of the occupations 
his family would like, he utters a ‘hapless motto’ (15): ‘For the vagabond shall inherit 
the earth’ (13) and jokingly sketches a coat of arms for the Vagabond family. Julian’s 
‘delicate jeer at the order of society in which his father lived and moved and had his 
being’ (15) enrages Mr Ford. ‘The absolutism of the head of the family’, which Mill refers 
to in Subjection (507) is the late-nineteenth-century equivalent of the absolutism of a 
Caligula or Domitian. There is no possibility of discussion between father and son about 
the course Julian’s life will take and with his father’s disapproval supported by an 
‘impacted group of uncles and aunts’, Julian is forced to leave the family home (15). 
While it is easier for Julian to negotiate his family’s expectations as a man – he is 
troubled by the idea of disappointing them, but not to the point of debilitating guilt – it 
is noteworthy that Caird explores the damaging effects of male familial tyranny on sons 
as well as daughters. 
 When Julian encounters Anna in Rome she tells him that she wanted ‘to teach 
women the secret of their wretchedness, and men the madness of their tyranny’ (96). 
Ironically, her frustrated ambition sounds exactly like the project of Subjection. Anna’s 
conversations with Julian about her life reveal that she has what Mill defines as spirit. 
People with a temperament of this kind, Mill says, are ‘particularly apt for what may be 
called the executive department of the leadership of mankind. They are the material of 
great orators, great preachers, impressive diffusers of moral influences’ (Subjection 
537–8). Anna recognises her power and how it has gone to waste: ‘“I wanted to be a 
speaker, to hold sway over the emotions of men and women – it is mere tilting at 
windmills to attack their minds! I had so much I wanted to say, so much that others had 
said that I wanted to send flying, with winged words, into the very hearts of my 
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generation!”’ (95) Instead of being a great orator, Anna, like Leonore in Whom Nature 
Leadeth, is forced to retreat into the kind of unintellectual society which Mill scorns in 
his Autobiography and to participate in trivial conversation which lowers the spirit and 
the intellect. She attracts attention within her social circle by the use of wit and epigram, 
and Julian regrets that this superficial mode of talk is a bar to more open and 
meaningful conversation with him. 
As the novel progresses, Anna demands of Julian an all-consuming, individuality-
denying love, which takes them even further away from the ideal of frank, mutual 
conversational exchange. Anna comes to rely on Julian’s conversation for intellectual 
pacification and emotional fortification, at the expense of his own well-being: ‘She 
looked to him now for what she called his “incantations”, and these must be provided 
whatever his own mood or preoccupations might be” (101). In the end, the complete 
breakdown of communication between them hinges on the different way each of them 
defines love: ‘“we ought to have exchanged our ideas on the subject, and not have gone 
on at cross purposes”’ concludes Julian (307). As Anna and Julian’s relationship 
deteriorates, the figures of Mrs Charnley and Clutha Lawrenson are introduced to the 
community of artists and socialites of which Anna and Julian are a part. For reasons 
which remain unclear, they decide to interfere in Anna and Julian’s relationship to 
prevent their marriage. Mrs Charnley is a kind of spiritual extremist who has ‘“no 
desires apart from her theories”’. Chapter XIX of the novel is a case study in how 
someone can manipulate a group discussion to convince others of her viewpoint: ‘Julian 
began to suspect that though apparently so fortuitous, the conversation was being 
skilfully guided by Mrs Charnley, who did no more than ask a leading question now and 
then’ (160–1). As the discussion develops: 
Julian’s impression strengthened that Mrs Charnley had been pursuing a 
Socratic method, by which she made her unconscious interlocutor 
establish, for her, the point which she wished to make clear. Not even the 
sudden sorties of Mrs Vincent could deflect her smooth line of 
progression. What her object might be was not easy to guess; but it was 
difficult to avoid thinking that it had some reference, direct or indirect to 
Anna and himself. (163) 
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Mrs Charnley knows when to talk and when to stay quiet, she makes well-timed, 
strategic interventions, magnetising the group, but not in an open and honest way: ‘She 
threw out suggestions: little barbed hints that pierced to the inner lines of thought; and 
in a moment seemed to undermine the fabric of our common work-a-day convictions’ 
(166). By the end of the novel, Anna is condemned to ‘suffering and solitude 
unspeakable’ (336). In New Woman Strategies Ann Heilmann struggles to reconcile the 
unsympathetic portrait of Anna, the ambiguous motivations of Mrs Charnley and Clutha, 
and the neo-pagan festival at the end of Pathway of the Gods with Caird’s feminist 
principles. The key to the novel perhaps lies in Anna’s statement that ‘We luckless 
beings of the transition period have to suffer the penalty of being out of line with the old 
conditions, before the new conditions have been formed with which we could have 
harmonised’ (316). Within such a transition period there will always be those who 
manipulate discussion, persuading, convincing and compelling others to take on views 
against their better judgments or in contradiction to their values. 
 
5.9 ‘Wild statements’ in The Logicians: An Episode in Dialogue  
In 1905 Caird published a short play which offers a more positive view of the 
Socratic method. Two men of science and rivals for Dorothy Lee’s love, Dr Catchpole and 
Professor Cooper are challenged about their experiments on animals by two anti-
vivisectionists and New Women, Mrs Langton and Mrs Cruncheon. Dorothy has been 
brought round to the campaigners’ point of view, much to the horror of her 
conventional, unquestioning aunt, Mrs Gibbins, and her friend Mrs Tresham. A third 
rival for Dorothy’s love, Bob Eccles, also becomes convinced of the campaigners’ 
arguments, revealing himself to be Dorothy’s ‘Ideal Man’: both receptive to new ideas 
and sympathetic to the plight of animals’ suffering. The play’s title calls to mind On 
Liberty when Mill points out the need for negative logic in the Socratic mode for 
‘convincing any one who had merely adopted the commonplaces of received opinion, 
that he did not understand the subject – that he had as yet attached no definite meaning 
to the doctrines he professed’ (50). Dr Catchpole and Professor Cooper assume their 
own infallibility in matters of science and seek to silence discussion. To placate Mrs 
Gibbins and Mrs Tresham, Dr Catchpole says: 
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The fact is, that the whole subject has been obscured by these hysterical 
agitators – Logic is in vain. You may take it from me, my dear ladies – I 
have had a large and intimate experience of laboratory practice – that 
there is not the slightest vestige of truth in the wild statements of these 
good people. Their assertions are the offspring of an inflamed 
imagination. Inspired by it, these enthusiasts – let us call them so in 
charity – do not hesitate to vilify an honourable profession, accusing us of 
the most atrocious crimes! (31) 
Like the New Woman, the animal rights campaigner is labelled extreme, disruptive, 
illogical and incapable of plain statements. The campaigners seek to reveal how the 
scientists obscure meaning themselves by use of authoritative but misleading 
statements. They turn the accusations of madness back on the scientists. As elsewhere 
in Caird’s work, and strongly recalling Mill in his ‘Nature’ essay, much attention is paid 
to establishing the precise meanings of words and phrases. There is a lengthy exchange 
about the meaning of the word ‘consistent’ and how it can be applied to people’s 
behaviour. By the end of the play the process of negative criticism has at least disrupted 
Miss Gibbins’s calm certainties and causes the scientists to retreat from their position of 
unassailable authority.  
 
5.10 Twentieth-century Novels: The Stones of Sacrifice and The Great Wave 
In The Stones of Sacrifice, published in 1915, but set in the 1890s, the 
protagonists Alpin Dalyrymple and Claudia Temple both find themselves alienated by 
their interactions with a society whose conversation features ‘haver’ and ‘blether’ 
(nonsense talk), ‘artless prattle’, ‘spiritual filibustering’, ‘baby-language’, ‘pitiful 
sentences’, ‘disjointed words’ and ‘sentimental phrases’.9 While the fellow residents of 
the small Scottish town of Culmore feel ‘pulled together again’ after hearing a rousing 
sermon in church, Alpin feels ‘miserably alien and cut off from his fellows’ (23). Alpin 
fully comprehends Claudia’s desire to leave her home only after he experiences the 
deadening effect of Lady Temple’s speech: ‘The mere sound of that loud, assured, 
prosaic voice sent scuttling to their hiding-places every living thought and feeling he 
had ever had! It left the world a blank; washed the colour out of everything’ (55). When 
                                                 
9 See pages 139, 141, 260, 339, 405, 420 and 452. 
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Claudia does escape to Paris to teach, the directive parents of her pupils leave her 
‘tongue-tied’ (87) and her romantic experiences leave her with an intense appreciation 
of the disconnection between words and their true meaning – between ‘expressed 
sentiments of actual worship’ and the promise of ‘ordinary stodgy domesticity’ (131). 
On her return to England she overhears a conversation between her brother’s friends 
which makes her think: ‘“Only a subject and despised race could be spoken of as those 
men spoke of us”’ (130). 
The Stones of Sacrifice juxtaposes the drawing room – where young women are 
advised by even the more open-minded older women to discuss unconventional 
thoughts about motherhood ‘in camera’ (77) – with a society for the discussion of 
socialism founded by Alpin, where he is expected to speak ‘ex cathedra’ (174). Alpin’s 
motivation for forming the discussion group is to discuss possibilities rather than 
promulgate foregone conclusions: ‘Socialism is a tendency, an idea, acting as a principle 
of growth, like the life-principle that guides the development of every living organism. 
Believing that the capitalist system is increasingly a failure, we are simply trying to 
suggest the gradual substitution of a less cut-throat idea’ (124, Caird’s emphasis). As the 
speakers at the Guild begin to emphasise the need for individuals to be sacrificed for the 
good of the race, Alpin realises their eugenic ideas are in direct opposition to his own 
views. Claudia is already unable to reconcile her love of liberty with ideas of self-
sacrifice. Their provisional proposals for socialism, which combine individual liberty 
with state regulation that safeguards the welfare of workers and members of the public, 
sound very much like Mill’s, who says in the Autobiography: 
The social problem of the future we considered to be, how to unite the 
greatest individual liberty of action, with a common ownership in the raw 
material of the globe, and an equal participation of all in the benefits of 
combined labour. We had not the assumption to suppose that we could 
already foresee, by what precise form of institutions these objects could 
most effectually be attained, or at how near or how distant a period they 
would become practicable. (175–6) 
In creating the Guild of the New Order Caird also recalls Mill’s fragmentary Chapters on 
Socialism (written in 1869 and published posthumously in 1879). In these, as ever, he 
pays much attention to the terms of the debate, suggesting that via ‘the press, public 
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meetings and associations’ (374) the widest number of working-class viewpoints must 
be taken into account. Repeating his call in Subjection for a discussion than goes down to 
the foundations of society, he insists on the inclusion of working class voices, because 
‘they will not allow anything to be taken for granted’ (375). Caird’s depiction of this type 
of forum pays attention to dissentient voices by including the character of Mr Scrase, 
who objects vociferously every time something is said in support of religion or the 
wealthy classes. The dominant views of the club become bound up with their mode of 
address which promotes style over substance. Recalling Vanora’s ‘soap bubbles’ in ‘The 
Yellow Drawing Room’, Alpin thinks of their speeches as composed of ‘rhetorical 
ragdolls’ (221), which dazzle with their eloquence thus obscuring ill-thought-out 
doctrines. 
As an alternative to the frustrations of general society and the one-sidedness of 
club debate, Caird offers the ‘creative, liberating process’ which Alpin and Claudia 
experience when they talk together. The effect of their conversation strongly recalls 
Mill’s description of life with Harriet. Like John and Harriet, Claudia and Alpin’s 
relationship is companionable, respectful and above all productively communicative. 
When the marry they live together in an unorthodox space, where they have meals 
together in a communal room, but have their own rooms for working and sleeping in. 
They conceive of the large central room in the flat as ‘a haven of peace and inspiration 
for all who entered it’ (377). The emphasis is on conversation: it becomes a space where 
people can talk fluently about their lives, vent their feelings and literally talk freely, 
without interruption. Again recalling Mill and Harriet, the novel ends with the focus on 
Claudia as Alpin’s counsellor, allowing him to ‘turn to his work for light and comfort: to 
the widening reaches of experience and faculty which that work was helping to discover 
and to add to the human inheritance’ (456). As he contemplates a Scottish landscape he 
feels ‘translated into a different order of experience’ (458). The idea of conversation as a 
means of translating or interpreting experience, seen in One That Wins and ‘A Romance 
of the Moors’ finds its most positive and hopeful expression in The Stones of Sacrifice. 
Caird’s final novel The Great Wave, was published in 1931, but is set just before 
the First World War. In the novel, free discussion is an important feature of the novel’s 
call for humane and responsible use of scientific developments. The Great Wave is the 
only piece of Caird’s fiction to refer directly to Mill. The novel’s central character, 
Grierson, consolidates his views on political liberty by reading either Subjection or On 
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Liberty: ‘Grierson, who had come across a book by John Stuart Mill on the subject, could 
not understand how any man who himself cared for freedom should desire to deny it to 
others, let alone be capable of treating those who asked for it with insult and ridicule’ 
(26). Typically for one of Caird’s protagonists, Grierson’s commitment to individual 
expression is problematic. As he challenges the stereotypes of masculine domination 
and aggression cherished by his family, his ‘very respect for their right to their own 
opinions, foolish though he deemed them, tended to hold him apart from a family who 
regarded opinions other than their own very much as a terrier regards a rat’ (403). 
Recalling the fox hunting image used to describe the Meredith’s conversation in Whom 
Nature Leadeth, this image of the terrier and rat demonstrates Caird’s enduring concern 
that suppression of opinion was a form of cruelty. 
As Grierson eschews his family’s tradition of military service in favour of 
scientific research, he is surrounded by conventional talk: his sister repeats ‘correct 
sayings’ (16), those around him pay ‘stupid deference to a musty old phrase about the 
“fighting instinct”’ (30), his social circle talk according to ‘a strictly standardized 
pattern’ (407). The novel’s scientific theme is extended to the damaging effects of small 
talk when Grierson worries that one of his interlocutors ‘has a genius for what might be 
termed, in technical phrase, “reducing the chemical potential of human conversation to 
the condition of unavailable energy”’ (211). The insidious effects of reductive small talk 
are considered alongside the dangers presented by obscure or misleading scientific 
terminology. After listening to a lecture on negative eugenics, advocating the view that 
‘the average and weakly must ever subserve the superior and the powerful’ (161), 
Grierson thinks that: 
Waldheim’s baldness of statement was to be welcomed. Keeping the 
brutal nature of the teaching hidden under scientific jargon and 
generalities – as English men of science almost always did – led to its 
getting mushed up by the Mrs Verrekers and so spreading, hopelessly 
bowdlerized – like a sugar-covered virus – to the general public. And the 
general public eventually decided the destinies of the world. (161) 
In her depiction of Grierson’s interactions with a community of scientists, Caird 
highlighted the vital importance of communicating specialist ideas to a wider audience 
in plain and accessible language.  
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As in all her previous novels, Caird contrasts unproductive conversation with the 
transformative potential of free discussion. After Grierson makes a discovery related to 
his ‘search for the power imprisoned in matter’ (340), he is overwhelmed by ethical 
considerations (the discovery is also obliquely referred to by an unscrupulous rival 
scientist as having to do with the development of ‘mechanical slaves, possessed of 
powers hitherto undreamt of’, 487). Grierson negotiates his scientific responsibilities 
regarding the discovery through discussion with Nora, a suffragist with a regard for 
‘their common humanity’ and a genius for ‘perfect companionship’ (336). Nora, like 
Claudia in The Stones of Sacrifice has a clarifying effect on his thinking: ‘Grierson caught 
his breath. She had put into words the faint hope that had lain at the back of his mind 
through all his ups and downs of elation and discouragement ... . Grierson felt as one 
sailing into harbour after a long and tempestuous voyage’ (340). Grierson and Nora’s 
relationship is a romantic one, but one founded on words: ‘he wanted to talk to her 
about everything in heaven and earth’ (347). Like Claudia and Alpin, and John and 
Harriet, theirs is a working partnership predicated on free discussion: ‘At last, after 
talking it over from every conceivable point of view and finding themselves exquisitely 
poised between tremendous pros and appalling cons, they decided to banish the subject 
(for the time) and let it soak into their minds’ (443).  
The novel’s epilogue describes Grierson’s malaise after his life has been 
shattered by the First World War – and here, too, free discussion is seen as an 
invigorating force. Nora deliberately takes the part of controversialist – ‘running amok 
among scientific dogmas to an alarming degree’ (509), encouraging a conversation 
about the misuse of scientific developments in order to restore Grierson’s drive for 
research: 
The Schopenhauer form of pessimism, backed up by the doctrine of the 
degradation of energy, had been too much for Grierson. It caused a 
reaction. And Nora’s wild suggestion of a possible recalling to life of the 
sleeping energy – coupled with her assertion of man’s power to possess 
himself and therefore his destiny – seemed to have broken the spell that 
held him and to have set the currents of his being flowing again. (512) 
194 
 
In response to the extremity of Grierson’s post-war depression, Nora abandons 
measured interaction and resorts to rhetorical tricks. The restorative effect these have 
on Grierson strongly recall Mill’s image of ideas warmed into life and activity. 
 
5.11 ‘What John Stuart Mill saw’: Caird’s Dialogue with Mill 
Though reviewers contemporary to Caird praised the wit and ‘never-ending play 
of humour’ in her prose, for the modern reader, there is also often an overwhelming 
impression of gloominess conveyed by narratorial intrusions which anticipate 
individual or relationship breakdown. The transformational potential of conversation is 
a powerful counterpoint to this melancholic tone. As the quotations from The Stones of 
Sacrifice and ‘A Romance of the Moors’ at the head of the chapter illustrate, Caird 
celebrates the pleasures of free conversation: the possibilities it offers for creativity and 
even for turning what is quotidian or painful into something artful. Though some of her 
characters delight in verbal manipulation or domination others appreciate the chance to 
listen, counsel or persuade. Origination, both in the sense of being the first to offer a 
new perspective, and in the sense of individuals thinking things through for themselves, 
is as central to Caird’s fiction as it is to Mill’s philosophy. Like Hardy, Caird’s recourse to 
Millian philosophy was strongly connected to individuals working out their ideas 
independently, rather than, as Mill would put it, unthinkingly inheriting the opinions of 
those closest to them.  
The phrase Caird used to describe her own childhood – her ‘scramble up’ – and 
her consequent need for self-education is important to bear in mind. After an 
inadequate education in childhood, many of Caird’s protagonists, both male and female, 
consciously take responsibility for their own learning, not through private study, but 
through discussion with others. Meaningful conversation gives time and space for 
development of ideas and individuality. This seems like an obvious enough statement, 
but the striking thing about Caird’s fiction is the way it consistently heeds Mill’s dead 
dogma/living truth warning (that a subject must be fully, frequently and fearlessly 
debated) in relation to free discussion itself. Caird did not see the life-long process of 
learning through talking as an obvious or inevitable event: her heroes and heroines self-
consciously seek out opportunities for such expansion. Drawing on Mill, Caird’s fiction 
offers discussion as a means for self-education, self-development and reconciling 
individual interests with the greater good. 
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6. Olive Schreiner’s John Stuart Mill:  
‘the purest & greatest soul God has yet given the English race’ 
 
About my feeling with regard to Jesus it is not strong in any way. But I deeply understand 
your feeling. The only man to whose moral teaching I am conscious of owing a profound 
& unending debt is John Stuart Mill; when I got home to Europe & found men & women 
whose views exactly coincided with indifference to his works or ridiculing them as old-
fashioned, it was keenly painful to me; because they had been the channels through 
which most of the spirit of current modern science reached me. 
Letter from Olive Schreiner to John T. Lloyd, 29 October 1892, lines 94–1011 
 
Olive Schreiner’s sensitivity to indifferent or unfavourable views of Mill among late-
nineteenth-century European intellectuals did nothing to diminish her own deep-felt 
regard for the philosopher. Charles Darwin may have transformed the ‘world of 
thought’, but Mill was ‘beloved’ (Thoughts on South Africa 336). Herbert Spencer was 
beloved, too, but where his First Principles (1862) had been an ‘intellectual aid’ to 
Schreiner, ‘Mill’s aid was directly spiritual’; in fact, reading Mill was even more 
spiritually enriching than reading Plato.2 Karl Marx’s ‘analysis of economic fact’ was far 
superior to Mill’s, but his ability to seek after the truth paled in comparison.3 As a young 
governess, Goethe meant more to Schreiner than any writer ‘except Mill’.4 When 
Schreiner wrote that the ‘most sacred spot’ in Europe was Heinrich Heine’s grave, she 
had to qualify her admiration for the German poet: ‘I don’t say he was the greatest man; 
he has never helped me or modified my life as Mill did’.5 Towards the end of her life, in 
1918, Schreiner was still writing of Mill in the most reverential terms. In a letter written 
to be read out at a commemoration meeting for Mill, she described him as ‘the noblest of 
those whom the English-speaking race has produced in the last hundred years’ and 
insisted on both the enormity of his achievements and the continued relevance of his 
works: ‘John Stuart Mill laboured for the freedom of Woman. But he did more. He 
                                                        
1 National Library of South Africa (NLSA), Cape Town, Special Collections, Olive Schreiner Letters Project 
transcription. Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations from letters are from the Olive Schreiner Letters 
Project (OSLP), an online, searchable archive of around 4,800 of Schreiner’s letters available at 
www.oliveschreiner.org. For readability, all citations from OSLP will be given in footnotes rather than 
parenthetically. 
2 OS to Betty Molteno, 24 May 1895, University of Cape Town (UCT), Manuscripts & Archives, OSLP 
transcription, 39–43, emphasis in original. 
3 OS to Betty Molteno, 24 May 1895, UCT, OSLP transcription, 25–32. 
4 OS to S.C. Cronwright-Schreiner, 15 June 1914, NLSA, OSLP transcription, 12–13. 
5 OS to Adela Villiers Smith née Villiers, 10 September 1906, NLSA, OSLP transcription, 5–6. 
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laboured for human freedom. Women can best show their gratitude to him by studying 
his writings especially his essay on Liberty’.6 As well as figuring his legagcy in such 
grand terms, Schreiner’s letters reveal that references to Mill were part of the smaller 
day-to-day details of her life. One of her dogs – an Irish terrier – was called Mill; she 
refers to him sleeping behind the stove and swimming in the sea.7 When she met the 
peace campaigner Norman Angell, she described him as ‘a delightful man, something 
like John Stuart Mill in the face’.8  
 This chapter takes a close look at Schreiner’s representations of Mill, and his 
works, throughout her published writing and her private letters. There is a slippage in 
her writing between generalised references, where Mill’s name is invoked as part of a 
roster of intellectual, political and literary figures, and more specific references, of the 
type outlined above, which are concerned with describing particular qualities 
attributable to Mill, or the effects induced by reading his works. This chapter aims to 
situate Schreiner’s Millian representations, both general and specific, within the context 
of her major preoccupations, including agnosticism, feminism, colonial society and 
British imperialism, at the same time as locating ‘Schreiner’s Mill’ within the context of 
other views of Mill. As I will discuss below, her effusive praise of Mill’s works is far from 
unprecedented, but her conception of the spiritual effect of reading Mill provides a quite 
different perspective to other writers. In The Healing Imagination of Olive Schreiner 
(1989), Joyce Avrech Berkman suggests that what Schreiner ‘absorbed from Mill 
appeared mostly to be his moral commitment to empirical and logical reasoning’ (70). 
This seems to be a critical commonplace about Mill rather than an adequate description 
of the ideas that Schreiner fuses together in her representations. In Schreiner’s writing, 
Millian prose is strongly associated with creative day-dreaming, art, beauty and 
romance.  
 In the sections that follow, I begin by considering exactly what constitutes the 
spiritual effect that Schreiner describes in her private letters and in her unfinished 
                                                        
6 Cronwright-Schreiner, Letters of Olive Schreiner, 402. 
7 The reference to the Irish terrier is in a letter from OS to Jessie Rose Innes nee Dods Pringle, July 1896, 
UCT, OSLP transcription, 22–23; ‘Mill is sleeping behind the stove’ is from an extract of a letter from OS to 
her husband S.C. Cronwright-Schreiner, 4 July 1896, NLSA, OSLP transcription, 3; and in a letter to Betty 
Molteno, about a trip to Port Alfred, OS says ‘We brought Mill with us, & he will try to swim out into the 
big breakers’, 20 August 1896, UCT, OSLP transcription, 27–28. 
8 OS to Havelock Ellis, 2 November 1914, NLSA, OSLP transcription, 7–8. 
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novel From Man to Man (published posthumously in 1926), particularly as it relates to 
System of Logic (1843). I then explore how this differs from other accounts of reading 
Mill which deal with emotions and mental wellbeing. I move on to show how Principles 
of Political Economy (1848) figures in her first novel, Undine (written before she was 20 
years old, but published posthumously in 1929) and her best-selling, critically 
acclaimed novel The Story of an African Farm (1883). My focus with these novels is on 
how Schreiner imagines that reading Mill forms part of self-education, especially for 
readers, like Waldo and Lyndall in African Farm, who are not privileged enough to have 
access to any kind of formal education – who are, in Lyndall’s words, poor, young, and 
friendless (156). In the final section of this chapter I consider the more generalised 
references Schreiner makes to Mill in her private letters and her political writings, in 
particular Woman and Labour (1911) and Thoughts on South Africa (1923). These have 
to do with how Mill is figured as an idealised national representative and agent of 
international progress. 
 Reading Mill plays a formative part in Schreiner’s intellectual development as it 
does for Mona Caird. Like Caird, Schreiner reads Mill as part of a process of self-
education, but that she does so growing up in South Africa marks an important 
difference between these two New Woman writers. As the quotation at the head of this 
chapter highlights, it was only when Schreiner, as she put it, ‘got home to Europe’ that 
she became aware of ambivalent attitudes towards Mill. Schreiner was born and raised 
in South Africa, so this is a telling phrase. In Olive Schreiner and the Progress of Feminism 
(2001), Carolyn Burdett argues that ‘Schreiner confronted, and was compelled 
creatively to work with, various productive contradictions’ (6). As a first generation 
colonial, she conceived of England as ‘a land of intellectual richness’ in contrast to the 
‘physically and spiritually bleak land’ of her birth, but this view was accompanied by 
‘the profoundest sense of how South Africa was affected by England’ (Burdett 7). Nadine 
Gordimer also writes of Schreiner’s sense, which was shared by other South African 
writers, of being ‘cut off from the world of ideas’ (224). Ultimately, though, Gordimer 
finds her guilty of ‘abandoning the search for a form of fiction adequate to contain the 
South African experience’ (226). In An Olive Schreiner Reader (1987) Carol Barash, like 
Burdett, sees the conflicting elements in Schreiner’s life as productive: though Schreiner 
is both ‘coloniser and colonised’, she ‘believed fundamentally in unity, and always 
advocated political and economic equality for all people in South Africa. Both the force 
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and ideological ruptures of Schreiner’s prose come from her attempts to bridge political 
divisions ...’ (19). Similarly, in her introduction to the first collected edition of 
Schreiner’s dreams and allegories, Elisabeth Jay emphasises the need to pay attention to 
the complex situation occupied by a writer ‘whose idealist concerns recognised no 
simple geographical boundaries’ (ix). In New Woman Strategies (2003), Ann Heilmann 
notes that Schreiner’s identification with the political struggles of the Boers against 
British capitalist interests and her condemnation of the ‘oppression of the black 
population by both British colonialists and Boers’ coexisted with a tendency to ‘deal out 
stereotypically raced roles’ in her fiction (123). All these critics, except perhaps 
Gordimer, affirm Schreiner’s commitment to progress. Burdett’s terms are useful again 
here: she says that Schreiner ‘became a critic of progress who never abandoned her 
commitment to it’ (7). In this chapter, I seek to demonstrate how Schreiner’s Mill 
formed an integral part of her commitment to progress at both an individual and 
societal level. Schreiner’s Mill is a role model and he is a provider of books to be mined 
for philosophical and political ideas about work, education, and liberty, and, most 
significantly (in terms of the new perspective it offers on Mill), used as a stimulus for 
creativity. 
6.1 The Spiritual Effect of Reading Mill 
 The Life of Olive Schreiner (1924), Samuel Cronwright-Schreiner’s biography of 
his wife, includes extracts from diaries which record Schreiner reading the Political 
Economy, aged 18, while living in tents with family members near the diamond mine at 
Kimberley, and the Logic, aged 20, while she worked as governess (92, 94).9 
Cronwright-Schreiner also describes the room at Ganna Hoek farm near Colesberg in 
which Schreiner wrote Undine:  
The room was mud-floored and ceilingless. It leaked badly; when the rain 
was heavy Olive used to put an umbrella over herself and lead the water 
out of the room by making a small furrow in its mud floor. The room 
contained a primitive bedstead, a box to hold her clothes and nothing else 
                                                        
9 My correspondence with Liz Stanley, Principal Investigator for the Olive Schreiner Letters Project, in 
April 2012, indicates that Schreiner read Mill assiduously in later life, too. Schreiner requested books by 
Mill in letters to the London Institute Librarian. These are yet to be transcribed and made available on the 
online archive. 
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(except Mill’s Logic to read); she used to wash in the little stream in the 
kloof [ravine] near by until she secured a basin. (107) 
Cronwright-Schreiner makes Mill’s Logic the symbol of Schreiner’s engagement with 
European intellectual life in very unlikely circumstances. There is something 
incongruous about Mill’s Logic being found in the mud and the rain, but delightfully, 
fortuitously so. It is a symbol of Schreiner’s self-education and desire for personal 
improvement against all odds, and of the possibility of a different kind of work (she 
intensely disliked being a governess). Ruth First and Ann Scott, in their 1989 biography 
of Schreiner, along with Gordimer in a review of their work, see Cronwright-Schreiner’s 
account of his wife as an unforgivable series of misrepresentations which, in its desire 
to define her writerly genius, removes her from her social context. If this vignette 
romanticises Schreiner in her isolation, it also draws on Schreiner’s own remarkably 
consistent representations of the way ideas about Mill and his works were incorporated 
into her life and her worldview, from her first youthful encounters onwards. 
 The quotation at the head of the chapter, in which Schreiner empathises with her 
correspondent’s deep feelings for Jesus by comparing them with her own deep feelings 
for Mill, is from a letter sent in 1892 to John T. Lloyd, a church minister who later left 
the ministry and became a freethinker. In lamenting the European men and women who 
were indifferent to Mill’s works, or ridiculed them as old-fashioned, Schreiner seems 
less to be making the case for the currency of his ideas, than their timelessness. 
Schreiner’s reverence for Mill is bound up with her view that his works ‘had been the 
channels through which most of the spirit of current modern science’ reached her. The 
spirit of science is something which informed Schreiner’s critical engagement with the 
world and her creativity. In the same letter she explains the position she has reached 
with regard to religion, telling Lloyd that she believes in the ‘unity of all things’ and that 
‘there is nothing but God’.10 She describes the agonising process, during her childhood, 
of reconciling her ‘^direct^ perception’ of the world with the things she is taught about 
Christianity, and the subsequent pleasure of discovering scientific knowledge which 
harmonised with her observations of her environment.11 Writing to Edward Carpenter 
                                                        
10 OS to John T. Lloyd, 29 October 1892, NLSA, OSLP transcription, 33–34 and 51. 
11 OS to John T. Lloyd, 29 October 1892, NLSA, OSLP transcription, 39–42. ^^ indicates Schreiner’s 
insertions. 
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in 1889, she had also commented on her view of the connectedness of all phenomena 
and experience. She wrote that: 
the same joy and peace comes to my little soul from reading Spencers 
First Principles or Mills Logic or even Gibbons Decline and Fall [sic] that 
comes to it from looking at a sunset behind these tall mountains. God can 
and does reveal himself through the intellect as through nature, through 
the reason of man as in the blowing of the wind.12 
Mill’s Logic, alongside Spencer’s First Principles and Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the 
Roman Empire (1776–89), is associated with the beauty of a natural landscape, 
harmony and organisation. Where others fear the unsettling effects of Mill’s prose, 
Schreiner consistently connects ideas of the intellectual stimulation he provides with 
ideas of consolation. A note to Havelock Ellis in 1887 simply reads: ‘I wish I could see 
you this evening. I am reading Mill’s Logic. It comforts me so’.13 Mill gave Schreiner tools 
for challenging the religious beliefs she was expected to inherit unquestioningly, and for 
connecting up different parts of her thinking, and this was fortifying. 
 Thus when Schreiner commented, in a letter to her friend Betty Molento in 1895, 
that ‘Mill himself is to my mind the purest & greatest soul God has yet given the English 
race’, Schreiner’s ‘God’ does not signify a single creator in the traditional Christian 
sense.14 In this letter to Molteno, Schreiner offers her most significant elaboration on 
what Mill’s thinking meant to her: 
They wrote & asked me some time ago (some English paper did) to 
mention for publication the passage in the bible or any other work that 
had been of most aid to my moral & spiritual growth. I wrote back I could 
not give a ^one^ passage, but the book which has had most effect on my 
spiritual life was Mill’s Logic, & more or less all his works, especially his 
political economy. I think they hardly believed me; that they fancied I was 
confusing between the intellectual knowledge of facts, & the spiritual 
attitude of soul. But I was not. Modern Political Economists, such as Karl 
                                                        
12 OS to Edward Carpenter, 21 January 1889, Sheffield City Library, Archives & Local Studies, OSLP 
transcription, 10–14. 
13 OS to Havelock Ellis, 20 March 1887, NLSA, OSLP transcription, 4–5. 
14 OS to John T. Lloyd, 29 October 1892, NLSA, OSLP transcription, 29. 
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Marks [sic] have gone much further than Mill in the analysis of economic 
fact, & as far as mere technical knowledge of logic goes other writers will 
now reproduce for you all Mill stated, but the spiritual, the pure soul 
searching after the truth which is God, seeking to know nothing, to seek 
nothing, to discover nothing but the truth, that, just that you will find 
nowhere else as in following & watching the mind of Mill work! I never 
read a page of Mill but I seem to enter a higher holier atmosphere, even 
Plato does not affect me in the same way. I have owed spiritually 
singularly little to other people; but to Mill my debt can never be paid. In 
the little p book if I wrote for my baby before it was born, in case I died, I 
begged it to re-read Mill all its life. Spencer has also helped me, but less 
than Mill. When I was sixteen & doubted every thing, his First Principles 
showed me the unity of existence; but it was an intellectual aid, which ^I 
myself had to transmute into spiritual bread. Mill’s aid was directly 
spiritual^. 15 
Just as Mill is Schreiner’s equivalent to Jesus in her letter to Lloyd, Mill’s Logic and 
Political Economy are here the sacred texts which replace the Bible. If Mill gives 
Schreiner tools for challenging Christian teaching, then religion also gives Schreiner a 
vocabulary for talking about Mill. As Elisabeth Jay has observed, freethinkers like 
Schreiner rifled ‘the terminology of orthodox faith, reinterpreting such words as “soul”, 
“immortality”, or “God” to incorporate elements of other philosophies that attracted 
them’ (xix). Frances Power Cobbe and the other commentators I discussed in chapter 
two considered the unquenchable quest for knowledge and truth displayed in Mill’s 
work to be evidence of a religious disposition. Schreiner takes this idea further, finding 
that reading Mill induces an exalted intellectual and emotional state, which helped her 
to deal with big questions about birth and death. She is conscious that this is an unusual 
position to take, and the likelihood is that it will be thought ill-considered, but insistent 
about this connection between her intellectual and emotional life. Though Spencer is as 
beloved to her as Mill is, and his First Principles underpinned Schreiner’s views on unity, 
Mill’s help is more enduring. Burdett explores how Schreiner draws on Spencer and 
concludes that while his ‘influence is detectable in Schreiner’s vision of a complex, 
                                                        
15 OS to Betty Molteno, 24 May 1895, UCT, OSLP transcription, 18–43. 
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aesthetic and intellectual, evolved form of sexual love ... or in the emphasis on global and 
holistic development ..., the Spencerian doctrines of struggle, competitiveness and 
survival are untiringly criticized and condemned’ (29, Burdett’s emphasis). Schreiner 
retained less of a critical distance in relation to Mill’s ideas, believing that they 
unfailingly enlivened her thoughts and opened up meaning. 
The links Schreiner draws between intellectual stimulation and the emotional 
consolations of reading Mill are underscored by the circumstances in which her letter to 
Molteno was written. Less than a month before, on 30 April 1895, after wanting a child 
for many years, Schreiner had given birth to a daughter, who had lived only for a few 
hours.16 During her pregnancy, Schreiner had mentioned the book she was writing for 
her baby to another friend, Isaline Philpot, telling her: ‘... every day I write a little to it; 
so that, in case I should die, it will still have that, and I am writing it out a list of all the 
books I want it to read’.17 Schreiner was also making other plans for the education of 
her child, informing Philpot: ‘If my child is a girl I shall bring her up from the time she is 
quite tiny always to look forward to some definite work in life’.18 Schreiner’s letter to 
Molteno reveals that she saw reading and re-reading Mill as a particularly important 
part of a child’s education, and perhaps especially valuable if that child was a girl, who 
needed to be taught to develop a robust inner life, look forward to the possibility of a 
professional life, and counter other people’s preconceptions about the limits of her 
abilities. Even as she mourned the loss of her baby, and was comforted by expressing 
her deeply personal debt to Mill, Schreiner looked to the hope which she believed that 
reading Mill could provide for future generations who were interested in progress and 
improvement.  
Subjection was the key Millian text for women involved in agitating for women’s 
rights at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, but 
Schreiner did not limit herself to this most obvious object of study. Her letter to the 
commemoration meeting thirteen years later reiterates this by singling out On Liberty 
rather than Subjection, and then extending her recommendation to all of Mill’s works. 
This is an important point, given the prevalence of gendered assumptions in Britain 
                                                        
16 On Olive Schreiner’s baby, see First and Scott, 213–14; and Burdett 11–12. 
17 OS to Isaline Philpot, 3 November 1894, NLSA, OSLP transcription, 4–6. 
18 OS to Isaline Philpot, 3 November 1894, NLSA, OSLP transcription, 8–10. 
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about who read Mill, and what parts of his oeuvre they studied. Even Mill’s protégé John 
Morley – who Schreiner knew and thought had a ‘touch of genius’, unlike Leslie 
Stephen19 – remarked on ‘the comparatively few women whose intellectual interest was 
strong enough to draw them to his books’ (‘The Death of Mr Mill’ 671). Morley fully 
supported Mill’s views on women’s rights, but his comment does not indicate any 
alertness to the institutional and educational structures which might have influenced 
this state of affairs. 
The quality which Schreiner says she prized most in Mill, as expressed in the 
letter to Molteno and others, is his commitment to seeking the truth.20 In the 
introduction to the Logic Mill explained that he thought it would be helpful if 
... we were to define logic as the science which treats of the operations of 
the human understanding in the pursuit of truth. For to this ultimate end, 
naming, classification, definition, and all other operations over which 
logic has ever claimed jurisdiction, are essentially subsidiary. They may 
all be regarded as contrivances for enabling a person to know the truths 
which are needful to him, and to know them at the precise moment at 
which they are needful. (7: 6) 
An attack on the intuitionist school of thought, the Logic grappled with the big questions 
that: ‘What are facts? and, What is experience? and, What are the consequent conditions 
of reasoning about facts?’; it was intended to ‘provide a logical armoury for all assailants 
of established dogmatism’ (Stephen, The English Utilitarians 79, 76). Such questions 
about truth, facts, classification, definitions and proof are found throughout Schreiner’s 
fiction, from Undine wondering ‘why anything was where it was, and why the world 
was the world, and the sun the sun, and she, she’ (21) to Lyndall in African Farm asking 
‘And how do we know that the story is true, Uncle Otto?’ (28). This foregrounding of 
epistemology in Schreiner’s fiction was not to everybody’s taste – the Saturday Review, 
for example, hoping to ‘hear of encounters with ravening lions, and of hairsbreadth 
escapes from raiding Zulus’ was disappointed to find that African Farm was ‘hyper-
philosophical’ (‘The Story of an African Farm’ 507-8). 
                                                        
19 OS to Havelock Ellis, 21 January 1887, NLSA, OSLP transcription, 5–6. 
20 Schreiner thought that John Maynard Keynes’s The Economic Consequence of the Peace (1919) was 
‘worthy of John Stuart Mill in its large truth-loving spirit’. OS to Havelock Ellis, December 1919, NLSA, 
OSLP transcription, 11–12. 
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In From Man to Man, which Schreiner regarded as her major work, she further 
explored the ideas about pursuing and knowing truths expressed in her letter to 
Molteno about Mill. In a letter to Karl Pearson, Schreiner outlined the narrative of the 
never-completed From Man to Man:  
... two sisters grow up on An African farm; the elder [Rebekah] reserved 
and self-contained with a passion for physiology, & Mill’s Logic as her 
particular companion. The younger [Bertie] beautiful & sweet, with the 
clinging, where she loves, self forgetful nature, incapable of enduring the 
anger of anyone who is near her which forms the ideal wife ^in most 
men’s minds^. She becomes a prostitute, not through any evil, but 
through her gentleness lovingness, & non-power of opposing human 
creatures who are near her. ... Rebekah the intellectual sister marries ... 
[whereupon] She grows harder & colder & deader to the outer world, 
more careful in the performance of her outward duties, but longing 
finding her life only in her tiny study with her books & her microscope....21 
Though the Logic is mentioned as Rebekah’s ‘particular companion’ in this letter, it is 
not directly named in the novel (as a whole host of other books are, including Darwin’s 
The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication); however, the chapter 
‘Raindrops in the Avenue’, which is given over to Rebekah’s philosophising, explores the 
Logic’s thesis that a belief in innate truths waiting to be discovered must be replaced 
with a system of analysed experience. 
 Even the circumstances of Rebekah’s speculations – enclosed within the small 
space of a study adjoined to her children’s bedroom, ‘carrying on a long discussion with 
herself as to what was the real cause of that curious hunger for an exact knowledge of 
things as they are, of naked truth about all things small or great, material and also 
psychic ...’ (177) – recalls Mill explaining that ‘The sole object of Logic is the guidance of 
one’s own thoughts’ rather than the communication of those ideas to others (7: 6). Mill 
adds that ‘Logic takes cognizance of our intellectual operations, only as they conduce to 
our own knowledge, and to our command over that knowledge for our own uses’ (7: 6). 
Rebekah’s self-contained reasonings on abstract questions are all for her own use, a 
product of her self-guided reading of books on geology, geography and botany, books 
                                                        
21 OS to Karl Pearson, 10 July 1886, University College London Library (UCL), OSLP transcription, 15–45. 
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which were ‘much more poetry to her’ than stories or poems (174). Her thoughts turn 
on what she calls the ‘new spirit’ or ‘a keen unending questioning of the facts of life’ 
(178). The new spirit is rooted in experience, rather than faith, and an understanding 
that ‘the true revelation of the unseen and the unknown beyond was to be found in the 
study of the seen and knowable about us’, so much so that ‘the true act of religious 
worship was the search after a knowledge of all reality’ (182). A work of art is defined 
as that which satisfies an emotional need by its representation of the truth. Thus in 
From Man to Man a book like the Logic is associated with ideas of worship and artistry, 
as it is in Schreiner’s letter to Molteno. Rebekah’s search for ‘almighty sincerity’, which 
makes it painful to encounter the majority of people busy lying to themselves, or 
(recalling On Liberty), spending a life time sophisticating with their own intellects, 
eventually leads her to find intellectual and emotional sympathy with her neighbour Mr 
Drummond, but Schreiner’s narrative cuts off at that point (184). 
6.2 ‘Following & watching the mind of Mill work’: Other Perspectives 
 What exactly was involved in, as Schreiner put it, ‘following & watching the mind 
of Mill work’? In order to more fully understand Schreiner’s construction of the spiritual 
effect of reading Mill, particularly in relation to the books she singles out – the Logic, 
Political Economy and On Liberty – it is useful to consider comparisons with other 
accounts of his ability to guide, teach and inspire though his writing. I begin with a 
twenty-first century reader of Mill, Stefan Collini, because his account distils a certain 
line of thinking about the dryness of Millian prose and provides a direct contrast to 
Schreiner’s view. Collini has argued that:  
The Logic is hardly attempting to awaken in us a sense of the mysteries of 
the universe, and none of the essays in the volumes of Dissertations and 
Discussions leaves us feeling that we now possess our experience in a 
quite new way. Nothing in Mill’s philosophy strains at the limits of the 
plainly expressible, and if this restriction gives his prose a rather 
pedestrian quality by comparison with that of the Sages, we might 
remember that it is part of the definition of the pedestrian that he has his 
feet on the ground. (Public Moralists 135) 
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Clearly for Schreiner the opposite was true: Mill’s writing did awaken a sense of the 
mysteries of the universe and leave her feeling that she possessed her experience in a 
new way. Collini’s comments about Mill’s style might be said to follow in the tradition of 
the Victorian literary critic R.H. Hutton, who acknowledged Mill’s powerful influence 
over English thought, but insisted that there was something lacking in Millian prose:  
What we miss in Mr J.S. Mill are personal characteristics beneath and 
beyond the permanent characteristics of his rational disquisition. There is 
a monotony in the calm, evenly flowing, impartial, didactic pertinacity of 
the disquisition, which is almost appalling, when we consider the number 
of volumes into which it has flowed with steady and uniform current, 
without a single important variety of doctrine or manner. (‘Mr John Stuart 
Mill’ 204) 
Hutton describes an unappealingly flat reading experience: relentlessly serious 
discourse with no ‘relieving glimpses’ of humour or idiosyncrasy (203). For Hutton, 
Mill’s strengths lie in his ability to systematise knowledge, but he does this at the cost of 
the human details which help readers to relate to a text. Schreiner thought that Mill’s 
style was consistent – ‘seeking to know nothing, to seek nothing, to discover nothing but 
the truth’ – but she interpreted this consistency very differently. It was marvellous 
rather than appalling, a reliable source of inspiration for diverse thoughts of her own. 
 Other Victorian readers describe an experience closer to that which Schreiner 
represented. In 1860, the clergyman R.W. Church published a response to On Liberty – 
the text which Schreiner felt that it would be most instructive for all women to study – 
in Bentley’s Quarterly Review. He disagreed with much in Mill’s essay but had this to say 
about the reading experience:  
The distinctness, the daring, the vigour of the discussion, the novelty 
which it throws round what is old and trite, the reality into which it 
quickens what is inert and torpid, even the peril and menace which it not 
obscurely discloses to convictions which may be matters of life and death 
to us, act as a tonic to the mind, and awaken, exercise, and brace it, even if 
they do not, as they well may, elevate the heart and widen the range of its 
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ordinary contemplations. The reading of a book like this ought to be an 
event in a man’s mental history. (211) 
The invigorating effects which Church recounts anticipate the position which Schreiner 
was to take, even though Church stops short of making a connection between 
intellectual and emotional benefits. The quality that Church identifies in Millian prose, 
of making old views new, was also highlighted by the American social reformer and 
preacher Moncure Daniel Conway, the author of the lively representations of Mill 
discussed in the first three chapters. In 1863 Conway was asked to give a series of 
lectures in Britain, to represent his anti-slavery views. Bound for Britain on board the 
steamship City of Washington, he read Mill:  
I have brought along John Stuart Mill’s new book on Liberty, published in 
Boston the day I left. It is a book of wonderful truisms, of startling 
commonplaces. In reading it one feels that such a book should be in the 
course of college study everywhere, so axiomatic are the laws it states; 
and yet there is scarcely a state on earth that would not be revolutionized 
by a practical adoption of his principles. (Autobiography I: 390) 
Living in London during the First World War, Schreiner stayed up all night reading 
Conway’s Autobiography (1904) – which, as well as this diary entry about his 
transatlantic voyage, also contained reminiscences of time spent with Mill and his step-
daughter Helen Taylor22 – and described it as delightful, charming and fascinating.23 
Schreiner would perhaps have appreciated his view of the potential for Mill’s theories to 
be taught and practically applied across the globe.  
 John Morley undoubtedly saw On Liberty and most of Mill’s works as 
transformational, but he expressed his approval in measured terms, making virtues of 
the weaknesses which Hutton perceived in Mill’s literary skills:  
Literary grandeur ... matters little where the kernel is a restatement and 
new reinforcement of Tolerance, discussion without restriction, the free 
life of the individual, so long as he does not injure other people, fair play 
                                                        
22 Schreiner had also spent time with Helen Taylor after meeting her at a meeting of a socialist 
organisation, Democratic Foundation, in 1884. See OS to Will Schreiner, 21 April 1912, UCT, OSLP 
transcription, 9–12. In the letter Schreiner mistakenly refers to Helen Taylor as Mill’s niece. 
23 OS to John Hodgson, 1 April 1916, HCCR, OSLP transcription, 16–18. 
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for social experiment. On all this nothing could be more bracing than 
Mill’s handling of his lofty case, and the idealism of it, the enthusiasm 
sustained as it was for page after page, very nearly approached the 
electrifying region of the poetic, in the eyes of ardent men and women in 
our age. (Recollections I: 62–3) 
For Morley, Mill’s unambitious style gives his work a transparency, perfectly suited to 
guide and teach his readers. Though it does not aim at literary grandeur, the quality and 
intensity of the affects produced by reading it are comparable to the affects produced by 
reading poetry. The same mode of address sustained for page after page is exciting, 
rather than monotonous as it is for Hutton. In his centenary tribute to Mill Morley tried 
to pinpoint even more precisely the feeling of reading Mill.  
He has none of the incomparably winning graces by which [John Henry] 
Newman made mere siren style do duty for exact, penetrating, and 
coherent thought ... Style has worked many a miracle before now, but 
none more wonderful than Newman’s. ...These graces were none of Mill’s 
gifts, nor could he have coveted them. He did not impose; he drew, he led, 
he quickened with a living force and fire the commonplace that truth is a 
really serious and rather difficult affair, worth persistently pursuing in 
every path where duty beckons. He made people feel, with a kind of 
eagerness evidently springing from internal inspiration, that the true 
dignity of man is mind.  
As I discussed in chapter four, Hardy cut out the article in the Times Literary Supplement 
which this quotation is taken from and pasted it inside the front cover of his copy of On 
Liberty. He drew a line in pencil the margin next to the paragraph which compares Mill’s 
style to Newman’s, perhaps indicating his agreement with Morley’s view. Morley’s view 
of Mill’s constant search for truth accords with Schreiner’s, but Schreiner went much 
further in her claims for the poetry of Mill’s prose. 
Though On Liberty was the book which Schreiner recommended women to read, 
it was the Logic and Political Economy which she identified in her letter to Molteno as 
having the most impact on her own life. Reviews and discussion of different editions of 
the Logic appeared from its original publication in 1843 and throughout the century. 
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Reviewing the fourth edition in 1856, the Saturday Review reflected on the energy 
which the English expended on ‘trivial, unsatisfying, not to say base objects’ and ‘the 
frothy excitements of the hour’ (‘Mill’s Logic’ 736). Existing in parallel with this, though, 
was ‘a solid demand for solid books on abstract subjects’ (‘Mill’s Logic’ 736). However, 
sales of books on philosophy did not necessarily equate to serious readers of books on 
philosophy. It could mean readers who engaged only superficially with such works, out 
of a desire to keep up with current literary trends and ‘a liking for the imposing forms of 
scientific language’ (‘Mill’s Logic’ 736). A different kind of reading was demanded by 
such works as the Logic, the writer explained: 
To be fruitful, they require to be studied with an intensity and 
perseverance which Englishmen rarely give to an abstract subject except 
in early youth. The exigencies of life very soon absorb all the powerful 
intellects, and there remain for philosophy only the halt, the maimed and 
the blind. In other words, metaphysics and logic only penetrate and 
discipline the mind so far as they enter into education; and this Mill’s 
Logic is really doing. It is admirably qualified to be a learner’s book – 
much more so than if it had been merely elementary. It is this, for it is 
simple and systematic; but at the same time, it lures the young curiosity 
onwards to the inner sanctuary. (‘Mill’s Logic’ 736, emphasis in original) 
That the Logic is particularly suited to be ‘a learner’s book’ and that ‘it lures the young 
curiosity onwards to the inner sanctuary’ precisely because of its difficulty are ideas 
which were to find expression in Schreiner’s personal writings. Though Mill’s work was 
of enduring educational value to her, it is strongly associated with the formation of 
youthful thoughts. The difference was that Schreiner imagined that diligent students 
grappling with the complexity of such philosophical texts were not just English men or 
‘poor lads who are to be examined’, as a reviewer of one of the digested versions of the 
Logic for university students termed it, but men and women of all types around the 
world (‘Our Library Table’ 233).  
 Upon its first publication in 1848, a reviewer of Political Economy in Blackwood’s 
Edinburgh Magazine decided that despite the book’s ‘severe character’ and lack of 
concession to popular appeal – qualities it shared with the Logic – it could not be 
considered ‘dry’ by anyone interested in the current state and future prospects of 
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society (‘Political Economy, by J.S. Mill’ 412). The book’s sense of intelligence and 
philanthropy made it impossible for even ‘the most complete opponent of the work not 
to rise a gainer from its perusal’, the reader would benefit from it whether their pre-
existing views caused them to ‘struggle with it, or acquiesce to its guidance’, and though 
the style is generally didactic, there are passages ‘which have had on us all the effect of 
the most thrilling eloquence, from the fine admixture of severe reasoning and 
earnestness of feeling’ (‘Political Economy, by J.S. Mill’ 412). The reviewer in Fraser’s 
Magazine similarly praised the spirit in which the book was written, declaring that 
‘every page evinces the warm sympathies of the writer with the joys and sorrows of his 
fellow-men. The happiness of mankind is ever before him as the object of inquiry; 
though no mawkish sentimentality blinds his judgement’ (‘Mill’s Political Economy’ 
247). The reviewer emphasises that the book’s value lies not in offering new ideas, but 
in its ability to bring together, and apply to practical problems, disparate elements of 
political economy. Thus the pleasure of reading Political Economy is a reposeful one, 
‘analogous to that which we receive from contemplating a quiet, serene landscape by 
Claude, or a Madonna by Perugino, after tasking our aching eyes with the melodramatic 
extravagance – the lamp-black and lightening of modern art’ (‘Mill’s Political Economy’ 
260, emphasis in original). Though Schreiner refers to feelings of peace, joy and comfort 
as effects of reading Mill, the register of her comments is different to the conservatism 
implied in the Blackwood’s reviewers distaste for modern art. For her these are qualities 
which are linked to the process of developing and understanding new views. 
The features which these early reviewers of the Logic and Political Economy 
praised were reiterated, years later, in memorial essays on Mill which reflected on the 
canonical status the texts had achieved. For Henry Fawcett ‘one reason of his 
attractiveness as a writer ... is the unusual power he possessed in applying philosophical 
principles to the facts of ordinary life’ (75). The Irish economist John Elliot Cairnes 
agreed, observing that in Mill’s writing (unlike Ricardo’s) ‘Principles of the most 
abstract kind are translated into concrete language, and brought to explain familiar 
facts ...’ (67). Cairnes concluded that ‘he has been enabled to divest of repulsiveness 
even the most abstract speculations, and to impart a glow of human interest to all that 
he has touched’ (73). Discussing ‘His Influence at the Universities’ Fawcett dwelt on the 
tolerance, kindness and sympathy which animated Mill’s writing and which encouraged 
the reader to trust him as a guide. Fawcett did not meet Mill until years after attending 
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university, and recalls that the effect of reading his books was a desire to meet the 
author: ‘I remember that we often used to say that there was nothing we should esteem 
so great a privilege as to spend an hour in Mr Mill’s society. There is probably no bond 
of attachment stronger than that which unites a pupil to one who has attracted him to 
new intellectual pursuits, and has awakened in him new interests in life’ (77). Schreiner 
never expressed a wish that she could meet Mill, who died when she was first reading 
his works in the early 1870s, but she does lionise him in the way that Fawcett and 
Cairnes did. 
By 1893, in Grant Allen’s The Woman Who Did, the way in which Mill’s Logic and 
Political Economy had become standard texts at Oxford and Cambridge was reflected in 
a character’s indifference to studying them. In the first chapter Alan Merrick says to 
Herminia Barton: 
When I go up to Oxford and see the girls who are being ground in the mill 
at Somerville, I’m heartily sorry for them. It’s worse for them than for us; 
they miss the only part of university life that has educational value. When 
we were undergraduates, we lived our whole lives – lived them all round, 
developing equally every fibre of our natures. We read Plato and Aristotle 
and John Stuart Mill, to be sure – and I’m not quite certain we got much 
good from them; but then, our talk and thought were not all of books and 
of what we spelt out in them. (27) 
Reading philosophy is, for Allen’s character, something to be taken for granted, and, as a 
result, boringly institutionalised. Its value is questionable in comparison to the moral 
and social education provided by rowing boats, playing cricket and drinking wine with 
his peers. Herminia agrees with Alan and criticises the ‘affectation of one-sided culture’ 
demanded of female students at Somerville (28) – the college which in 1907 was to 
receive from Helen Taylor what remained of Mill’s library. Somerville students being 
‘ground in the mill’ may also be a dismissive reference to their involvement in the 
campaign for women’s suffrage, which had been supported by Mill – such puns were a 
favourite in the comic press during the time that Mill was in parliament.24 Schreiner 
read The Woman Who Did in 1895 and remarked ‘It’s not a work of art at all’.25 
                                                        
24 See Robson’s ‘Mill in Parliament: The View from the Comic Papers’, 103–05. 
25 OS to Mary Sauer nee Cloete, 1 April 1895, NLSA, OSLP transcription, 34–35. 
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Schreiner’s specific objection was to the portrayal of the relationship which develops 
between Alan and Herminia, who she felt were bound together by the lower rather than 
the higher aspects of their natures; but, she may well have objected to the casual 
disregard which Alan Merrick has for reading Plato and Aristotle (in 1899 she told 
Havelock Ellis that she loved them and their beautiful work), 26 as well as Mill. 
Schreiner’s personal experiences of reading Mill take place outside of the establishment, 
and the results she describes are not separate from, but an integral part of, a well-
rounded education; they have intense intellectual and emotional implications. Her 
fictional characters who read Mill likewise do so outside of the academy, and the effect 
is similarly profound. By considering Schreiner’s approach to Mill and his works in the 
context of these other views, it is possible to see that she brings together and develops 
several strands of thinking about the benefits of reading Mill. 
6.3 ‘Beautiful dreams’ in Undine 
 As Burdett explains in Olive Schreiner and the Progress of Feminism, the 
unevenness of the narrative in Undine – the ‘jolting move from feminist critique to 
romance’ – makes for a very disconcerting read; Schreiner was aware of these flaws in 
her story and never intended for this first attempt at a novel to be published (14–15). 
Nevertheless, as Burdett observes, the story is full of the themes and issues which 
Schreiner was to rework so powerfully in African Farm (14). One of these is the link 
between reading Mill and productive day-dreaming. The first few chapters of Undine are 
the ones primarily concerned with feminist critique. In these chapters, Undine Bock is ‘a 
queer little child’ growing up in South Africa, and then an equally ‘queer and strange 
and odd’ adolescent in England, struggling to understand her religious doubts and 
develop her intellectual inclinations, but thwarted by unsympathetic family members 
(13, 34). In England, Undine is courted by three members of the Blair family: brothers 
Harry and Albert and their odious father George. Undine has ‘contemptuous pity’ for 
Harry’s lack of independent thought (84) but her desire for the ‘Piece-of-perfection’ 
Albert marks the narrative’s shift into romance, as she renounces her books and her 
opinions in an effort to conform to a passive model of femininity (116). Like Hadria in 
Caird’s Daughters of Danaus negotiating her relationship with Professor Theobald, 
                                                        
26 OS to Havelock Ellis, 25 July 1899, Harry Ransom Research Center (HRRC), University of Texas at 
Austin, OSLP transcription, 68–69. 
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Undine is painfully aware that her attraction to Albert compromises her ability to 
articulate her opinions. In a passage which bears remarkable affinity to Caird’s fictional 
treatment of Millian free discussion, the narrator in Undine reflects: ‘There are men and 
women in whose presence we seem to be released from ourselves and to be possessed 
of ideas and powers of expression which till then we never dreamed of; while others 
seem to shrivel us up and leave us standing without a correct word in all our vocabulary 
on which we can lay hands. One of these latter was Albert Blair’ (78). When Albert 
rejects Undine, she marries his father in order ‘serve’ Albert, by securing a settlement 
which his father intends to deny him. Undine has a baby with George and this new life 
briefly reignites her passion for learning; her books become ‘as food to one who wakes 
after a long, dark dream’ (144). But the baby dies, and then George does too. Undine, 
having ensured that her inheritance is divided equally between Harry and Albert, 
returns to the diamond fields in South Africa to look for work, but finding only 
insufficient ironing and sewing dies in poverty, heartbroken at the loss of her 
intellectual life. 
One of the intellectual interests that Undine abandons in order to please Albert is 
reading Mill. The episode involving a copy of Political Economy in Undine has been read 
by First and Scott, and by Burdett, as concerned with a gendered difference between 
types of reading material. When Undine’s Cousin Jonathan accuses her of reading ‘trash 
and sentimentality’ and ‘effete nonsense’ in the form of Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s 
poetry, Undine responds “‘There lies what I have been reading”, she said, pointing to 
where Mill still lay on the ground. “There is nothing very sentimental in that, I fancy”’ 
(70). First and Scott think the scene mirrors a ‘division in culture’ which the novel as a 
whole is concerned with exposing: ‘non-sense and non-sentiment are polarized, as 
though symbolizing the meaning of female and male’ (87). Burdett suggests that 
‘Undine’s reply upholds the gendered distinction implied in Cousin Jonathan’s jibe ... But 
her “masculine” reading does little or nothing to moderate Undine’s response to 
romance when confronted by Albert Blair; instead, her intellectual ambition simply 
dissolves under the force of her feeling for him’ (15). As I will show, reading this episode 
in the context of Schreiner’s other representations of Mill complicates these binaries. 
When Undine points out that she has been reading unsentimental Mill, Cousin 
Jonathan is still sneeringly dismissive, remarking: ‘“You are likely to get just as much 
good from this style of reading as the other”’ (70). The issue at stake is not primarily the 
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genre of the reading material, but Cousin Jonathan’s attitude to Undine’s independent 
thinking and her attempts at self-education. Undine, however, (at this point in the story 
at least) is quietly confident of her own ability to engage with Mill. When she 
subsequently finds herself forced to make conversation with the foolish Harry Blair, it is 
this they discuss: ‘“You have Mill’s Political Economy here, I see,” he remarked. “I am just 
going through his works with very great pleasure. They are beautiful, are they not?” 
“Very,” said Undine, smiling inwardly’ (72). Undine’s inward smile has a double 
meaning, indicating both her own sense of the beauty of Mill’s works, and her contempt 
for Harry’s confident pronouncement. The latter is connected to Undine’s realisation 
that Harry’s expensive formal education has left him full of ‘knowledge and 
acquirements of every kind’ which are completely unconnected to his inner life (72). 
The first few chapters of Undine explore issues of self-education, including the 
satisfaction to be had in independent reading and the striving to make connections 
between an inner and outer life. In the first chapter, when Undine is reading ‘an old 
man’s book’ – A Careful and strict Enquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of the 
Freedom of Will, which is supposed to be essential to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, 
Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame, by Jonathan Edwards, A.B. – the narrator 
remarks that: 
There was a strange contrast between the little reader and her great 
brown book as she sat there on the floor on that Sunday afternoon. The 
child so warm, with the wild blood dancing in every vein, looking so 
eagerly into the world, so ready to give and take – the book so old, so 
dead, with the life-thoughts of another generation petrified in its old 
yellow leaves, now probably being read for the last time. (26) 
The book represents her father’s break with the conventions of his own religious 
upbringing: a move from ‘truth and Arminianism to the ways of Calvinism and error’ 
perceived by her grandfather to be evil (26). A frisson of intellectual pleasure is evoked 
here, in the contrast between the old, dead book and the youthful, lively Undine. By 
gaining an individual insight into material seen as irrelevant or inappropriate for a 
young female reader, in making it her own, Undine is transgressing familial and gender 
norms and takes pleasure in doing so. Such pleasure is also evident in Undine’s self-
confident attitude to reading Mill, when others find it incongruous, derisory, or simply 
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fail to understand its significance. Unlike the ideas in Edwards’s religious treatise, 
however, the ideas in Political Economy are not petrified, they are very much alive and 
bound up with Undine’s inner and outer life. 
In a letter to Havelock Ellis, Schreiner described the stimulating effect of reading 
Karl Pearson’s book The Ethic of Freethought (1888) and then elaborated on this quality 
in other writers: 
Someone has said that the power of stimulating thought ^& feeling^ is the 
power of genius. Only genius can do it, but all genius doesn’t do it. Mill 
does, Spencer doesn’t to the same extent. Goethe does, Schiller does not at 
all. Whitman & Browning do, Tennyson does not at all. I personally prize 
the stimulators most, I like a book you can only read a few pages of & then 
you have to throw it down you have so many thoughts of your own. I have 
never fully analyzed what this stimulating power is but it is possibly [sic] 
only ^to a very complex nature, & is the result of their seeing things with 
something of that wonderful complexity that exists in life. ... ^27 
In Undine Schreiner dramatises this moment when a book must be thrown down to 
allow for personal reflection, and it is the wonderful complexities of Mill’s Political 
Economy that stimulate the eponymous heroine’s thought: 
One afternoon, late in the summer, Undine sat half buried among the long 
grass at the foot of the tree. Mill’s Political Economy, with its face turned 
on the ground, lay at her feet, while a little black beetle scudded hither 
and thither among its pages, all unnoticed. Her hands were busily 
employed in picking off small bits of dried bark from the trunk of the old 
tree; while her thoughts were in the same key, and as sweet and 
impossible of fulfilment, as ever were little Ellie’s when she sat along ’mid 
the beeches in the meadow. (66) 
When Undine complains about the lack of intellectual sympathy between herself and 
Cousin Jonathan, what most distresses her is that he accuses her of ‘dreaming, not 
reasoning’ (70), that he fails to recognise the value of the ‘beautiful dreams’ and ‘happy 
                                                        
27 OS to Havelock Ellis, 19 January1888, HRRC, OSLP transcription, 9–19. 
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thoughts’ she has underneath the tree (111). The comparison to Ellie day-dreaming in 
Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s ballad ‘The Romance of the Swan’s Nest’ (1850) certainly 
evokes negative connotations in relation to day-dreaming. In the poem, Little Ellie 
fantasises that a duke’s eldest son will become her lover, and that she will show him a 
swan’s nest that she has discovered, but when she emerges from her day-dream she 
discovers that the swan has deserted the nest and a rat has gnawed the reeds. For Little 
Ellie, day-dreaming is not productive: ‘Love, sexuality, fertility, a cosy Victorian home: 
while she dreams of annexing male power – because, presumably, she dreams of it – she 
loses the secret treasure of a woman’s life’ (Mermin 105, emphasis in orginal). But in 
Undine’s case, it is not chivalric romance or fairy tales that have provoked her ‘sweet’ 
thoughts; rather it is the concerns which Mill explores in Political Economy and how 
these connect to her own situation.  
 In Book IV, on the Influence of Progress, Mill reflects on the conditions necessary 
for individuals to cultivate, under a system of individual property, the ‘Art of Living’ as 
opposed to the ‘art of getting on’ (129). These include ‘sufficient leisure, both physical 
and mental, from mechanical detail, to cultivate freely the graces of life’ and also 
sufficient solitude for thinking (128). Predicting the pressures which would result from 
an increase in production and population, Mill notes that ‘Solitude, in the sense of being 
often alone, is essential to any depth of meditation or of character; and solitude in the 
presence of natural beauty and grandeur, is the cradle of thoughts and aspirations 
which are not only good for the individual, but which society could ill do without’ (129). 
So the scene focusing on Undine’s dreamy seclusion, entangled in nature, connects to 
Mill’s discussion of the necessary conditions for developing the life of the mind, which in 
turn is linked to individuals’ ability to contribute to society through being productive in 
the work that they do. When Undine returns to South Africa and tries to become 
financially independent, she confronts one of the other concerns in Political Economy, 
that ‘All persons are not equally fit for all labour...’ (14). She earns her transport to the 
diamond fields by caring for another woman’s children and wonders, ‘When we labour 
like brutes, do our hearts become like theirs, till to eat and rest becomes all our 
ambition? (190). Forced to search for the most menial of labour at the diamond fields, 
Undine’s need for subsistence supersedes all else, but she ‘... tried to be profoundly 
philosophical and to place before herself very clearly her own advanced ideas of the 
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subject of labour. ... Is not all work, if it be earnestly done, noble and ennobling?’ (199).28 
Clearly, in Undine’s case, the answer to this question is no, as the pursuit of a ‘higher’ life 
is denied her (191). At her most impoverished, ‘she held the creed of the hungry – that 
ideas are a delusion and sentiments a snare’ (205). 
6.4 ‘Startled joy’ in The Story of an African Farm 
 The episode in which Waldo discovers a copy of Political Economy in African 
Farm is central to the novel’s treatment of self-education. This relates to Lyndall, too, 
who self-educates in preference to enduring the destructive lessons of her finishing 
school, but the first reviewers often focused on Waldo’s situation, remote from any 
centre of learning or means of formal education. In the Fortnightly Review, Henry 
Norman observed that African Farm ‘is the story of the growth of the human mind cut 
off from all but the most commonplace influences’ (882). The Athenaeum said that it set 
‘before the reader with striking vigour the problems which trouble a strong intelligence 
and an imaginative ambition remote from any possibility of culture’ (‘Novels of the 
Week’ 276). A reviewer in Time found this aspect of the story likely to have wide appeal: 
‘The vivid description of the aspirations of a partially educated boy is most true to 
nature, and the reader will probably find many of his own youthful doubts and fears 
placed before him again the pages of this book’ (‘The Story of an African Farm’ 508). In 
1888, W.L. Courtney wrote a piece on ‘The Agnostic in Fiction’ for Harry Quilter’s short-
lived journal, the Universal Review. Courtney felt that female novelists were guilty of 
confusing the intellectual motivations of agnosticism with emotional ones, but praised 
the ‘much more robust and masculine intellect’ which Olive Schreiner displayed in her 
portrait of the ‘intellectual freethinker’ Waldo in The Story of an African Farm (78). In 
the same article, Courtney, who was to publish a biography of Mill the year after, 
observed: 
The popularity of the Agnostic is a curious feature in modern English 
fiction. For being a purely intellectual character, the natural inference 
would be that he was not an essentially dramatic one. The late Mr John 
Stuart Mill was a capital instance of an Agnostic, and though of great 
                                                        
28 On Schreiner’s attack on ‘the female parasite who contributed nothing to the sustaining labors of her 
society’ in Woman and Labour, see Regenia Gagnier’s The Insatiability of Human Wants (2000). 
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interest in the intellectual world, no one would have the hardihood to say 
that he could be made the central figure in a romance. (73) 
The rigid divide which Courtney perceived between intellectual and emotional 
motivations was something which Schreiner’s novel, and all her writings, actually 
sought to challenge. Part of this challenge was having the hardihood to give Mill, or at 
least, his Political Economy, a role in African Farm which included elements of romance. 
Where Hardy’s characters, Ethelberta and Sue Bridehead, turn somewhat 
knowingly to Utilitarianism and On Liberty respectively, for pragmatic reasons, Waldo, 
perhaps the youngest reader of Mill in fiction, happens upon a copy of Political Economy 
by chance. It is a moment of empowerment for him when his thoughts are given form by 
reading Mill – thrown into sharp relief by his subsequent violent mistreatment by 
Bonaparte Blenkins. The pleasure in incongruity found in Undine is also expressed in 
African Farm. Em’s warning about the books in the loft – ‘I don’t think they are very nice, 
not stories’– their location, hidden ‘Under a pile of sacks’ in ‘a rough packing case’, and 
the appearance of the ‘dull, brown volume’ that Waldo settles on to read, are all 
contrasted with Waldo’s ‘startled joy in the book’ (75–6). Waldo reads Political Economy 
avidly, in an absorbed manner more readily associated with novel reading, and has a 
bodily reaction which combines excitement, comfort and ‘triumphant joy’ (76). Waldo’s 
reading merges the shock of the new, with the shock of the familiar, allowing him to give 
form to his religious doubts, and learn about the possibility of making productive 
connections between deep historical knowledge and the present. For Undine reading 
Political Economy provokes day-dreaming, and it sends Waldo into a reverie too. 
Afterwards he ponders Schreiner’s favourite theme of unity as he stares dreamily at a 
sow and her little pigs and decides: ‘Taken singly they were not beautiful; taken 
together they were’ (78). Later in the novel, when Waldo encounters his stranger, the 
qualities of art and truth once more associated with the effects of reading Mill, when the 
stranger says: ‘And the attribute of all true art, the highest and the lowest, is this – that it 
says more than it says, and takes you away from itself. It is a little door that opens into 
an infinite hall where you may find what you please’ (133). Both Mill and Schreiner are 
not concerned with a monolithic ‘Truth’; but rather with something many-sided, the 
kind of truth that Waldo’s stranger describes when he says that ‘There is nothing so 
universally intelligible as truth. It has a thousand meanings and suggests a thousand 
more’ (134).  
219 
As Waldo dreams, Bonaparte ‘reasons’. The narratorial voice mocks Bonaparte’s 
ignorance of the pleasures of learning and of Mill in particular, in Millian terms, 
referring to his speculation that Waldo has been eating smoked sausages in the loft as a 
‘chain of inductive reasoning’ and his ‘simple rule’ regarding books as ‘of infinite utility’ 
(77, 79). Bonaparte’s rule is: 
Whenever you come into contact with any book, person or opinion of which 
you absolutely comprehend nothing, declare that book, person, or opinion to 
be immoral. Bespatter it, vituperate against it, strongly insist that any man 
or woman harbouring it is a fool or a knave, or both. Carefully abstain from 
studying it. Do all that in you lies to annihilate that book, person, or opinion. 
(79, emphasis in original). 
Schreiner’s satirical take on Bonaparte’s ignorance seems particularly poignant in light 
of some of the vituperative attitudes towards Mill that I discussed in chapters two and 
three. This abuse is made literal in African Farm, as Waldo’s copy of Political Economy 
lands in the mud when Bonaparte pushes him into the pig sty, is branded ‘Polity-gollity-
gominy’ by Tant’ Sannie before being flung at Waldo’s head, and finally thrown in the 
fire: ‘It lay upon the heap of coals, smoked, flared, and blazed, and the “Political 
Economy” was no more – gone out of existence, like many another poor heretic of flesh 
and blood’ (81).  
The burning of one of Mill’s books was not unprecedented in fiction: the 1867 
American novel St Elmo by August J. Evans sees a character disgusted by Mill’s support 
for women’s suffrage throw a copy of Considerations on Representative Government into 
the fire, but in that instance the book was at least read by the person doing the burning. 
Reading Mill could also provoke threats of violence. Schreiner’s friend, the peace 
campaigner Norman Angell recalled a much more idyllic experience of reading Mill, 
somewhat akin to Undine’s, lying, aged seventeen, ‘under the trees near his Lincolnshire 
home, reading, once more, John Stuart Mill Essay on Liberty; and eating chocolate 
creams’ (1), but this was followed by a threat from his older brother that ‘one more 
quotation from John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer or Darwin’ would result in ‘a first-class 
hiding’ (4). In African Farm, Bonaparte and Tant’ Sannie’s reaction to Waldo reading Mill 
serves to emphasise Waldo’s powerlessness and vulnerability (which as Lyndall points 
out is not as great as hers). Prior to Waldo reading the chapter on property in Political 
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Economy, Bonaparte has destroyed the sheep-sheering machine which Waldo has spent 
nine months lovingly crafting.29 Having no heed for the pleasure which Waldo has taken 
in his work, Bonaparte also denies Waldo his right to the produce of his labour. But 
their incomprehension of Mill also serves to fortify Waldo’s desire for book-learning 
and philosophising. The Story of an African Farm, like Undine, evokes the contrast in 
Political Economy between the ‘art of getting on’ which is concerned only with the 
accumulation of wealth and the ‘Art of Living’ – which takes into account the 
relationship of education to labour, the different motivations for work, and the fitness of 
different people for different tasks: in short, the cultivation of individuality.  
6.5 ‘World-wide functions in the unfolding of human life on the globe’: Mill as 
National Representative 
 In the final section of this chapter I turn to consider the more generalised 
references to Mill in Schreiner’s work, and how her idea of Mill as a national 
representative – ‘the purest & greatest soul God has yet given the English race’ – 
functions. If Mill was a hero for Waldo, then he was also, in Schreiner’s view, a hero in 
his own romance. In letters to her husband, Schreiner used Mill’s marriage to Harriet as 
a model of the ‘happiest marriages’.30 In 1906 she wrote to Cronwright-Schreiner of ‘the 
wonderful effect of sex love in stimulating & raising the intellectual faculties, as in the 
case of the Brownings pwho both produced nearly all their best & greatest work during 
their intensely happy married life, & Mills case & a great many others’.31 Schreiner’s 
conception of the intellectually enriching nature of ‘sex love’ was part of her ‘overt aim 
to imagine what “progress” might mean in relation to heterosexual love’ (Burdett 87), 
her belief ‘that equal education and access to labor would strengthen the “sexual” 
bonding of men and women’ (Gagnier, Insatiability of Human Wants 85), and her 
‘fundamental conviction that emotion or feeling cannot be kept separate, or expelled 
from, the sphere of intellect and reason (Burdett 90). Pursuing these ideas in Woman 
and Labour, Schreiner observed that: ‘A Mill, a Shelley, a Goethe, a Schiller, a Pericles, 
have not been more noted for vast intellectual powers, than for the depth and intensity 
of their sexual emotions’ (233). As I have noted throughout this thesis, Mill was 
                                                        
29 See Burdett on Waldo’s ‘maternal projects of nine months’ labour’ (39). 
30 OS to S.C. Cronwright-Schreiner, 4 June 1907, NLSA, OSLP transcription, 2. 
31 OS to S.C. Cronwright-Schreiner, 24 November 1906, National English Literary Museum, Grahamstown, 
OSLP transcription, 9–12. 
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characterised by Bain and other male commentators as lacking in sexual feelings. He 
was typically seen as representing the opposite to Goethe in this respect, as ‘Goethe and 
Mill: A Contrast’ (1874), which I discussed in chapter two, demonstrates. And in Caird’s 
engagement with Millian ideas she focuses on Platonic companionship between men 
and women, seeing sexual attraction as weakening rather than strengthening 
individuality. So in making Mill one of her national representatives of an idealised 
heterosexual love Schreiner offered a very different perspective. 
 In ‘The Englishman’, one of the essays collected in her Thoughts on South Africa 
(1923), Schreiner is concerned to establish the characteristics of the individuals who 
make the most contribution to cultural, artistic and social development around the 
world. Her connected interest in this essay is the ‘welding together’ of the populations 
in South Africa: Black, Boer, English, and Asian, and the contribution which English 
people had to make to global development (322). In Schreiner’s view the latter 
influenced the former. Schreiner hoped for an egalitarian or meritocratic society but 
saw things as they were in hierarchical terms: ‘What we consider the attitude of the 
Englishman in South Africa should be to the alien, and especially the African, races 
beneath him, depends mainly on the view we take of his nature and his world-wide 
functions in the unfolding of human life on the globe generally’ (331). Identifying herself 
as English in this instance, Schreiner outlined four groups or viewpoints to explain the 
English nature and function globally. The first was the ‘average Englishman’ who 
carried on his life selfishly without considering his relation to the greater good (331). 
The second was a group that held illogical and vaguely expressed ideas that ‘the whole 
world was made for the Englishman’; the ‘Impossible and repulsive’ conception held by 
this type of person was that English people would come to dominate at the expense of 
‘all the other infinitely complex interesting forms of human life on earth’s vast 
continents’ (332, 333). The third was the view generally held by ‘all non-English nations 
and peoples’ and this was that ‘there is something not merely astonishing but ludicrous 
in the conception that earth’s vast millions, civilized and uncivilized, Asiatic and 
European, black and white, are to be swept away by this trading fragment of the race’ 
(334). The fourth was the one that she subscribed to, which was that, though, in terms 
of art, science, philosophy and religion, the English were ‘far more receivers from the 
common stock than contributors’, the contribution which they had made and could 
continue to make was their love for individual freedom (339).  
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 Schreiner then identifies three ways to love freedom, a tendency which she 
believes to be present in varying degrees in all English people. The first is a selfish love, 
whereby individuals prize freedom ‘as a possession for themselves alone’ (342). The 
second, drawing on On Liberty, involves loving ‘liberty so dearly that we would not 
willingly inflict an injustice or a wrong on another’ (343). The third love of freedom 
involves ‘a burning passion to spread it broadcast over the globe’ (343). Schreiner 
rehearses numerous objections to her idea that English people wish to promote 
personal freedom on a global scale. These include slavery, a ‘stained ... African record’ 
leaving ‘a trail of slime and gore’ and the ‘inhuman and fiendish barbarities of the Indian 
Mutiny (344–346). There is also the problem of the English inability to tell the truth to 
themselves and others; in fact, ‘In the history of the world there was never a people 
whose record of relations with other peoples showed so hideous a record of falsehood 
and self-deception’ (348). Coexisting with Schreiner’s dream that the English, will lead 
the way in creating societies ‘in which every creature from its birth shall stand free and 
untrammelled’ is an awareness that her view of the ‘liberating power’ inherent in 
Englishness begins to sound dangerously like the ‘national egoism and mental 
refraction’ which she criticises in others (357, 365). 
 The idea of national character that Schreiner constructs in ‘The Englishman’ has 
its highest and lowest points. The highest point that she perceives involves ‘the master 
minds which express our race’ (351). When she discusses what she believes to be 
lacking in the English contribution to world-wide learning, the only person she thinks 
can really take a place on the world stage is Darwin, ‘great and beloved as to many of us 
of to-day are the names of J.S. Mill and Spencer’ (336). However, in making the case for 
the global dissemination of individual liberty, Mill took his place alongside a range of 
greater and lesser known international public figures: 
If it is said to us that our idea of the function of the English race is all very 
well, but in reality all that races seek is self-aggrandisement, we reply that 
we are fully aware of this tendency to the most blatant self-
aggrandisement in our people, but we also know other tendencies; and 
Washington, Lincoln, John Brown, Florence Nightingale, Josephine Butler, 
John Stuart Mill, Howe, Livingstone, Moffat, and the multitudes who 
harmonize with and follow them, are not less truly English. In every land 
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where the English race is growing, in Australia, New Zealand, America, 
England and even South Africa, side by side with its less specialized 
elements we have this broad humanitarian element, as surely and 
unfailingly developed in every land, and on this we build our hope. (361) 
As I have shown in this chapter, Mill meant many specific things to Olive Schreiner in 
her own life and the lives of her fictional characters, but he also embodied and 
disseminated ‘this broad humanitarian element’ which offered most hope for progress 
across the world. Schreiner’s Mill was a complex, many-sided figure who made dreams 
of changes big and small possible. 
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Conclusion 
‘What do I care about J.S. Mill!’ moaned he. ‘I only want to lead a quiet life’. (215) 
Jude the Obscure, 1895  
  
It was the reference to Mill in Jude the Obscure that provided me with the starting point 
for this project. I was struck by Hardy’s portrayal of Mill as a potentially disruptive 
presence in late-nineteenth-century domestic life: Sue’s earnest enthusiasm for Mill’s 
theory of liberty, Phillotson’s reluctance to engage with it. The words Hardy gave to 
Phillotson invited questions: What did individual Victorians care about Mill? How did 
they feel about their encounters with his philosophy? How did Millian philosophy have 
to be negotiated in nineteenth-century lives? The words Hardy gave to Sue – Mill’s 
words – led to questions about interactions between philosophy and literature: did 
other novelists have recourse to Mill? How did they represent Millian thought in their 
fiction? The dialogue between Sue and Phillotson also pointed to the interplay between 
interpretations of Mill’s philosophy and perceptions of him as an eminent philosopher. 
Phillotson’s ‘J.S. Mill’ evoked a different set of associations from Sue’s careful reading of 
‘J.S. Mill’s words’, and yet the two things were clearly inextricably linked. 
 In the search for answers to the questions prompted by my reading of Jude the 
Obscure I have tried to construct an account of Mill that is as many-sided as possible (to 
use Goethe’s term, which Mill valued highly1). The sources I have brought together 
reflect diverse engagements with Mill in many respects. They deal with different aspects 
of his life and thought, and they do so in varying depth. Some offer incredibly well 
worked out responses, others are more cursory. Most were produced for public 
consumption by specific audiences, but some formed part of private communications or 
personal reflections. Some were highly conscious of the way Mill’s philosophy was being 
invoked to comment on wider attitudes towards science, culture and gender. Others 
were more concerned with scrutinising the details of Mill’s extraordinary life (a 
tendency encapsulated by an image in the Times of Mill ‘under a glass case, hermetically 
sealed’). The British Quarterly Review’s description of ‘the distinguished admirers or 
honourable opponents of Mill’s philosophical career’ has often seemed like a 
constrained way of describing the passionate adherence or the vehement disavowals 
                                                        
1 See Mill’s Autobiography (129 and 131). 
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expressed. Taken together, these sources reveal the ways in which one of the most 
authoritative men of the nineteenth century was venerated, but also the extent to which 
his voice was vulnerable to mockery or condemnation. 
The many-sidedness of responses to Mill inevitability presents other areas for 
investigation. One of the future directions for Victorian studies that Regenia Gagnier 
identifies in her 2011 article ‘Whither Victorian Studies?’ is ‘global interactive networks’ 
(53). Further work on representations of Mill could engage with two of these: Literature 
Compass’s Global Circulation Project and the Archive of Working-Class Writing, hosted 
by Liverpool John Moores University. In Eminent Authors Georg Brandes claimed that 
Mill ‘was equally true and equally great, whether he addressed his maturely considered 
thought in some renowned work to a circle of readers spread over the whole globe, or 
whether in his own home, without any assumption of superiority, he dropped an 
accidental remark to a chance visitor’ (146). By including the viewpoints of Brandes, 
Conway, Taine and Schreiner, this thesis has considered a few members of that global 
circle of nineteenth-century readers beyond Britain, but clearly there is much scope for 
further research here. In 1865, Cassell’s Illustrated Family Paper noted that Mill’s works 
had been translated into French, German, Italian and Russian, and that his writings 
were ‘highly prized’ in America (88). The Global Circulation Project, headed by Gagnier, 
has considered responses to On Liberty in China, as one example of how liberalism 
‘circulated through cultures in contact since the mid-nineteenth-century (‘Whither 
Victorian Studies?’ 54). A call for papers could invite further international perspectives 
on representations of Mill and responses to his work. 
The British sources I have considered in this thesis have mostly represented 
middle-class perspectives, but two commentators in particular point to alternative 
approaches. First, Moncure Conway, whose lively anecdotal accounts for American 
readers of Harper’s, portrayed working-class conversations about Mill. In addition to his 
story, discussed in the introduction, about hearing a man in the street challenge a 
preacher ‘“See ’ere, pars’n, Jon-stote Mill says as how that ere’s oll bosh!”’ (‘The 
Westminster Canvass’ 736), Conway suggested the extent to which Mill’s lack of 
religious faith was a familiar point of reference on the streets of London, and in 
churches up and down the country: ‘He is pitied in a thousand chapels, and denounced 
in ten thousand, as a man without “saving faith”. I heard a street preacher in 
Marylebone Road, standing in the rain with an umbrella over him, deploring that a “man 
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of sech talons had not hoffered ’is ’eart to God ...”’ (‘John Stuart Mill’ 534). Second, 
George Holyoake, whose pamphlet John Stuart Mill: As Some of the Working Classes Knew 
Him praised Mill’s accessibility to the working classes, in print and in person. The top-
down models of Mill’s influence, proposed by, among others, the Reader and the House 
of Commons doorkeeper William White, are called into question by Conway’s and 
Holyoake’s accounts of direct working-class responses to, and discussions of Mill. The 
Archive of Working-Class Writing, due to launch at the end of 2012, will include 
nineteenth-century autobiography, poetry, prose, fiction, journalism, pamphlets and 
polemics, and could potentially provide further evidence of direct or indirect 
engagements with Mill. 
Research by Janet Browne, Constance Areson Clark and Suzanne Gapps into the 
iconography of Darwin from the nineteenth century through to the twenty-first century 
suggests corresponding ways in which work on Mill and visual culture could be 
developed. Harry Furniss’s early twentieth-century view of Mill, which I discussed in 
chapter three, may not offer the most subtle analysis of Mill’s parliamentary career or 
his philosophical legacy, but it does raise an important point about the significance of 
images to perceptions of Mill. In addition to the scope for further research into 
nineteenth-century images of Mill, it would be interesting to investigate the continuities 
between nineteenth-century uses of Mill’s image and later ones. Figures 1 and 2 are 
examples of twentieth-century images that could prompt further research.  
Figure 1 shows the cover image for the 1969 edition of F.A. Hayek’s John Stuart 
Mill and Harriet Taylor: Their Friendship and Subsequent Marriage (first published in 
1951). Varouxakis and Kelly note that for ‘Hayek and classical liberals inspired by him, 
Mill became a figure of deep suspicion. This is perhaps most curious in the case of Hayek 
who, whilst regarding Mill as a liberal apostate, was also important in encouraging a 
number of scholarly initiatives that contributed to the subsequent late-twentieth-
century reappraisal of Mill’s ideas’ (5). The cover of Hayek’s book used the 1840 cameo 
of Mill, which, as discussed in the introduction, was concerned with celebration of his 
intellect, having been produced at a time when Mill’s eminence was rising and. 
Occupying Mill’s oft-remarked-upon brow in this re-use of the cameo is a depiction of 
Harriet Taylor in bright pink – giving pictorial form to the idea that the balance of Mill’s 
brain was unsettled by his relationship with Harriet. The David Levine caricature in 
Figure 2 is an angular, elongated rendering of Mill’s profile that recalls not only the  
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Fig. 1. Dust jacket for 1969 edition of F.A. 
Hayek’s John Stuart Mill and Harriet 
Taylor (first published 1951). 
 
Fig. 2. Caricature of Mill by David Levine. New York Review of 
Books. 31 October 1974. 
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Vanity Fair caricature, but also Hardy’s description of his head ‘sloped back like a 
stretching upland’ (‘A Glimpse of John Stuart Mill’). It puts the emphasis firmly back on 
Mill’s head as a symbol of his intellect, unaffected by Harriet. The Levine caricature 
accompanied a review of Gertrude Himmelfarb’s On Liberty and Liberalism: The Case of 
John Stuart Mill in the New York Review of Books in 1974, which linked Himmelfarb’s 
position to Hayek’s. In ‘Did Mill Go Too Far?’ Ronald Dworkin was unconvinced by 
Himmelfarb’s hypothesis that the explanation for On Liberty was that Harriet Taylor 
‘took over Mill’s mind’ (1). Thus these images are bound up with the issue of Mill’s 
collaboration with Harriet, which has been of interest to so many commentators, and 
with the twentieth-century reappraisal of Mill’s oeuvre.  
Mill may not have had the sway that Darwin had in twentieth-century cultural 
life and continues to have today, but he is still an important presence. Suzanne Gapps, 
with reference to Geoffrey Cubitt’s introduction to Heroic Reputations and Exemplary 
Lives (2000), argues that Darwin is a ‘cultural hero’ and as such remains the object of 
‘collective emotional investment’ (341–2). Can the same be said of Mill? Crossovers 
between specialist and general interest in Millian philosophy are suggested by the Mill 
News Letter, which combined Millian scholarship with elements of the fanzine. 
Produced biannually from 1965 to 1988, by the editorial team responsible for the 
Collected Works, each issue began with an item of ‘Milliana’: a snippet from a Victorian 
text or a reference in twentieth-century popular culture, from detective novels to Monty 
Python’s ‘Philosopher’s Song’. Another research question that might be productively 
asked is what cultural values are associated with references to Mill in popular culture?  
Since beginning this project I have received weekly Google alerts which list new 
references to Mill on the internet. These alerts show that Mill features regularly in 
personal blogs and journalism, on all of the topics for which Varouxakis and Kelly argue 
he has continued relevance: liberty, individuality, diversity, gender equality, freedom of 
thought and speech, forms of democracy and political representation. Viewing Victorian 
cultural life through a Millian prism has foregrounded these enduring concerns with 
voice and voicelessness. Thomas Hardy, Mona Caird and Olive Schreiner shared a keen 
sense of how reading Mill could form part of self-education, and how it related to 
imagination and the formation of intellectual independence. Their fiction is deeply 
engaged with Mill’s warnings about conformism and conventional language. In the 
course of considering the arguments for and against Mill, I have found myself most 
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drawn towards the unconventional depictions, especially the vivid, heartfelt, and 
sympathetic views offered by Florence Nightingale and Olive Schreiner. However, these 
gained much of their force by being read alongside equally vivid and heartfelt depictions 
which were wholly unsympathetic to Mill and his philosophic endeavours. Mill said in 
On Liberty that ‘the only way in which a human being can make some approach to 
knowing the whole of a subject, is by hearing what can be said about it by persons of 
every variety of opinion, and studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every 
character of mind’ (25). This has been the most effective way of gaining some sense of 
what constituted ‘the John-Millennium’. 
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Appendix: Chronology of Key Events, Publications and Memorials 
This chronology of Mill’s life and works combines details from the brief chronologies 
given in: the Broadview edition of Three Essays on Religion, edited by Louis J. Matz, the 
OUP edition of On Liberty and Other Essays, edited by John Gray, and Lives of Victorian 
Political Figures: Part 4, edited by David Martin. It also draws on Kinzer, Robson and 
Robson’s A Moralist in and Out of Parliament and Mill’s Autobiography, and includes 
dates of images and other memorials discussed in this thesis. 
1806 Born on 20 May in London, eldest child of Harriet and James Mill. 
1809–20 Educated at home by his father, James Mill. Begins to learn Greek, so he 
later reports, at three years old and Latin at eight. Helps to teach some of 
his eight younger siblings (five sisters and three brothers). Spends time in 
the company of his father’s friends, especially Jeremy Bentham. 
1820–1 Year-long visit to France, staying with the brother of Jeremy Bentham, Sir 
Samuel Bentham, and his family. 
1822 Founds a discussion group called the Utilitarian Society which continues 
until 1826. 
1823 Begins work for the East India Company as a junior clerk in the same 
department as James Mill. Arrested for distributing handbills about 
contraception and imprisoned for one night.  
1825 Helps to found the London Debating Society. 
1826–7 Suffers a mental crisis (as he later calls it in his Autobiography). 
1830 Begins friendship with Harriet Taylor. 
1835 Founds and edits the London Review, later to become the London and 
Westminster Review. 
1836 James Mill dies. 
1840 Stays with the Fox family in Cornwall. The cameo of Mill is thought to date 
from this time. Mill’s brother, Henry, dies in Cornwall.  
1843 System of Logic published. 
1848 Principles of Political Economy published. 
1851 Marries Harriet Taylor. 
1858 Retires from the East India Company after having risen to the position of 
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Chief Examiner of Indian Correspondence. Harriet Taylor Mill dies on 3 
November in Avignon and is buried there. 
1859 On Liberty published. Dissertations and Discussions – a collection of Mill’s 
essays previously published in the periodical press – is also published. 
1861 Utilitarianism published in Fraser’s Magazine. Considerations on 
Representative Government published. 
1865 Parliamentary candidature announced on 23 March. Elected MP for 
Westminster on 12 July. Auguste Comte and Positivism and An Examination 
of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy published. Mill is photographed by 
John Watkins. From 1865–68 many caricatures of Mill appear in the 
periodical press. 
1866–8 Heads the Jamaica Committee, formed to call for the prosecution of 
Governor Eyre, who was responsible for the brutal suppression of a 
rebellion in Jamaica in October 1865. 
1867 Delivers Inaugural Address to the University of St. Andrews on 1 February. 
On 20 May, proposes that the word ‘man’ be replaced by the word ‘person’ 
in the clauses of the Reform Bill which dealt with enfranchisement. The 
amendment is defeated, but attracts 73 votes.  
1868 Loses seat in Parliament in November’s General Election. 
1869 The Subjection of Women published. 
1873 Sits for portrait by George Frederic Watts. Caricature by Sir Leslie Ward 
appears in Vanity Fair on 29 March. Mill dies on 6 May, aged 66, in 
Avignon, and is buried there, next to Harriet. The Mill Memorial 
Committee is formed. The Autobiography is published on 17 October. 
1874 Three Essays on Religion published. 
1878 Thomas Woolner statue raised on the Thames Embankment. 
1879 Chapters on Socialism published. 
1882 Extracts from Caroline Fox’s journals, Memories of Old Friends, published. 
Alexander Bain’s John Stuart Mill – A Criticism: With Personal Recollections 
published. 
1889 W.L. Courtney’s Life of John Stuart Mill published. 
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